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Foreword 
The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs has established interdisciplinary research on 
policy problems as the core of its educational program. A major element of this program is the 
nine-month policy research project, in the course of which one or more faculty members direct 
the research of ten to twenty graduate students of diverse disciplines and academic backgrounds 
on a policy issue of concern to a government or nonprofit agency. This “client orientation” 
brings the students face to face with administrators, legislators, and other officials active in the 
policy process and demonstrates that research in a policy environment demands special 
knowledge and skill sets. It exposes students to challenges they will face in relating academic 
research, and complex data, to those responsible for the development and implementation of 
policy and how to overcome those challenges 
The curriculum of the LBJ School is intended not only to develop effective public servants, but 
also to produce research that will enlighten and inform those already engaged in the policy 
process. The project that resulted in this report has helped to accomplish the first task; it is our 
hope that the report itself will contribute to the second. 
Finally, it should be noted that neither the LBJ School nor The University of Texas at Austin 
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by Jurgen Schmandt and Aysegül Kibaroğlu 
Policy Research Project on Sustainability of Euphrates-Tigris and Rio 
Grande/Bravo 
This publication arose from a Policy Research Project on the sustainability of river systems. Our 
team of faculty members and graduate students studied water management issues in two river 
systems—Euphrates-Tigris (ET) and Rio Grande/Bravo-Conchos (RG). (The Rio Grande is 
called the Río Bravo in Mexico, hence we often use both names). See Figures I.1 and I.2 for maps 
of these two river systems. Occasionally we also refer to the Colorado River because it is 
managed together with the Rio Grande/Bravo by the same international agency, the International 
Border and Water Commission (IBWC). These rivers are part of a ten-river project called 
Sustainability of Engineered Rivers in Arid Lands (SERIDAS), described in the next section. 
The ET/RG project took nine months to complete, from September 2015 to May 2016. It was 
directed by professors Aysegül Kibaroğlu, MEF University, Istanbul (International Relations), 
and Visiting Professor at the LBJ School; and Jurgen Schmandt, of the LBJ School and the 
Houston Advanced Research Center, or HARC (Water Policy and Sustainability Science). The team 
received advice on matters pertaining to hydrology and meteorology from Dr. George Ward, 
Center for Research in Water Resources at The University of Texas. Several experts on specific 
aspects of our research agenda visited with the team. This for-credit graduate course was 
organized as a policy research project that serves as an instrument for both learning and public 
service. The project team met for three hours each week, when necessary using Skype to connect 
with distant team members. Students organized their work in small groups or prepared individual 
case studies. The full team reviewed all contributions and helped draft the conclusion. 
Both the ET and RG river systems are drought-prone and likely to face increased water scarcity as 
a result of climate change and reservoir sedimentation. Water demand will increase due to 
population growth in river stretches close to areas with highly productive irrigated agriculture. 
We sought to answer these questions: 
1) How do water stakeholders prepare for future water scarcity? 
2) How sustainable is water supply and demand in the river basins? 
We placed these questions in the context of sustainability science: linking local to global 
conditions, studying issues using an interdisciplinary framework, integrating the experience of 
stakeholders, and providing sound scientific guidance to decision-makers for implementing step-
by-step improvements. These principles were developed by the National Academy of Sciences, 
and have greatly changed the way we study the future sustainability of natural resources.1 
                                                 
1 National Research Council, Our Common Journey: A Transition toward Sustainability (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy Press, 1999). 
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Figure I.1. 
Euphrates and Tigris Rivers and Reservoirs 
      Source: HARC, compiled from GRanD Database, NID, GRDC, USGS, NASA, and ESRI data. 
The common elements of the two river systems framed much of our research agenda: 1) reliable 
water supply (at least until recently) from snowpack in the mountainous source regions, 2) 
fertile downstream land from millennia of annual sediment accumulation during spring melts, 
3) massively increased agricultural production as a result of modern large-scale river 
engineering (reservoirs and distribution networks), and 4) population growth in riparian cities next 
to irrigated lands. A major part of our work focused on studying the impacts of large reservoirs, 
both in the storage lakes and downstream. For each reservoir we asked how year-round water 
availability increased food production and enhanced the economic well-being of farmers and 
cities. We then turned to challenges that need to be faced: climate change/variation, reservoir 




Colorado and Rio Grande/Bravo Basins and Reservoirs 
     Source: HARC, compiled from GRanD Database, NID, GRDC, USGS, NASA, and ESRI data. 
We took care to highlight differences between the river systems. In the case of the Euphrates- 
Tigris we asked, for example, how the emergence of a non-state actor—ISIS—and its control of 
strategic water infrastructure compels water stakeholders to search for new mechanisms for reliable 
water management. In the case of the Rio Grande we worked with water stakeholders in the Paso 
del Norte stretch of the river, covering parts of New Mexico, Texas, and Chihuahua. We 
conducted a survey of current water management arrangements and plans for coping with 
increased water scarcity in the future. We also reviewed more than 300 agreements between 
Mexico and the United States that were crafted in the decades following signing of the 1944 water 
treaty. These “minutes” address changing conditions in the Colorado and Rio Grande basins and 
we wanted to know if the minute process could be used to cope with increasing water scarcity. 
 xvii 
Some important parts of our work took place outside the classroom. We organized two 
workshops, one on each of our river systems. The ET workshop was held at Ohio State 
University on April 21-22, 2016, and the RG workshop convened in El Paso, Texas, on May 27, 
2016 (more information on these events can be found in Part IV of this report). 
Overview of the SERIDAS Project 
This section provides background information on the Sustainability of Engineered Rivers in Arid 
Lands project (SERIDAS) to which our PRP contributed. 
Goals 
Engineered rivers are the lifeblood of irrigated agriculture, produce electricity, and supply water 
for industry and cities in the river basins. By now most large rivers in the world have been 
engineered—equipped with multiple dams, bypass canals, and distribution channels. River 
engineering brings large benefits to farmers and cities. It also creates risks. 
Members of the SERIDAS network study ten rivers, namely Colorado (U.S./Mexico), Euphrates-
Tigris (Middle East), Júcar (Spain), Limarí (Chile), Murray-Darling (Australia), Nile (North 
Africa), Rio Grande (U.S./Mexico), São Francisco (Brazil), and Yellow (China) in order to find 
out how the rivers will do in 2040 and 2060 (see Figures I.3 and I.4). All share important 
characteristics: upstream mountains supply reliable stream flow from glaciers, snowpack, or 
rainfall. Large-scale water engineering has created important agricultural systems that support 
the economic well-being of basin populations and contribute to global food security. While 
physical conditions are similar, political, social, and economic features differ widely, as do 
arrangements for water governance. 
Specifically, the SERIDAS projects asks how natural and social conditions in the ten river 
systems listed above will change by 2040 and 2060. By how much will future water scarcity 
damage basin economies, populations, and natural conditions? Or can water managers and users 
take steps to make the rivers and basins more sustainable? 
The project applies the principles of sustainability science to the study of agriculture-intensive 
dryland river basins: linking global to local conditions, using integrative/interdisciplinary 
frameworks and working with stakeholders. It looks at both physical and social drivers of 
change—climate change/variation, reservoir sedimentation, surface-to-groundwater connection, 
and environmental flow on nature’s side; and population and land use changes, as well as options 
for more efficient water use and better governance, on the social side. 
History 
Under EPA grant R824799, the Houston Advanced Research Center convened a Mexican-U.S. 
team for an interdisciplinary study of water supply and demand in the Lower Rio Grande, the 
1,000-kilometer-long river segment on the U.S.-Mexico border that is dependent on Amistad and 
Falcón reservoirs. The research team spent several years on the project and found that the river 
would be dramatically changed by 2030. Most importantly, there would be one-third less river 
water: 
 xviii 
 Each decade the Rio Grande loses 5 percent of reservoir storage to sediment buildup 
behind reservoir dams;  The basin population will double by 2030, requiring a larger share of river water; and  Environmental flow, already low, will decline even more. 
Figure I.3. 
The SERIDAS Rivers 
     Source: HARC, “Sustainability of Engineered Rivers in Arid Lands,” http://www.harc.edu/work/SERIDAS. 
There was one good piece of news: researchers found that farmers might be able to maintain the 
value of current harvests while using less water—provided they adopted more efficient irrigation 
methods and shifted to less water-demanding crops. And both agriculture and cities could make 
much progress with water conservation and repair of leaking distribution systems.2 
The Rio Grande/Bravo results brought up more questions: Were they representative of rivers 
elsewhere? What are the prospects for engineered rivers in arid lands worldwide? How will the 
rivers do under the impacts of climate change, reservoir sedimentation, and population growth? 
The project resulted in the creation of SERIDAS to find answers. 
Work Done, Work Underway 
The project team completed Phase I of the project—conducting the above-mentioned test study 
(Lower Rio Grande), developing study methodology, recruiting the study team, holding two 
international workshops (Austin, Texas, in 2014, and Hannover, Germany, in 2015), and 
                                                 
2 For a detailed summary of the study results, see J. Schmandt, “Bi-national water issues in the Rio Grande/Rio 
Bravo,” Water Policy 4 (2002): 137-155. The full report is available at 
http://mitchell.harc.edu/archive/RioGrandeBravo/Report. An abstract is available on the EPA website at 
https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncer_abstracts/index.cfm/fuseaction/display.abstractDetail/abstract/857/report/F. 
 xix 
assessing past and current river conditions. The project team includes an expert for each of the 
rivers as well as specialists for key change factors. Phase II, currently underway, projects 2040 
and 2060 conditions in the basins, recommends ways for using water more efficiently, and 
analyzes the impact of changed river conditions on global and regional water, food, and energy 
security. 
Figure I.4. 
SERIDAS River Characteristics 
        Source: HARC, compiled from data provided by the SERIDAS team. 
Members of the SERIDAS Network 
The SERIDAS project assembled a team of river experts to project water supply and demand for 
a group of heavily engineered rivers worldwide. A second group of team members was invited to 
advise the river experts on how to deal with future risks. 
SERIDAS River Experts 
 José Albiac, Researcher, CITA, Government of Aragon, Agricultural Economics (Júcar 
basin)  Michael Cohen, Senior Research Associate, Pacific Institute (Colorado basin)  Daniel Connell, Research Fellow, Environment and Development Program, Crawford 
School of Public Policy, Australian National University (Murray-Darling basin)  Mohamed Taher Kahil, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg 
(Júcar basin)  Aysegül Kibaroğlu, Department of Political Science and International Relations, MEF 
University, Istanbul (Euphrates-Tigris basin) 
 xx 
 Antonio Magalhães, Center for Strategic Studies, Brasilia, Economics (São Francisco 
basin)  Alexandra Nauditt, Cologne University of Applied Science, Earth sciences (Limarí basin)  David Pietz, University of Arizona, History (Yellow basin)  Lars Ribbe, Cologne University of Applied Science, Hydro Informatics (Nile basin)  Jurgen Schmandt, HARC and UT Austin (Rio Grande basin)  George Ward, UT Austin (Rio Grande basin) 
SERIDAS Issue Advisers 
 Peter Gleick, Environmental Scientist, Co-founder of the Pacific Institute, energy and 
resources, food security  Stephanie Glenn, Program Director, Hydrology and Watersheds, HARC, environmental 
science and engineering, groundwater connection  Antonio Magalhães, Center for Strategic Studies, Brasilia, economics and poverty, 
sustainability  Tony McLeod, Murray-Darling River Authority, water planning, river management  Ari M. Michelsen, Resident Director, TAMU, AgriLife Research and Extension Center, 
agricultural economics  Steve Murdock, Allyn R. and Gladys M. Cline Professor of Sociology, Rice University, 
sociology, demography  Gerald North, University Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric Sciences and 
Oceanography, TAMU, climatology, climate change  Lars Ribbe, Cologne University of Applied Science, hydro informatics, information tools 














PART I. RESERVOIR IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 
 2 
Chapter 1. Methodology 
by Haytham Oueidat 
Overview 
We divided the Euphrates-Tigris and Rio Grande/Bravo in river segments reaching from one 
reservoir to the next one. Each reservoir creates both a new hydrological sub-basin and a socio-
economic impact region. The Reservoir Impact Assessment (RIA) approach allows us to find 
answers to multiple questions: What is the purpose of the reservoir—flood control, drought 
management, agricultural and municipal water supply, industry? What has been the impact on 
irrigated agriculture and city growth? How is the storage lake used? When is water released from 
the dam? How much? How is the water divided between users? How is the reservoir managed 
and maintained? In planning ahead, is there consideration of storage volume loss due to 
sedimentation? Or of the impact of climate change? What is the environmental impact? 
RIAs are useful stepping stones for the assessment of conditions and prospects in the entire river 
basin. They allow for a close look at the benefits as well as problems in the hydrological and 
socio-economic sub-basin created by the reservoir and its hydrological and socio-economic 
region. We recommend to the members of the SERIDAS river network to include reservoir 
impact assessments in their studies. 
The following was the suggested outline for the RIAs in this report. This was intended as general 
guidance since students were free to structure their RIAs according to data availability and 
personal preferences. 
1. The dam 
a. History, planning, and financing 
b. Engineering details 
c. Rationale for location 
d. Goals and changes over time 
e. Maintenance 
f. Problems 
2. The reservoir (lake, storage area, upstream of dam) 
a. Capacity (maximum volume) 
b. Size of allocation pools (irrigation, municipal, energy, environmental flow) 
c. Area covered 
d. Uses (recreation, fishing, cities, etc.) 
e. Drought incidence (frequency, minimal volume ever recorded) 
f. Storage loss due to sedimentation 
g. Description of area before the dam was built (people, cities, villages, etc.) and number 
of people displaced 
3. The impact area (drainage area, sub-basin watershed downstream of dam) 
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a. Discharge from dam (average, maximum, minimum) 
b. Size (river length plus riparian land receiving river water) 
c. Distribution channels/canals/pipe lines (how does water reach irrigated land?) 
d. Hydropower 
e. Water use 
f. Irrigation (normal and drought years) 
i. Municipal water supply (total and water use per capita over time) 
ii. Industry 
iii. Ecology, in-stream flow 
iv. Water left for discharge to next reservoir or the sea 
g. Farming (crops, irrigation technologies, value of harvests, river water supplemented 
    by ground water), cost of water 
h. Irrigation districts 
i. Population growth/decline 
4. Governance 
a. Agency(ies) 
b. Compacts, treaties, agreements 
c. Rules for coping with drought/flooding 
d. Flexibility/success in coping with new conditions 
e. Planning for the future 
f. Whether impact of climate change is considered and how 
Reasoning for Reservoir Impact Assessments 
The unidimensional treatment of river streams complicates the evaluation of their influence on 
the environments through which they traverse. A great deal of insight would be inadvertently 
excluded, for instance, by contemplating the two basins included in this study with a purely 
hydrological “lens,” or similarly a purely retrospective or political one would unveil the 
underlying motives of management up to now but would not highlight the correctness and 
fairness of water-related decisions or lack thereof to the different constituents of the basin. 
A comparative analysis on that large a scale suggests that while similarities and contrasts will be 
derived from a macroscopic examination of the two rivers, this approach is likely to be 
superficial for failing to explore in detail the notable peculiarities of the system. Consequently, a 
multilevel methodology had to be adopted to facilitate the comparison of the two basins and to 
provide a set of common elements to investigate in each. This procedure, the RIA, involved a 
delicate scanning by geographic apportioning of the entire network in regions between one dam 
and another. 
The following RIA focal points provide a working template and orient the individual reports that 
follow. 
Geography 
We divided the river into segments and joints to represent stream channels and reservoirs. Each 
analysis area was deliberately demarcated by two dams of the same series to define the nature of 
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the relationship between the dam locations and various aspects of that node-to-node interface. 
Arguably occasional buffers upstream of the reservoir could also be included to slightly expand 
the study area—as reservoirs fill up they form widely stretched inundation zones that change in 
function with noticeable water level variations. 
History 
Every dam is an edifice purposely built in response to specific objectives of water planning and 
management, and while all were presumably conceived within different contexts and visions, 
some recursive goals and hurdles could be identified in seemingly dissimilar political 
environments from surveying the construction and maintenance processes as they occur in the 
life of the reservoir. 
Hydrology and Socioeconomic Evaluation 
Regions’ social and economic characteristics are outlined along with a description of the 
hydrology and infrastructure in place. The hydrologic features should include data and text on 
irrigated lands, water supply, flood control, and/or energy production traced over 10- to 20-year 
intervals until the latest available information was published. The socioeconomic attributes 
comprise population and water demand data over the same timeline, and literature reviews on the 
region’s economy, irrigated agriculture, and signs of urbanization. 
Transboundary Governance 
Every region is rich in interesting events that shaped its fate in history. A review of local 
governing bodies, stakeholder jurisdictions, and notable agreements and treaties could determine 
how or if the observed difficulties were resolved. 
Problems Confronted 
Any hydrological system is inherently faced with challenges internal and external to it. The 
control for sediment transport, salinity, flooding, droughts, and ecological damage cannot digress 
from accounting for growing population needs. This section should lead to observations on 
strategies devised to handle the effects of water scarcity. 
The information will be reported in both metric and imperial units depending on the adopted 
custom in the corresponding literature for each basin. It is also important to note the impediments 
encountered while performing RIAs such as the absence of data on current conditions, which 
could in itself constitute an argument on the limitations of this methodology. Nonetheless, using 
RIAs to gather evidence for the characterization of international rivers could prove to be a robust 
instrument for its ability to expose and overlay in a single lot a range of common aspects and 
issues that would otherwise be addressed separately. 
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Chapter 2. Keban Dam 
by Melissa Stelter 
History, Planning, and Financing 
The Keban Dam is located in Elazig province in Eastern Turkey. The region is mountainous and 
is bordered by the Hazar, Maden, Ak, and Karaboga Mountains. The dam is placed below the 
point where the Munzur, Peri, Murat, and Karasu rivers form the Euphrates river.3 (See Figures 
2.1 and 2.2 for maps.) 
The construction of the Keban dam began in 1964 under the administration of the Euphrates 
Planning Authority, which was established in 1961. The goal of Keban Dam was to provide 
electricity and to promote urbanization and industrialization. Funding for the dam was provided 
by the Marshall Plan, France, Germany, Italy, and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID). Funding from the World Bank was withheld until Turkey negotiated 
flows with Syria.4 However, Turkey was able to sign an agreement with USAID guaranteeing a 
flow of 350 cubic meters per second and this agreement was confirmed by Syria and Iraq.5 
Construction of the rockfill and concrete gravity dam was finished in 1974, after 10 years of 
construction; it was the first project of its size and the first project to result in displacement of 
people in Turkey.6 
The Reservoir 
The construction process was complicated due to the geological foundation of the region. The 
basement of the dam was karstic marble, meaning that the foundation contained caves. The 
accessible caves were filled with cement and the inaccessible caves were filled with grouting. 
However, it was still a possibility for leaking to occur on the left side of the dam. When the 
reservoir was filled to capacity, a whirlpool formed as water entered two previously 
undiscovered cavities, and a leak was also discovered at Keban Creek. The reservoir levels were 
reduced while repairs were completed. A concrete wall was constructed around the sinkhole and 
the cavities were filled. There is still a leak at Keban Creek but it is reduced and maintains a low 
and constant flow rate.7 
 
                                                 
3 Kenan Alpaslan, Ahmet Sesli, Ridvan Tepe, and Mehmet Ali T. Koçer, “Vertical and Seasonal Changes of Water 
Quality in Keban Dam Reservoir,” Journal of Fisheries Science, 6(2) (2012): 252-262. 
4 Kerem Oktem, “When Dams Are Built on Shaky Grounds: Policy Choice and Social Performance of Hydro- 
Project Based Development in Turkey” (Dämme auf unsicherem Grund. Politische Strategien und soziale 
Auswirkungen von Wasserprojekten in der Südost-Türkei), Erdkunde 3 (2002): 310-325. 
5 Ayşegül Kibaroğlu, Building A Regime for the Waters of the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers Basin (The Hague: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2002). 
6 Oktem, “When Dams Are Built on Shaky Grounds.” 
7 Aziz Ertunç, “The Geological Problems of the Large Dams Constructed On the Euphrates River (Turkey),” 
Engineering Geology 51(3) (1999): 167-182. 
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Figure 2.1. 
Location of the Keban Dam 
     Source: Aziz Ertunç, “The Geological Problems of the Large Dams Constructed On the Euphrates River 
(Turkey),” Engineering Geology 51(3) (1999): 167-182. 
Figure 2.2. 
Tributaries Leading to Keban Dam  
      Source: Aziz Ertunç, “The Geological Problems of the Large Dams Constructed On the Euphrates River 
(Turkey),” Engineering Geology 51(3) (1999): 167-182. 
 7 
The Impact Area 
This was the first project in Turkey that made it necessary to relocate people since the dam 
would flood certain lands, and the relocation process was inefficient and inequitable. The people 
who benefitted from the project were the owners of large tracts of land who received a payment 
and then moved to Western Turkey. The landless peasants could not benefit from this same type 
of compensation and, upon relocating to urban centers, struggled to find non-farm employment. 
An estimated 30,000 to 40,000 people were relocated as a result of this project. The provincial 
capital of Elazig doubled in population, which resulted in a housing shortage and poor living 
conditions.8 
After completion, the dam began producing an estimated 6,000 gigawatt hours of energy each 
year. The dam has a crest elevation of 848 meters and a crest length of 1,097 meters. The height 
from the foundation is 207 meters and the height from the river bed is 163 meters. Maximum 
water surface elevation is 846.67 meters and the average water surface elevation is 845 meters. 
At normal surface-level elevation, the storage lake has a volume of 30,600 cubic meters. The 
completion of this dam changed the downstream flows. At Jarablus, Syria, the average flow rate 
from 1938 to 1973 was 30 billion cubic meters.9 This flow rate average represents the flows up 
to the year before the completion of Keban dam, the first dam on this river. In the period after the 
construction of the Keban dam, the flows reduced to 24.9 billion cubic meters from 1974 to 
1987. While the flow rates of the Euphrates changed after the construction of the dam, this water 
was not used for irrigation or municipal water consumption, it was solely for electricity. As a 
result, this dam’s main effect on the region was displacing a portion of the residents in Elazig 
province. 
There are also some concerns about downstream water quality due to water pollution. Sewage is 
discharged into the Keban Dam reservoir, leading to an increase in heavy metals in the water. An 
estimated 0.346 kilograms per square kilometer of chromium and lead are added to the water 
each year, along with 2.17 kilograms of cadmium and 1.08 kilograms of nickel. This not only 
degrades the quality of water that will be used downstream for irrigation purposes, but the fish, 
especially carp, consume these heavy metals and could then enter the food system if consumed.10 
In addition to environmental pollution, the dam led to siltation. Based on 2006 estimates by the 
General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works of Turkey, 14.7 percent of the Keban Dam volume 
was lost since closing. 
 
                                                 
8 Oktem, “When Dams Are Built on Shaky Grounds.” 
9 Ercan Ayboga, “Report About the Impacts of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and the Ilisu Dam on the 
Downstream Countries Iraq and Syria” (Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive, 2009). 
10 Yakup Cuci, Halil Hasar, Mehmet Yaman, and U. Ipek, “Pollution in Keban Dam Lake: Trace Metals from 
Classical Activated Sludge System” Bulletin of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology 67(6) (Dec. 
2001):906-912. 
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Chapter 3. Atatürk Dam 
by Rachel Weinheimer 
History of the Dam 
Atatürk Dam was not Turkey’s first major dam construction project; it was preceded by the 
Keban Dam (started in 1966 and in operation in 1974) and the Karakaya Dam (started in 1976 
and in operation in 1987). It is, however, the main feature of Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia 
Project (GAP) and the sixth-largest dam in the world, with a volume of 48.7 billion cubic meters 
and standing at 169 meters high (see Figure 3.1). The dam was funded by the Turkish 
government and constructed by Turkey’s State Hydraulic Works (known by the Turkish acronym 
DSI), spanning two provinces in Turkey’s southeast, Adıyaman and Şanlıurfa. When fully 
realized, the total irrigated area will be approximately one million hectares.11 
Construction began in 1983 and was completed in 1990. A tunnel system was constructed in 
1997 and provides water through a system of irrigation networks and canal systems. In addition 
to irrigation, Atatürk Dam is an important source of energy in Turkey. The dam began producing 
energy in 1992 and produces 7.8 billion kilowatt hours per year, valued at US$468 million. The 
dam is maintained by DSI. 
One of the major issues currently faced by the dam is competing objectives driving development 
in the GAP region. Though the Atatürk Dam was planned and constructed to provide both 
hydroelectric power and newly irrigated land, hydro-climatic conditions have constrained the 
dam’s ability to operate at full capacity.12 Turkey’s southeast is not receiving enough rainfall for 
Atatürk Dam to function as planned, which forces the government to prioritize the dam’s 
objectives in the region. Additionally, the dam’s initial objectives of providing power and 
irrigating land have expanded to include improvement projects intended to transform the social 
and economic landscape of the Southeastern Anatolia region.13 Some of these projects include 
literacy centers, health education, family planning education, and other initiatives meant to help 
close the gap in gender disparity in the region. 
The Reservoir 
The storage capacity of the Atatürk reservoir is 48.7 billion cubic meters, making it the 20th-
largest reservoir in the world. While in its planning stages, the Atatürk reservoir was intended to 
supply irrigation water to 882,380 hectares of agricultural land, which corresponded to about 54 
percent of the total GAP irrigation area. The irrigation system encompassed six irrigation 
                                                 
11 Ibrahim Yüksel, “South-Eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) Factor and Energy Management in Turkey,” Energy 
Reports 1 (2015): 151-155. 
12 Anna Brismar, “The Ataturk Dam Project in South-East Turkey: Changes in Objectives and Planning Over Time,” 
Natural Resources Forum 26(2) (2002): 101-112. 
13 Leila M. Harris, “Water and Conflict Geographies of the Southeastern Anatolia Project,” Society & Natural 
Resources 15(8) (2002): 743-759. 
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schemes: the Siverek-Hilvan scheme (160,105 hectares), the Bozova pumped scheme (69,702 
hectares), the Suruc-Baziki scheme (146,500 hectares), the Mardin-Ceylanpinar scheme 
(334,939 hectares), and the Urfa-Harran scheme (141,535 hectares). The last two were regarded 
as the most important.14 
The GAP region has been under a severe drought since 1998 with conditions expected to worsen. 
These conditions have significantly constrained the potential of the dam project to provide a 
steady supply of electricity. For continuous production, the reservoir must maintain a minimum 
operational water level of 525 meters. In October 2000, the water level dropped to only 526.59 
meters, and in spring 2001 it still hovered very close to the minimum.15 
Figure 3.1. 
Map of Turkey with Location of Atatürk Dam and Reservoir 
    Source: Google, “Google Maps,” accessed April 2016, https://www.google.com/maps. 
Resettlement of Reservoir Residents 
The construction of the Atatürk Dam and subsequent inundation of the reservoir area displaced 
approximately 40,000 people16 from dozens of villages in Adıyaman and Şanlıurfa.17 The 
residents were given the choice of monetary compensation or a land allotment; over 95 percent 
                                                 
14 Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry State Planning Organization, The Southeastern Anatolia Project Master Plan 
Study, Final Master Plan Report, vol. 2, 2nd ed., June 1990. 
15 Brismar, “The Ataturk Dam Project in South-East Turkey.” 
16 Jennifer Keiser, Marcia Caldas De Castro, Michael F. Maltese, Robert Bos, Marcel Tanner, Burton H. Singer, and 
Jürg Utzinger, “Effect of Irrigation and Large Dams on the Burden of Malaria on a Global and Regional Scale,” 
American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 72(4) (2005): 392-406,  http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_ 
health/resources/ajtmhmalaria.pdf.  
17 John F. Kolars and William A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991). 
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chose monetary compensation. Figure 3.2 shows a 1987 map of the villages and cities that were 
flooded when the Atatürk Dam was built. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show maps of the impact areas. 
Figure 3.2. 










   Source: Turkish State Hydraulics Works (DSI), Archived map (1987), provided to author  by DSI. 











          Source: Turkish State Hydraulics Works, “DSI,” accessed January 2016, http://barajlar.dsi.gov.tr/. 
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Figure 3.4. 
Euphrates River and Surrounding Regions Before Construction of Atatürk Dam in 1984 
   Source: O. Ozcan, B. Bookhagen, and N. Musaoglu, “Impact of the Atatürk Dam Lake on Agro-Meteorological 
Aspects of the Southeastern Anatolia Region Using Remote Sensing and GIS Analysis,” International 
Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences, XXXIX-B8 (2012): 
305-310. 
The Harran Plain is located in Şanlıurfa and represents approximately half of the irrigated area 
(141,855 hectares) created by the Atatürk Dam. In 1994, water reached the Harran Plain via the 
Şanlıurfa tunnels. As shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6, irrigated areas increased 289 percent from 
1993 to 2002.18 In 2002, cotton accounted for over 85 percent of all crops grown on the plain, 
while cereals, maize, and vegetables accounted for the remainder. A canal system is also being 
built in order to provide irrigation to the Siverek-Hilvan plains, which will allow an additional 
64,500 hectares of land to be irrigated.19 
Irrigation Management and Organization in the Harran Plain 
A case study conducted in 2009-2011 found that in the course of two decades, irrigation 
management and practice had fundamentally changed in Turkey.20 The creation of the Atatürk 
Dam changed Harran Plains irrigation from small-scale (using groundwater) to large-scale (using 
surface water). In addition to this shift, DSI established irrigation associations, which work in a 
semi-autonomous fashion and are comprised of local authorities and farmer representatives who 
distribute water to farmers, operate and maintain canals, and collect fees. The case study showed 
that these associations voice similar concerns: farmers applying inappropriate irrigation practices 
and not adopting water-saving irrigation methods, and irrigation associations not using irrigation 
                                                 
18 Mutlu Ozdogan, Curtis E. Woodcock, Guido D. Salvucci, and Hüseyin Demir, “Changes in Summer Irrigated 
Crop Area and Water use in Southeastern Turkey from 1993 to 2002: Implications for Current and Future Water 
Resources,” Water Resources Management 20(3) (2006): 467-488. 
19 John F. Kolars and William A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991). 
20 Gül Özerol, “Institutions of Farmer Participation and Environmental Sustainability: A Multi-Level Analysis from 
Irrigation Management in Harran Plain, Turkey,” International Journal of the Commons 7(1) (2013): 73-91. 
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fees to reduce water use and not enforcing sanctions against excessive water use. Though the 
associations are meant to work as a collective, opportunities for participation are mixed and 
institutional alignment is low. According to the case study, this low level of alignment has 
implications for the environmental sustainability of practices in the Harran Plain. 
Figure 3.5. 
Harran Plain, August 1993 
Source: NASA, Satellite Images (1993), accessed February 2016, 
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/HarranPlains/Images/ataturk_1993.jpg.  
Figure 3.6. 
Harran Plain, August 2002 




Though populations shifted during the construction of Atatürk Dam, the densities of these 
regions did not change substantially. In 1991, the population density (people per square 
kilometer) was 49. In the year 2000, this number rose to 50.3.21 
Problems 
Salinization 
The Harran Plain, which is irrigated by the Atatürk Dam, faces excessive salinization as a result 
of the rising level of groundwater. The level of salinization in the area in 1987 was 5,500 
hectares; in 1997 it stood at 7,498 hectares and in 2000 it had expanded to 11,403 hectares.22 As 
a result, there have been high levels of aquifer and groundwater contamination. Additionally, 
well equipment has been corroded due to salty water.23 
Health Concerns 
Though Turkey has almost completely eradicated the presence of malaria within its boundaries, 
there were several epidemics throughout the 20th century,24 some of which may correlate to dam 
projects. During the construction of Atatürk Dam’s irrigation tunnel system to Şanlıurfa in the 
early 1990s, there was a sharp spike in the number of cases of malaria. The province of Şanlıurfa 
(with a population of one million in 1990) reported that malaria cases increased from 785 in 
1990 to 5,125 in 1993.25 Though the dam construction contributed to the number of cases, it was 
most likely not the sole factor in the rise of malaria. During this time, Turkey also accepted 
thousands of migrant workers who were found to be carrying and spreading the disease. 
Security Issues 
When dam construction commenced, militant Kurdish separatists (the PKK) staged multiple 
deadly attacks against construction workers, engineers, and crew associated with the dam 
project. In addition to attacks against people, approximately 1,100 vehicles and pieces of 
working machinery were destroyed.26 These attacks prolonged the project’s construction time 
and drove up the costs of completing the dam. Theft of the electricity generated by the Atatürk 
                                                 
21 Keiser et al., “Effect of Irrigation and Large Dams on the Burden of Malaria on a Global and Regional Scale.” 
22 M. Irfan Yeşilnaçar and Ibrahim Yenigun, “Effect of Irrigation on a Deep Aquifer: A Case Study from the Semi-
Arid Harran Plain, GAP Project, Turkey,” Bulletin of Engineering Geology and the Environment 70(2) (2011): 213-
221. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Serap Aksoy, Sedat Ariturk, Martine Y.K. Armstrong, K.P. Chang, Zeynep Dörtbudak, Michael Gottlieb, M. Ali 
Ozcel, Frank F. Richards, and Karl Western, “The GAP Project in Southeastern Turkey: The Potential for 
Emergence of Diseases,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 1(2) (1995): 62-63, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/1/2/ 
pdfs/95-0207.pdf. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Paul A. Williams, “The common and uncommon political economies of water and oil ‘wars,’” ASAM Review of 
International Affairs 3(1) (2003): 13-28. 
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Dam is also a concern. The illicit use of the energy causes mechanical failures and power 
outages in the region.27 
Loss of Historical Heritage 
The land of modern-day Turkey was host to millennia of civilization. When lands are inundated 
in Turkey, it is almost inevitable that cultural heritage sites will be lost. When the Atatürk Dam 
was built and its reservoir filled, the ancient city of Samosata was flooded. Samosata was one of 
the largest Greco-Roman cities along the Euphrates in Asia Minor and one of the four cities of 
the Commagenian Kingdom. It was also inhabited by Assyrians and Hittite whose relief carvings 
dating to the 8th century B.C. had been discovered. The relics and history of this site now lie 
below approximately 120 meters of water.28 
Transboundary Water Agreements and the Atatürk Dam 
Binational issues related to Atatürk Dam were first addressed in the 1987 protocol between 
Turkey and Syria. The protocol was developed by the Turkish-Syrian Joint Economic 
Commission on July 17, 1987, and at the time was considered provisional.29 
The text of Article 6 of the protocol reads as follows: 
During the filling up period of the Atatürk dam reservoir and until the final 
allocation of the waters of Euphrates among the three riparian countries the 
Turkish side undertakes to release a yearly average of more than 500 m3/sec at 
the Turkish-Syrian border and in cases where monthly flow falls below the level 
of 500 m3/sec, the Turkish side agrees to make up the difference during the 
following month. 
Two years later, the Protocol of 1989 was signed between Syria and Iraq. The impounding of the 
Atatürk Dam created flow issues on the Euphrates River which necessitated a water allocation 
agreement between Euphrates riparians Syria and Iraq. A bilateral accord between Syria and Iraq 
was developed, according to which 58 percent of the Euphrates water coming from Turkey 
would be released to Iraq by Syria. 
 
                                                 
27 Ulaş Demircan, “6 İldeki Kaçak Elektrik Kullanım Oranı 4 Atatürk Barajı'na Bedel,” 2015, 
http://onedio.com/haber/6-ildeki-kacak-elektrik-kullanim-orani-4-ataturk-baraji-na-bedel-674657. 
28 David L .Kennedy, “Drowned Cities of the Upper Euphrates,” Aramco World 49(5) (Sept.-Oct. 1998),  
http://archive.aramcoworld.com/issue/199805/drowned.cities.of.the.upper.euphrates.htm. 
29 Cecilia Tortajada, Dogan Altinbilek, and Asit K. Biswas, “Impacts of Large Dams: A Global Assessment” 
(Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2012). 
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Chapter 4. Tabqa Dam 
by Anne Kilroy 
Because the Euphrates is the major source of freshwater in the arid nation of Syria, plans for 
damming the Euphrates near the Turkish border had been considered since the country was a 
French Mandate.30 After Syria’s independence, the country adopted the paradigm of hydraulic 
mission, which sought to maximize the potential utility of the river’s resources by constructing 
large-scale water development projects. With financial and technical assistance from the Soviet 
Union and West Germany, Tabqa Dam was finally completed in 1973.31 The initial goals for the 
dam included generating 1,100 megawatts (MW) of electricity, irrigating over 1.5 million acres 
of land, and providing a source of drinking water for Aleppo, the country’s largest city.32,33 
Figure 4.1. 
Tabqa Dam 
    Source: Steve White, “ISIS chiefs hiding in an enormous dam where UK, US, and Russia refuse to bomb,” 
Mirror, January 21, 2016, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/isis-chiefs-hiding-enormous-dam-
7219847. 
                                                 
30 M. EI-Khatib, “The Syrian Tabqa Dam: Its Development and Impact,” The Geographical Bulletin 26 (1984): 19-
28. 
31 Ibrahim Kaya, “The Euphrates-Tigris Basin: An Overview and Opportunities for Cooperation Under International 
Law,” Arid Lands Newsletter 44 (Fall/Winter 1998). 
32 Carla Hunt, “Last boat to Tabqa,” Saudi Aramco World 25(1) (1974): 8-10. 
33 Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), “Syria, Aleppo Sub District Population,” 2008, http://www.cbssyr.sy/index-
EN.htm. 
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At the time it was completed, the Tabqa Dam was the largest dam ever constructed, measuring 
196 feet (60 meters) high, 2.7 miles (4.5 kilometers) across, and 1,680 feet (512 meters) wide at 
the base.34 Today Tabqa remains the world’s largest earth-filled dam, built with over 1.5 billion 
cubic feet of compacted gravel, sand, clay, dirt, and an impermeable core.35 This massive 
structure damming the flow of the Euphrates River led to the creation of the man-made Lake 
Assad, the largest reservoir in Syria.36 (See Figure 4.2.) 
Figure 4.2. 
Lake Assad 
            Source: Earth Snapshot, “Lake Assad and Nearby Agriculture, Syria,” June 2009,  
    http://www.eosnap.com/image-of-the-day/?s=%22lake+assad%22.  
Located 40 kilometers west of the city of Ar Raqqah, Tabqa was the first modern Syrian dam 
built on the Euphrates. The dam is located in a central area that experiences low levels of 
rainfall, making the surrounding areas reliant on irrigation for agricultural production. At 1,007 
feet (307 meters) above sea level, the location of the dam was ideal not only for satisfying water 
demand but also for flood prevention. 
Despite the economic and agricultural benefits, the long-term effects of damming the river have 
revealed several negative externalities, especially for Iraq. When Syria temporarily blocked the 
Euphrates after closing of the dam, the flow of the river downstream was inevitably reduced, but 
further declines in water quantity due to evaporation, sedimentation, reduced precipitation, and 
variations in upstream flow exacerbated this effect. What little flow continues downstream is 
then polluted by high levels of gypsum and dissolved solids, as the salinity of the Euphrates as it 
                                                 
34 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “AQUASTAT,” 2016, 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm. 
35 Hunt, “Last boat to Tabqa.” 
36 FAO, “AQUASTAT.” 
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enters Iraq has more than doubled since the dam was constructed.37 When the flow of the 
Euphrates was completely dammed to fill the lake in 1974, Iraq complained that its flow of the 
Euphrates had been so severely depleted that it threatened to bomb the dam a year later.38 (See 
Figure 4.3.) 
Figure 4.3. 
Salinity of the Euphrates within Iraq 
     Source: K.hayyun A. Rahi and Todd Haliham, “Changes in the salinity of the Euphrates River system in Iraq,” 
Regional Environmental Change 10 (Feb. 2009):27-35. 
Furthermore, high levels of sediment accumulation in the river have threatened the structural 
integrity of the dam. As a result of deforestation, desertification, and climate change, the amount 
of sediment flowing through the Euphrates is increasing. Even before the construction of the 
dam, scientists estimated that, on average, 140 million tons of sediment would build up at the 
base each year.39 The composition of the earth-fill dam and the subsequent weight of the lake 
formed behind it places a great deal of pressure on the fragile dirt core, and too much pressure or 
an overflow from the lake will cause the dam to fail. As such, the dam requires a substantial 
amount of annual maintenance and repairs in order to remain structurally sound, but over the last 
several decades the prioritization of this upkeep has often taken a back seat to national security 
agendas. As a result, the neglected Tabqa Dam is considered to be at high risk for collapsing, and 
non-state actors have strategically prioritized occupying territory surrounding the dam because 
government forces would not dare to conduct air strikes in the area in fear of releasing a 
devastating flood.40 
                                                 
37 Khayyun  A. Rahi and Todd Haliham, “Changes in the salinity of the Euphrates River system in Iraq,” Regional 
Environmental Change 10 (Feb. 2009):27-35. 
38 Kaya, “The Euphrates-Tigris Basin.” 
39 EI-Khatib, “The Syrian Tabqa Dam: Its Development and Impact.” 
40 David Michel, Amit Pandya, Syed Iqbal Hasnain, Russell Sticklor and Sreya Panuganti , “Water challenges and 




On an average day, Lake Assad is 50 miles (80 kilometers) long and 5 miles (8 kilometers) wide. 
The waters of the reservoir are used for hydropower generation and irrigation but also for fishing 
and water transportation. The reservoir has an annual discharge of 6.8 billion cubic meters per 
year and a maximum capacity of 2.8 cubic miles (11.7 cubic kilometers), although the actual 
capacity is currently only 2.3 cubic miles (9.6 cubic kilometers), equal to about 82 percent 
capacity.41 The reservoir has a maximum surface area of 240 square miles (610 square 
kilometers), although the actual surface area is currently only 173 square miles (477 square 
kilometers). Much of this decrease in capacity is due to reduced rainfall and high levels of 
evaporation from the basin and further exacerbated by an increase in global temperatures.42 
The waters of Lake Assad irrigate about 644,000 hectares of agricultural land, which is slightly 
less than half of all irrigated land in Syria. This represents only about 20 percent of the original 
goal.43 The dam produces 800 MW of hydroelectric power annually, which is over 50 percent of 
Syria’s hydropower production and 10 percent of Syria’s total energy production.44 Although the 
Tabqa has not yet fulfilled its original goal of generating 1,100 MW/year, the number of villages 
receiving electricity increased from 241 in 1970 to 1,173 in 1978. 
The impact region surrounding the Tabqa Dam and Lake Assad is one of the oldest continuously 
inhabited regions in the world, with the first evidence of civilization dating as far back as 7,000 
BCE. When the Syrian government announced plans to flood the area in order to create a 
reservoir, many archaeologists protested and flocked to the area to excavate what they could 
before the lake was filled. The creation of Lake Assad also displaced 60,000 people in 43 
villages. An estimated two-thirds of those who were relocated elsewhere and promised 
proportional compensation never received their remuneration.45 
The Impact Area 
The construction of the Tabqa Dam was a pivotal moment for the Syrian economy. At the time 
of its completion, the Syrian government was seeking to reduce its dependency on foreign food 
imports and set out to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency. Today, food exports total nearly 20 
percent of all of Syria’s merchandise exports, and as a result the country’s socioeconomic 
structure relies heavily on the agricultural sector. After the construction of the dam, 
implementation of various irrigation networks boosted Syria’s share of agriculture in GDP from 
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21 percent in 1986 to 34 percent in 1992.46 At last measure in 2007, the agricultural value added 
to Syria’s GDP was still substantial at 18 percent, and nearly 15 percent of the country’s 
population remains employed in the agricultural sector.47 
In the Tabqa region, water irrigates over 1.4 million hectares of arable land, and the amount of 
land equipped for irrigation has been increasing at an average rate of 3.2 percent over the last 11 
years. A majority of irrigation water (58 percent) comes from groundwater, while 42 percent 
comes from surface water.48 However, irrigation experts estimate that the efficiency of irrigation 
methods is less than 60 percent due to outdated and wasteful distribution methods.49 An 
estimated 80 percent of irrigated farms use flood irrigation, wasteful not only for the large 
quantities of water it requires but also for the runoff that pollutes the water downstream.50 
The increase in agricultural productivity has led to a drastic increase in water withdrawals. 
According to the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics, Syria’s total water withdrawal (including 
losses) was over 19 billion cubic meters in 2007. The Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment 
(GRACE) satellite mission observed that water in the Euphrates-Tigris was being reduced at a 
rate of 20.5 cubic kilometers during a seven-year period from 2003-2009. The total amount of 
water withdrawn during this period is equal to the size of the Dead Sea. One explanation for this 
trend is attributed to the annual evaporation on Lake Assad, estimated to be upwards of 1.3 cubic 
kilometers due to Syria’s high summer temperatures (and now exacerbated by the effects of 
climate change) and the large number of square kilometers of surface area of the waters on Lake 
Assad. 
The effect of a diminishing water supply combined with a growing population (Syria’s 
population has grown from 3 million in 1950 to over 22 million in 2012) resulted in a reduction 
in water availability per capita from over 5,550 cubic meters per person per year in 1950 to less 
than 760 cubic meters per person per year in 2012.51 When a historic drought hit the region in 
2007, the effects were so severe that an estimated 1.5 million herders and farmers from 
northeastern Syria were displaced, and the vast majority of them resettled in urban areas in hopes 
of finding employment.52 By the end of that year, the flow of the Euphrates River had decreased 
to approximately 70 percent of its normal flow by the time it crossed into Iraq and employment 
in the Syrian agricultural sector had dropped by 33 percent.53 It is estimated that 1.3 million 
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people were affected by the drought and that 800,000 “severely affected” people lost their 
livelihoods and basic food supports.54 By 2010, the UN estimated that 3.7 million people, or 17 
percent of Syria’s population, was food insecure.55 
Governance 
After violent conflict between Iraq and Syria was narrowly avoided regarding the amount of 
water released to the Iraqi border, Iraq and Syria agreed to a share of 60 percent and 40 percent 
of the river’s resources. In 1990, Syria and Iraq met in Baghdad to revisit their previous 
agreement on the proportion of water to be released to Iraq, and Syria increased its share of the 
flow to 42 percent. However, both agreements focused primarily on issues of water quantity and 
did not consider issues of water quality. The agreements also failed to consider the variability in 
upstream flow to be released by Turkey and did not include a strategy for drought management 
in the basin, contributing to the devastating effects of the drought of 2007. 
Furthermore, because regional water  institutions in Syria and Iraq have little administrative or 
legal capacities with which to execute water infrastructure repairs, these neglected and 
dilapidated irrigation systems and dams are significantly contributing to the water deficit in the 
region. Often, Syrian water stakeholders rival one another while navigating their state’s 
bureaucratic administration system.56 Administrative districts in Syria are also divided in terms 
of agro-climatic zones, which distorts the reality of water situations on the ground because water 
management districts are not organized by the amount of irrigated water supplied to the area but 
only by the amount of annual precipitation.57 This kind of organizational structure is ripe with 
opportunities for corruption and unequal distribution of water resources because they can 
continue to allocate water to the areas with the lowest rainfall even if those areas are already 
receiving the most water. 
Conclusion 
The Tabqa Dam is central to the Syrian economy, particularly with respect to its agricultural 
sector and its renewable energy sector. However, the Syrian government has not been able to 
properly maintain the infrastructure in the basin, and as a result, the country faces high levels of 
water insecurity due to non-state actors controlling the dam. Securing the Tabqa Dam from ISIS 
forces and repairing the infrastructure of the dam should be a top priority, as millions of lives in 
the region are being directly threatened by water and food insecurity.58 
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Chapter 5. Mosul Dam  
by Haytham Oueidat and Ryan Brown 
The Mosul Dam is located 50 kilometers north of Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq, and is 
the country’s largest dam (see Figure 5.1). Construction began in 1981 and the reservoir was 
filled in 1986. The purpose of the dam is to regulate flooding, irrigate agriculture in Northern 
Iraq, and to provide electricity and water to Mosul. 
Figure 5.1. 
The Mosul Dam 
    Source: CBS News, “Fears grow about Mosul Dam catastrophe,” March 9, 2016, http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
news/fears-about-mosul-dam-catastrophe-grows. 
The main hydroelectrical station, Mosul 1, has an installed capacity of 750 megawatts and 
contains four 187.5 megawatt Francis-turbine generators. The Mosul regulation dam, Mosul 2, is 
downstream and functions to regulate tail waters of the larger dam, with an installed capacity of 
62 megawatts. A pumped hydro facility, Mosul 3, is upstream and has capacity of 240 
megawatts. The entire Mosul dam project has a capacity of 1,052 megawatts.59 
Planning was difficult because the geology of prospective sites was not ideal for dam 
construction. Five separate engineering teams chose five different sites for the dam from the 
1950s to the 1970s. When the location finally was chosen, the dam was built on a foundation of 
gypsum, which dissolves when in contact with water. Therefore, the dam must constantly be 
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“grouted” with concrete and other materials in order to plug any holes. Grout material is 
constantly pumped into the base, and over 50,000 tons have been injected into the foundation 
since the dam’s opening. Downstream sinkholes have formed at various times and must be 
maintained. (Long-run maintenance is discussed in the governance section below.) During the 
planning stage, engineers advised that the foundation be thoroughly grouted prior to building the 
superstructure. Instead, in order to speed up construction, the foundation was blanket-grouted 25 
meters deep around the foundation and in a 150-meter curtain directly below the dam.60 
The rush to build the dam may have been part of the larger goal of the Ba’ath party to arabize 
Northern Iraq. The dam was built, at a total cost of $1.5 billion, in order for Saddam Hussein to 
maintain control in Northern Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War.61 Hussein was able to maintain 
regional support by providing electricity, irrigated land, and running water to the people 
surrounding Mosul. 
The initial flooding of the reservoir submerged several archaeological sites, harming the cultural 
heritage of not only the region, but also the world. Today, in addition, a failure of the dam would 
destroy a number of Assyrian heritage sites downstream.62 
The Mosul Dam has been called the “most dangerous dam in the world” due to the erosion of its 
foundation. A collapse of the dam would result in Mosul being flooded under 20 meters of water 
within two hours, and an estimated 500,000 deaths and 500,000 people displaced.63 Flood water 
would reach Baghdad’s six million residents within three to four days, and potentially flood 
Baghdad International Airport.64 The flooding would shut down the Iraqi power grid, destroy 
irrigated agriculture, and leave internally displaced persons (IDPs) susceptible to armed militant 
groups such as ISIS.65 Preparing for a flood will require coordinated efforts for evacuation, 
which are discussed in the governance section below. In addition, the engineering plans for the 
dam are evaluated below. 
The Reservoir  
The reservoir, Lake Dahuk (Figure 5.2), has a capacity of 11.1 cubic kilometers and covers an 
area of 380 square kilometers—8.1 cubic kilometers of the capacity is considered in the active 
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pool, meaning that it is used for power generation and downstream releases, and the remaining 
2.96 cubic kilometers are inactive (dead) storage. 
Sedimentation is an issue for Lake Dahuk, yet no detailed assessment has been carried out since 
its planning stage. A 2013 study indicated that the annual reduction rate in the dead and live 
storage capacities of the reservoir is 0.786 percent and 0.276 percent respectively, and that the 
useful life of the Mosul Dam reservoir is about 125 years.66 This useful life estimate only takes 
into account sedimentation and not the potential for dam failure. 
The number of Iraqi citizens displaced by the dam construction is unknown at this time. Accurate 
population data for Iraq, provided by the U.N., is only available for 1987, and therefore any 
analysis of migration pre-or post-dam construction is an estimate and therefore beyond the scope 
of this study. Downstream cities and villages are threatened by a potential dam collapse. As well, 
a number of archaeological sites were flooded when the dam opened in 1986 and many sites are 
threatened by a potential collapse. 
Figure 5.2. 
Lake Dahuk 
   Source: Thair M. al-Taiee and Anass M.M. Rasheed, “Simulation Tigris River Flood Wave in Mosul City Due to 
Hypothetical Mosul Dam Break,” Damascus University Journal 25 (2009), 
http://www.hidropolitikakademi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Damascus-University-Journal-Flood-
Wave-in-Mosul-City-Due-to-a-Hypothetical-Mosul-Dam-Break.pdf. 
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Northern Iraq climate is classified as semi-arid, sub-tropical Mediterranean. This region has 
experienced reduced moisture-carrying westerly winds from the Mediterranean Sea and 
increased temperature, both likely due to the effects of climate change.67 These regional climate 
trends have reduced the ability for vegetation to grow, and thus have effected agricultural 
production in the region.68 
Figure 5.3 is a historic time series showing the water levels of Lake Dahuk. The lowest level was 
303 meters above sea level, coinciding with the droughts of 1997, 1999, and 2009. The 
reservoir’s dead storage capacity of 2.96 cubic kilometers corresponds with a level of 300 
meters. This suggests that at times of very severe drought, the dam was depleted to its physically 
limiting threshold.69 
Figure 5.3. 
Mosul Dam Lake Historic Water Levels, 1992-2011 
  Source: Database for Hydrological Time Series of Inland Waters (DAHITI), “Mosul Dam Lake,” Technische 
Universität München, 2014, http://dahiti.dgfi.tum.de/en/118/time_series/. 
Impact Area 
The al-Mosul plateau is Iraq’s breadbasket, providing 70 percent of the country’s grain 
production. The 1999-2000 droughts in Iraq were considered the worst in 50 years by a U.N. 
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estimate.70 During this drought, the region received only 20 percent of its normal rainfall, 
reducing the average flow of the Tigris by 20 percent.71 This resulted in 75 percent smaller crops 
of wheat, barley, and rice. In the event of drought or Mosul Dam’s failure, Iraq is threatened by 
famine due to its reliance on irrigated agriculture. 
The dam’s average inflow is 561 cubic meters per second and the average outflow is 555 cubic 
meters per second. The maximum and minimum inflow and outflow vary as noted in Figure 
5.4.72 The dam is located 50 kilometers north of Mosul, in Ninewa province. The lake extends 
roughly another 40 kilometer upstream to meet its inlet, which is in proximity to the borders of 
both Turkey and Syria. The upstream trail of the Tigris is captured within mountainous ranges 
unfolding at the entry point of the inundation pond. The main single-sided drainage area 
becomes the left bank of the reservoir and is comprised of seven valleys summing up to 1,241 
square kilometers. 
Figure 5.4. 
Maximum, Minimum, and Mean Inflow and Outflow 
 
     Source: Issa E. Issa, Nadhir Al-Ansaria, and Sven Knutssona, “Sedimentation and New Operational Curves  
for Mosul Dam, Iraq,” Hydrological Cycles Journal 58 (2013): 1-11, https://pure.ltu.se/portal/files/ 
43957787/mosul_dam.pdf. 
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The dam consists of two power-generating units that service 1.7 million people with electricity. 
The first is an inverted tunefork bottom outlet-combining outflow from the lake and the 
powerhouse.73 The dam services the needs of Ninewa’s irrigation sector through the Al-Jazeerah 
pumping station at a rate of 45 cubic meters per second. The pumping station is located at the 
inlet of the reservoir and allows water to flow south downstream to agricultural areas. According 
to the Iraq Information Portal an estimated 47 percent of cropland was lost from the drought in 
2009 that farmers are still unable to afford replenishing.74 As stated previously, this region 
provides 70 percent of Iraq’s grain production. 
Figure 5.5. 
Mosul Dam Infrastructure Components 
  
     Source: Nadhir Al-Ansari and Omar Rimawi, “The Influence of the Mosul Dam on the Bed Sediments and 
Morphology of the River Tigris,” Human Impact on Erosion and Sedimentation-Rabat Symposium, April 
1997, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/253015364_The_influence_of_the_Mosul_Dam_on_ 
the_bed_sediments_and_morphology_of_the_River_Tigris. 
Mosul’s reliance on the reservoir water and economy is poorly documented. Around 39 percent 
of Ninewa province is rural and the population count of 2.8 million inhabitants constitutes 9 
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percent of the total Iraqi population.75 Surprisingly, only 87 percent of the residents have access 
to improved drinking water.76 
Governance 
The Ministry of Water Resources was established after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and is 
responsible for the management of Iraq’s dams and irrigation canals. Although the main 
framework is centralized, many times local communities are relied upon for management. 
Autonomous entrepreneurial groups have worked with the state commissions since the 
restructure of the ministry’s sectoral administrations in 2003. 
There are no apparent policies on drought management in the region. From the indicators seen 
above we can deduce that reservoirs are accepted to be “operational until dry.” GRACE imagery 
revealed a reduction of almost 70 percent in groundwater storage from 2007 until 2009, 
corresponding to years of record drought and a lack of viable management techniques.77 
Failure of the Mosul Dam could occur at any time, but the World Bank has hired an Italian firm, 
Trevi Group, to permanently plug the foundation, at a cost of $300 million.78 Emptying the 
reservoir is not considered an option because Northern Iraq is dependent on the Mosul Dam for 
drinking water and irrigated agricultural production. 
A second option, aiding the stability of the foundation, is to build a 200-meter cutoff slurry wall 
below the dam. This plan is risky because a cutoff wall at this depth has never been attempted 
and the estimated cost is $3 billion.79 
A third option is much more feasible, and offers a potential venue for cross-border cooperation 
between Iraq and Turkey: water could be stored in the mountainous regions of Turkey. The high 
altitude and narrow geography of this area would lessen the surface area of the reservoir, thus 
reducing evaporation losses. In turn, Iraq would pay for this storage with oil and gas exports, 
providing energy security for fossil fuel-poor Turkey and secure an income stream for cash-
strapped Iraq.80 The United States would benefit by subsidizing this process, as it would mitigate 
the substantial cost of a humanitarian disaster caused by a dam failure. This plan would call for 
the decommissioning of the Mosul Dam, but a cooperative framework such as this would exploit 
regional synergies while also promoting cooperation on other venues.81 
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In preparation for a potential dam failure, Iraq must first establish an education campaign to give 
credibility to its evacuation routes and alert system. Iraqi media is highly politicized and local 
residents may not believe state communication platforms. The alert system must respond quickly 
to dam failure, use multiple communication channels, and, most importantly, be trusted by local 
residents.82 International cooperation will be required to respond to a humanitarian crisis caused 
by flooding. Aid actors will have to utilize a variety of delivery methods to provide water, food, 
shelter, sanitation, medical, and livestock assistance. These efforts will be further complicated by 
the destruction of infrastructure and the presence of violent non-state actors.83 
 
                                                 





Chapter 6. Middle Rio Grande and Cochiti Dam 
by Sara Eatman 
Introduction 
It is clear from looking at a map of New Mexico, with all of the major cities and a swath of 
irrigated agriculture hugging the banks of the Rio Grande, that the river is critical to the 
development of the region. The history and laws related to use of the Rio Grande water have 
determined how this resource has been used, and therefore shaped the development of the region. 
An agricultural tradition dating back to pre-Columbian times persists, although development has 
significantly changed the river itself. The three states and two countries that rely on the Rio 
Grande are only going to put increasing pressure on the available water supplies as the 
population grows and climate impacts supplies. The fish and wildlife that depend on the river, 
especially the endangered silvery minnow, have shaped recent changes on how the river is 
managed and will require coordination among all users to manage this resource into the future. 
Early History 
The Pueblo people irrigated the Rio Grande valley as early as 10 A.D. using a system of 
acequias, or main-stem diversion canals, and secondary channels, or laterals, that served each 
family or farm. The community shared responsibility for maintenance of the acequias.84 Maize, 
beans, and melons were planted in the fertile bottom lands of the Rio Grande.85 
Spanish expeditions into New Mexico began in the 1520s and 1530s as a joint venture of 
Franciscan missionaries and Spanish military. Early outposts were established at the Pueblos of 
northern New Mexico in 1598.86 The missionaries settled inside or near to the Pueblos in order to 
have access to Pueblo people for conversion and as a labor force. The settlers used the existing 
irrigation canal structures and extended the system, relying heavily on native labor. 
Through the 17th century, Spanish settlers spread across the middle Rio Grande basin. However, 
the colony remained small, reaching a population of between 2,000 and 2,500. The area was 
remote; over 1,600 miles from Mexico City, and neither the Native Americans nor the climate 
were reliably hospitable.87 In 1680 the Pueblo Revolt drove the Hispanic colonists out of the 
middle Rio Grande to exile in El Paso del Norte. The Pueblo fighters gained significant ground 
when they cut off the water supply to the remaining colonists sheltered in Santa Fe through 
control of the acequia.88 
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The Spanish colonists took over a decade to return, but they returned and reestablished the 
colonies along the Rio Grande throughout the 18th century. In 1821, Mexico won independence 
from Spain, and in 1848 Mexico ceded New Mexico to the United States under the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo.89 Although the middle Rio Grande Valley was largely settled and farmed, it 
wasn’t until the railroad passed through New Mexico in 1890 that the population grew 
significantly (see Figure 6.1). At the time New Mexico gained statehood in 1912, the population 
was approximately 350,000. At this point, strains on the water supply began to show, and active 
management became critical. 
Figure 6.1. 
Population of New Mexico, 1900-2010 
   2,500,000   
2,000,000   
1,500,000   
1,000,000   
  500,000   
   0 
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010  
  Source: Bureau of Business and Economic Research University of New Mexico, “Historical Demographic Tables 
and Maps,” http://bber.unm.edu/historical-comparisons. 
Water Law in New Mexico 
The doctrine of prior appropriation governs water law in New Mexico. Based on Spanish water 
law, the doctrine states that the first person who puts the water to beneficial use has the right to 
appropriate water. Beneficial use is assumed to be consumptive use for the purpose of irrigation, 
livestock, municipal, industrial, or domestic purposes. Water rights can be transferred as long as 
there is no impact on other claims. If a water right is not put to beneficial use for four years, it 
reverts to the public. 
Water rights are issued based on their priority date, and those issued before the 1907 enactment 
of the New Mexico Water Code are considered “vested” so are not required to have a permit 
unless the use or withdrawals associated with the right are changed. Junior water use permits 
may not impair senior water rights, and in dry years junior users may receive limited water or no 
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water at all.90 Because agricultural users don’t typically pay volumetrically for their water, and 
because their claims are based on how much water they can put to beneficial use, there is little 
incentive to conserve.91 
The Office of the State Engineer (OSE) is the administrative entity that administers water 
allocations. Water rights priorities are registered with the state, and the OSE has the 
responsibility to adopt administrative rules that do not interfere with any existing adjudications 
(certain Pueblo water rights, for instance) and enforce the priority system. Water allocations are 
based on “administrable water rights” that were compiled from any adjudicated rights (which are 
limited), surveys, licenses, and permits demonstrating the seniority, location, quantity, and 
beneficial use. The majority of water rights have not been adjudicated, but are fulfilled based on 
OSE’s best information.92 This limits the ability of some claimants to transfer or sell their water 
rights, and makes the existence of a water market infeasible.93 
The interaction between shallow groundwater and surface water has been long-established in 
New Mexico water law. The Office of the State Engineer’s authority to administer surface water 
rights extends to shallow groundwater rights that are understood to be hydraulically connected to 
the river. In some cases, a water right holder may be permitted to drill a supplemental well to 
compensate for impairment of their surface water right. These decisions are made on a case-by-
case basis in order to account for geologic/hydrologic differences from site to site.94 
Pueblo water rights are not subject to state water law, and have been adjudicated for Pojoaque 
Basin pueblos, Taos Pueblo, and the Navajo Nation. The settlements include some guaranteed 
deliveries, inter-basin transfers, groundwater-surface water interactions, and agreements not to 
make priority calls on water in some cases.95 In 1938, the federal government, New Mexico, 
Colorado, and Texas signed the Rio Grande Compact, which established annual delivery 
obligations between the states based on gauged flows at specified locations throughout the 
basin.96 Beginning in Colorado each state’s delivery to their downstream neighbor was indexed 
based on the flows in river and key tributaries. The treaty includes provisions for a debit and 
credit system to carry over across years, water quality requirements, inter-basin transfers, and 
reservoir storage operations so as to “remove all causes of current and future controversy 
between [the states].”97 The Rio Grande Compact is discussed in more detail later in this report. 
However, between signing of the compact and 1966, Colorado did not comply and accumulated 
a debt of one million acre-feet of water to New Mexico. As a result, New Mexico accumulated a 
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500,000 acre-foot debt to Texas. In 1966, New Mexico and Texas sued Colorado to force 
compliance, and the case was eventually heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. The lawsuit 
continued until 1985, when reservoirs were filled and Colorado’s water debt was erased. The 
debt that New Mexico had accumulated to Texas was not erased, and debts and different 
interpretations of the Compact have failed to prevent conflict between the parties.98 
Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District 
The early 20th century brought both flooding and drought, and resulted in an overall reduction in 
irrigated acreage in New Mexico’s Rio Grande Valley. In 1923 the Middle Rio Grande 
Conservancy District (MRGCD) was formed as a local political subdivision in order to 
coordinate and manage irrigation and drainage from Cochiti Reservoir to San Marcian, just 
upstream of Elephant Butte Reservoir (see Figure 6.2). Deforestation and development in the 
southern Colorado since the late 1800s had increased the silt washing into the Rio Grande. When 
sediment-laden water reached the wider, slower reaches of the Middle Rio Grande the silt settled 
out and resulted in higher stream bed and water tables. This caused shallow flooding along the 
river banks and resulted in a loss of over 60,000 irrigated acres.99 
The MRGCD began an infrastructure improvement project in 1928 that mitigated flood risks 
through the use of levees, increased irrigation capabilities with improved and extended delivery 
canals, and recovered flooded farmland with a drainage canal system. One storage dam at El 
Vado was built, and four main irrigation diversions were built at Cochiti, Angostura, Isleta, and 
San Acacia to serve irrigators along the inner basin (shown in Figure 6.3).100 These projects were 
credited with the development of 118,000 acres, 59,159 of which were irrigated, and 20,700 of 
which were Indian lands.101 
MRGCD was criticized for rushing the projects and for taking some shortcuts in construction. 
Conversely, the cost of the projects was passed on to farmers through assessments of the benefit 
received, which were prohibitively high for some farmers. As the nation faced the depression, 
the MRGCD struggled financially.102 
Major flooding in 1941 focused New Mexican attention on flood control, and federal assistance 
was provided through the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers. The 
MRGCD shared responsibilities with these two federal agencies under the Rio Grande 
Comprehensive Plan of 1950: The Bureau of Reclamation took responsibility for El Vado dam 
and the main channel of the Rio Grande between Velarde (near Taos) all the way to Elephant 
Butte. The Army Corps of Engineers took over maintenance of Cochiti Dam, and the MRGCD 
maintained the three remaining diversion dams and all of the irrigation facilities. 
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Middle Rio Grande Conservation District Jurisdictional Area 
 
      Source: Middle Rio Grande Conservation District. 
The MRGCD still manages upkeep of the irrigation and drainage systems, and farmers that used 
those systems paid annual fees based on irrigated area. The District manages distribution of 
water to users within its area, and does so proportionally based on land area. Additionally, the 
District delivers water to six Pueblos. The MRGCD negotiates with the Pueblo “majordomos” to 
meet water needs, and are typically served by the same mechanism as other water users in the 
District. Some of the Pueblos have established “prior and paramount” water rights through the 
court system, and receive water preferentially in drought.103 The MRGCD has revised their 
mission to include not only maintenance and operations of the irrigation, drainage, and flood 
control infrastructure, but also the management of parks, paths, and open space around the many 
waterways that thread across the Middle Rio Grande.104 
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Figure 6.3. 
Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District 
 Source: Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District. 
San Juan - Chama Diversion Project 
The San Juan - Chama Diversion Project, a trans-mountain transfer from the Colorado basin to 
the Rio Grande basin, was authorized in 1962. The Bureau of Reclamation began construction in 
1964 and the tunnels were completed in 1970. 
Under the Colorado River Compact, New Mexico was allocated 11.25 percent of the Upper 
Basin of the Colorado River’s estimated annual flows (or 840,000 acre-feet per year on 
average).105 The San Juan - Chama project delivers a portion of New Mexico’s allocation 
(110,000 acre-feet per year on average) across the continental divide to the Rio Grande basin 
through a system of diversion structures and 26 miles of tunnels. Water is diverted from the 
Blanco, Navajo, and Little Navajo Rivers (tributaries of the Colorado) to the Rio Chama, a 
tributary of the Rio Grande, and stored in Heron and El Valdo reservoirs. The reliable yield, 
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approximately 86,000 acre-feet per year, is contracted by municipalities and irrigators along the 
Rio Grande (see Figure 6.4). The Corps of Engineers receives an annual allocation of about 
5,000 acre-feet per year to maintain Cochiti Reservoir for recreation, fish, and wildlife.106 San 
Juan - Chama water must be accounted for separately from the native flows in the Rio Grande 
and must be used within New Mexico.107 
Figure 6.4. 
Contracted Amounts for San Juan - Chama Water 
       Source: U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 
El Vado Reservoir 
The El Vado Dam was built as a part of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District works in 
1935, and rehabilitated by the Bureau of Reclamation in the 1950s. The MRGCD uses El Vado 
to store native Rio Chama water for the “prior and paramount” water rights held by the six 
Pueblos served by MRGDC (Kewa, Cochiti, San Felipe, Santa Ana, Sandia, and Isleta). The 
reservoir stores water in the spring runoff season and releases water during the irrigation season 
and, in some cases, water to meet New Mexico’s obligation to Texas under the Rio Grande 
Compact. 
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Heron Reservoir 
Heron Reservoir was authorized in 1962 and constructed on Willow Creek, a tributary of the Rio 
Chama, in 1971. The Bureau of Reclamation constructed Heron reservoir to store imported water 
from the Colorado River Basin as a part of the San Juan - Chama Diversion Project. The Azoteca 
Tunnel delivers an average of 94,200 acre-feet from a San Juan River tributary into Heron Lake 
each year, as compared with an average of 15,000 acre-feet of native flow. The storage capacity 
is 401,320 acre-feet, which is reserved for the San Juan - Chama water, while the native inflows 
are metered and an equivalent amount is released at the dam. As shown in Figure 6.4, the 
majority of the water is contracted by Albuquerque and other smaller municipal entities, and a 
smaller portion is under contract to the MRGCD and Pojoaque Valley Irrigation Districts. 
Cochiti Dam 
The federal Flood Control Act of 1960 authorized construction of a flood and sedimentation 
control dam at Cochiti, replacing the irrigation diversion dam, which had been constructed by the 
MRGCD in 1935. The original project didn’t include any water rights to fill or maintain a 
permanent pool. However, after the San Juan - Chama Diversion Project authorization, there was 
additional water available in the basin, and in 1964 the project’s authorization was amended to 
include a permanent pool for recreation, fish, and wildlife. This authorization does not designate 
Cochiti to store water for the purpose of supplying downstream water users.108 
Under this authorization, Cochiti Reservoir was operated with equal amounts of inflow and 
outflow under normal conditions. Storage capacity, beyond the permanent pool, can be used to 
mitigate downstream flood damage. The Rio Grande slows and widens downstream from Cochiti 
Dam, which causes sediment to be deposited. This causes the riverbed to rise over time, and 
increases wetland area and shallow flooding along the banks. Sediment control is accomplished 
by slowing down the water from tributaries feeding the reservoir, which allows particles to drop 
out within the reservoir and limits sedimentation in the riverbed downstream.109 
The entire Cochiti Dam site and inundation area are within the Pueblo of Cochiti, and the project 
was vocally opposed by the Pueblo of Cochiti members from the initial dealings with the federal 
government in the 1960s.110 The location of the lake, between Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and Los 
Alamos, was selected so that New Mexicans from metropolitan areas could access the lake for 
recreation, and thereby encourage economic development. Along with the dam construction, 
there were plans to build the Town of Cochiti Lake, which was a proposed development open to 
up to 40,000 non-native residents (compared with the Pueblo’s population of about 1,000 
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people). The Town of Cochiti Lake was developed in the 1970s, but only about 400 houses were 
built.111 
Figure 6.5. 
Cochiti Dam Water Wars 
     Source: Thomas Blog, “Waterworks,” accessed March 11, 2016, http://santafereview.com/waterwars/ 
review/blog.html. 
The reservoir was opposed by the Pueblo’s governing body because the inundation area included 
a significant portion of the Pueblo’s traditional farmland. After the reservoir was constructed, 
even more farmland was flooded due to seepage near the dam. After filing for damages in 1976 
and initiating multiple lawsuits over the subsequent decades, the Pueblo succeeded. The Army 
Corps of Engineers issued a formal apology to the Cochiti Pueblo Indians in 2001. 
Because the Cochiti Dam’s primary function is flood and sediment control, it is operated with the 
intent that inflows are equal to the outflows until the capacity of the downstream channel has 
been exceeded. The permanent recreation pool has been maintained at 50,000 acre-feet since the 
dam was constructed. Annually, the lake captures approximately 970 acre-feet (1,200,000 cubic 
meters) of sediment. The reservoir has capacity for an additional 545,000 acre-feet that can be 
used for flood control.112 
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Growth and Environmental Concerns 
The majority of municipal water demands in New Mexico are met with groundwater, while 
agricultural users rely mainly on surface water. The Middle Rio Grande planning area includes 
Sandoval, Bernalillo, and Valencia counties and approximately coincides with the study area 
(excluding Socorro County). Based on the 2010 Middle Rio Grande Regional Water Plan, 
demand across the region is 431,640 acre-feet per year; 129,126 of which is met with 
groundwater, and 302,514 of which is met with surface water. However, the source and usage 
are closely linked: 83 percent of surface water was used for agriculture and 68 percent of 
groundwater was used to meet municipal needs.113 
The region has seen increasing demands and water scarcity due to drought and climate change. 
The ability of the OSE or others to set aside some portion of the Rio Grande for environmental 
purposes has been disputed as a “beneficial use.”114 Since the 1990s, environmental issues have 
been the primary drivers of changes in how water is managed on the Rio Grande. In 1994 the 
Silvery Minnow was listed as endangered. The resulting lawsuits on behalf of the minnow 
required restoration of their habitat, but did not specify any environmental flow requirements. 
The federally mandated restoration of the minnow’s habitat has required cooperation between 
local, state, and federal agencies to ensure that the river “flows continuously” according to the 
mandate. However, in 1996 the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District diverted all of the flow 
from the Rio Grande into their irrigation canals, which killed 10,000 minnows, or 40 percent of 
their remaining population.115 
Conclusions 
The Middle Rio Grande basin was fully allocated to users as early as the 1920s, and has been 
preserved as a resource primarily used for agriculture. In this way, the Rio Grande is the link to 
over a thousand years of agrarian culture in the river valley, and the seniority of agriculture as a 
beneficial water use has limited urbanization. Although the Cochiti Dam doesn’t serve to manage 
the Rio Grande as a water supply, it does allow for greater development downstream as a result 
of flood control. The most significant boon to municipal growth may not be a dam, but the 
tunnels of the San Juan - Chama project, linking the Rio Grande Valley to the Colorado River 
basin. 
Figure 6.6 shows that the water conveyed by the Rio Grande, both native Rio Grande water and 
the San Juan - Chama Project water, has allowed for significant agricultural and municipal 
development in an otherwise arid region. 
Management of the Rio Grande has at times been collaborative in response to environmental 
issues (or the litigation that results from those environmental issues). With the weight of the 
Endangered Species Act, the silvery minnow may force the most significant changes in the 
future of the Middle Rio Grande. 
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Impact Area of Cochiti Dam, as Shown by the Visibly Irrigated Area 
Comprising the MRGCD Jurisdiction 
 
   Source: Middle Rio Grande Conservation District. 
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Chapter 7. Elephant Butte and Caballo Dams 
by Brian Jackson and Marcos Duran 
Introduction 
The Paso de Norte (PdN) region is experiencing historic population growth in each of its 
component regions, El Paso, Cuidad Juárez, and Las Cruces. Typical of the American southwest, 
there is an excess of evaporation over precipitation throughout the region, leaving the PdN 
dependent on surface water transported from upstream regions. The Elephant Butte reservoir was 
constructed to control the flooding and drought patterns of the region and provide a steady water 
supply to create a rich farming and agricultural economy in the region. Caballo reservoir was 
added later to also allow for year-round hydropower generation at Elephant Butte. 
The mission of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation was to build infrastructure that would capture 
every gallon of water in the west and use it in agricultural or urban centers to promote the 
regional growth and economy. The growth of the PdN region is intimately tied to the success of 
the reservoir system. Sedimentation, population growth, and climate change now threaten the 
water future of the region. 
Figure 7.1. 
Elephant Butte Dam 
       Source: U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 
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History 
At the turn of the 20th century, westward expansion to the Pacific coast was anything but 
complete. The U.S. government was actively promoting westward expansion through the 
Homestead Act of 1862 and the underlying belief in manifest destiny and the ideology of rain 
follows the plow.116 The explorations of John Wesley Powell, the first head of the U.S. Geologic  
Survey, and initiatives by new state representatives from western states like Francis Newall of 
Nevada led to passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902 authorizing the creation of the Bureau of 
Reclamation. Theodore Roosevelt created the hydrologic mission to create and expand 
productive farmlands by bringing water through irrigation and flood control to turn the west into 
the new growth area of the United States. 
Planning and Goals 
In recognition of the 1906 IBWC convention with Mexico and under the authority of the 
Reclamation act of 1902, Congress reauthorized the Reclamation Act in 1906. Among the first 
projects as a result of the reauthorization was the Elephant Butte Dam.117 Elephant Butte was 
built to regulate the water flow through New Mexico to El Paso, Texas. Prior to the construction 
of the dam, irrigation was difficult due to the destructive forces of the Rio Grande when it 
flooded. 
Construction and Maintenance 
Construction began in 1911 and the dam was completed in 1916. As a hydroelectric dam, 
Elephant Butte Dam provides electricity for much of the surrounding area. It is able to produce 
electricity year-round and during drought because of Caballo Dam, which lies 25 miles 
downstream from Elephant Butte. Caballo was built in 1936 for two primary reasons: to allow 
for the year-round production of electricity from Elephant Butte, and to compensate for the loss 
of storage volume at Elephant Butte due to sedimentation. 
The Bureau of Reclamation maintains the dam itself, and the Elephant Butte Irrigation District is 
responsible for maintenance of the diversion canals and irrigation infrastructure. 
Hydrologic Region 
Irrigated Land 
According to the Bureau of Reclamation, the Elephant Butte and Caballo reservoir systems 
combine to irrigate 196,557 acres of farmland in Sierra and Dona Aña Counties in New Mexico 
and El Paso and Hudspeth Counties in Texas, as of 1991.118 A review of the USDA Census 
of Agriculture shows that the number of irrigated acres in the Paso del Norte region has been 
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decreasing for the past two decades. In 1997 Dona Ana, Sierra, and El Paso counties 
accounted for a total of 133,230 acres of irrigated land. By 2012, the three counties only 
accounted for 109,085 acres. This trend conforms to the dry period which began in the early 
2000s and continued until 2013. However, the census data does not explain whether water 
scarcity is the reason for this decrease in acreage, or whether it is due to changes in crops, 
agricultural practices or urbanization. 
Figure 7.2. 
Irrigated Land Over Time 
             Source: USDA, “USDA Census of Agriculture,” https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/. 
Water was plentiful after the construction of the dam. Water levels oscillated between 1-1.5 
million acre-feet of water throughout the 1920s. The first dry period occurred during the Dust 
Bowl Era, 1934 and 1935. At this time water levels dropped below 500,000 acre-feet of water. 
Water scarcity reached unprecedented levels when the drought of record occurred in 1945 and 
continued until the late 1950s. In the mid-1950s water levels went as low as 100,000 acre-feet of 
water in the reservoir. After the drought of record, the water supply stabilized, but water levels in 
the lake did not recover until the floods in 1979, which brought the water back to above 1 million 
acre-feet. The mid 1980s began a decade of plentiful water. The dam was frequently discharging 
water as the lake filled up to the flood pool. This trend reversed beginning in the early 2000s as 
drought again set into the region. It was in 2011 that the region experienced the most severe 
drought since the drought of record in the 1950s. Though more precipitation followed in 2013, 
lake levels have not recovered. On June 25, 2016, Elephant Butte Lake stood at 16 percent full, 




The Paso del Norte population in New Mexico and Texas numbers over 1 million people. Most 
of the growth has occurred in El Paso County. Prior to the construction of the Elephant Butte 
Dam, El Paso’s population was just over 50,000 people. Without proper infrastructure, there 
were years when the river was nearly dry upon reaching the City of El Paso. After the dam was 
constructed at Elephant Butte the population doubled to over 100,000 people by 1920. The 
population grew slower in the following decades until the decade between 1950-1960, when the 
population increased from 195,000 to 314,000 people. Growth accelerated again during the 
1990s and 2000s, and by 2010 the region was home to over 800,000 residents. 
Dona Ana County, where the city of Las Cruces, New Mexico, is located, has generally 
experienced more moderate growth than El Paso County. In 1910 over 12,000 people lived in the 
county. After the construction of the dam, the population only rose to 16,000 by 1920. The 
county did not exceed 100,000 people until the 1980s. By 2010 its population was just over 
200,000 people. 
Finally, Sierra County continues to be sparsely populated. In 1910 it had 3,500 people living in 
its boundaries, and in 2010 it still had not exceeded 12,000 people. 
Figure 7.3 
Population Growth in Paso del Norte (U.S. Portion), by County 
     Source: Bureau of Business & Economic Research, University of New Mexico, “Total Population: 1900 to 2010  




The New Mexico dairy industry is the largest component of the agricultural industry in New 
Mexico, generating $1.32 billion in economic activity,119 and dependent on the Rio Grande for 
water. The Juárez-El Paso-Las Cruces region produces cotton, pecans, vegetables, alfalfa, 
grapes, and other high-value crops.120 
Water Demand 
From 1990 to 1995, water demand in the Middle Rio Grande increased from 1,830,628 acre-feet 
to 2,104,873 acre-feet. This represents an increase of 15 percent in water demand in the region. 
Water demand remained stable through the 1990s but began to decrease after 2000. In 2005, total 
water demand was 1,905,965 acre-feet. In 2010, on the eve of the new drought of record, it 
shrank to 1,773,521 acre-feet. It is clear from this data that the region does decrease its water 
demand during drought. From 1995 to 2010 water demand shrank by nearly 16 percent. Both 
urban areas and agriculture adjust their use of water during drought, however surface water is 
used almost primarily by agriculture, with urban areas changing the amount of groundwater they 
pump in drought.121,122  The ratio of surface water use to groundwater use remains fairly stable 
over time, with surface water accounting for roughly two-thirds of overall water usage. 
Problems 
Sedimentation 
Kent Collins and R. L. Ferrari conducted a survey for the Bureau of Reclamation in 1999 by 
comparing sonograms to image the lake bottom along original 1915 topographic transects of the 
Elephant Butte reservoir. They found that 611,442 acre-feet of sediment have accumulated along 
the bottom of the reservoir. That represents a rate of sedimentation of 7,253 acre-feet per year 
over the life of the dam. However, they noted that using data from 1988 they found a 
sedimentation rate of 3,719 acre-feet per year. This indicates that sedimentation is correlated to 
inflows, therefore when inflows are low during drought years, sedimentation is similarly low.123 
The Bureau of Reclamation monitors the inflow of sediments from the top of the reservoir to 
maintain an estimate, based on flow, of the sedimentation of Elephant Butte reservoir, but has 
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not replicated the Collins and Ferrari survey since 1999. The Bureau of Reclamation should re-
survey the reservoir transects to make a current model of sedimentation and storage capacity. 
Flooding 
Elephant Butte is part of a network of dams, weirs, and channels designed to capture and control 
flood waters. As such, lake levels have rarely reached the flood pool level, which is 2 million 
acre-feet. The first time this occurred was in 1944, and it did not occur again until the mid-
1980s.124 
Droughts 
Lake levels slowly filled throughout the beginning of the 20th century. The first period of 
drought after the construction of the dam remains to this day the drought of record. For over a 
decade, from 1945-1957, the central valley of New Mexico experienced prolonged drought.125 
During this period, lake levels were decimated. Following this drought lake levels began to 
stabilize. From 1979-2003 the Elephant Butte Irrigation District was able to supply the region 
with a “full” supply (i.e., 790,000 acre-feet) of surface water.126 However, in 2003 another 
prolonged dry period began, and in 2011 the region experienced the most severe drought since 
the 1950s. This dry period continued until 2013.127 
Climate Change 
In a review, Hurd and Coonrod estimated economic impacts of climate change on water 
resources in the Upper Rio Grande. They found that, under the relatively dry scenario, the region 
can expect a loss of approximately 0.2 percent of the estimated Gross State Product (GSP) of $60 
billion. Runoff change was estimated to fall by 28 percent and annual direct economic damages 
in 2080 were estimated at $100 million using a hydro-economic model of the watershed.128 
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Chapter 8. La Boquilla Dam 
by Deirdre Appel 
Introduction 
Due to massive water use in the Paso del Norte area, the Rio Grande/Bravo downstream from 
Fort Quitman, Texas, is reduced to a small river. The river is revived by a tributary from Mexico, 
the Conchos. Therefore, we include a reservoir assessment for La Boquilla Dam in the Conchos 
sub-basin. 
This chapter begins with a section on the history, planning, goals, and construction of the 
reservoir and dam. The hydrological and socio-economic regions created by the reservoir are 
explored in further detail followed by an analysis of governance covering the reservoir and how 
it may affect the region. The paper concludes with options for dealing with increased water 
scarcity. 
Figure 8.1. 
Conchos River Basin 
    Source: Sierra Rios, “Rio Conchos,” http://www.sierrarios.org/GuidedTrips/RaftTripInfo_Conchos.html. 
The Rio Conchos is one of the most important rivers in Northern Mexico and is highly important 
for South Texas. The Rio Conchos begins high in the Sierra Madre Occidental, moves through 
the central plains of Chihuahua, and finds its confluence with the Rio Bravo/Rio Grande just 
above Texas’ Big Bend National Park. It is an essential ribbon of life in the arid desert. 
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The Conchos river basin lies in the state of Chihuahua, Mexico, and covers about 26,400 square 
miles. The Conchos basin accounts for roughly 14 percent of the total area of the Rio Bravo 
basin and 35-40 percent of the surface flow of the lower Rio Grande.129 The river is a lifeline for 
municipal, agricultural, and industrial water needs in Chihuahua. Once the river meets the Rio 
Grande/Bravo, it satisfies these same demands for Texas and other eastern Mexican states like 
Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. A list of major cities in the Rio Conchos basin and their 
populations over time is displayed in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1. 
Major Cities in the Rio Conchos Basin 
Locality 1995 Population 2000 Population Estimated 2020 Population 
% Change 
(2000-2020) 
Chihuahua 609,059 677,852 957,347 41 
Hidalgo de Parral 95,913 103,285 136,048 32 
Delicias 93,447 99,137 124,996 26 
Camargo 37,572 39,189 47,881 22 
Jiménez 30,992 32,966 42,121 28 
Meoqui 25,066 27,288 34,838 28 
Ojinaga 18,063 18,342 20,353 11 
Saucillo 15,454 15,679 17,917 14 
   Source: Mary E. Kelly, “The Rio Conchos: A Preliminary Overview” (Austin, Tex.: Texas Center for Policy 
Studies, 2001), http://www.texascenter.org/publications/rioconchos.pdf, 6. 
There are several reservoirs in the Rio Conchos basin. A list of major reservoirs in the Conchos 
basin is shown in Table 8.2. La Boquilla reservoir (also known as Lake Toronto), built during 
the Mexican revolution in 1910, is the largest and oldest reservoir on the river. It was completed 
in 1916—the same year as Elephant Butte Reservoir. Today, the reservoir is used to generate 
hydropower and meet irrigation demands. The remainder of this paper will focus on the La 
Boquilla reservoir. 
History of the Dam and Reservoir 
Planning and Goals 
Construction for La Boquilla began during the Mexican Revolution in 1910. The reservoir, the 
largest in Chihuahua, is used to supply water downstream to irrigation districts and when supply 
levels are high enough, the reservoir is also used to generate hydropower. The reservoir, 
however, did not always serve this need. Initial construction was born out of a desire to provide 
electric power to nearby mining districts and was put forth by a privately owned construction 
company. In the early 20th century, the purpose of the reservoir was to supply electric power to 
the Parral mining district about 50 miles from a power house just below the La Boquilla Dam.130 
                                                 
129 Mary E. Kelly, “The Rio Conchos: A Preliminary Overview” (Austin, Tex.: Texas Center for Policy Studies, 
2001), http://www.texascenter.org/publications/rioconchos.pdf. 
130 Edwin Jr. Duryea, and H.L. Haehl, “A Study of the Depth of Annual Evaporation from lake Conchos, Mexico”, 
Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers, 30:1 (1916): 1829-1901. 
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In fact, the Canadian owners of the dam refused to submit to a project that would use the water 
needed by their hydroelectric dam for irrigation use.131 
Table 8.2. 
Major Reservoirs in the Conchos Basin 
River Reservoir Year Completed 
Storage Capacity 
Mm3 (MAF) Uses 
Florido San Gabriel 1981 255 (0.21) Irrigation 
Florido Pico de Aguila 1993 50 (0.045) Irrigation 
Conchos La Boquilla 1916 2903 (2.34) Irrigation, hydroelectricity 
Conchos La Colina 1927 24 (0.195) Irrigation, hydroelectricity 
San Pedro F. Madero 1949 348 (0.28) Irrigation, sediment control 
Chuvíscar Chihuahua 1960 26 (0.021) Municipal, irrigation, flood 
control 
Conchos Luis L. León 1968 337 (0.29) Irrigation, flood control 
   Source: Mary E. Kelly, “The Rio Conchos: A Preliminary Overview” (Austin, Tex.: Texas Center for Policy 
Studies, 2001), http://www.texascenter.org/publications/rioconchos.pdf, 7. 
   Note:  Mm3 means  million cubic meters; MAF means million acre-feet. 
Construction and Maintenance 
At the time of construction, the La Boquilla Dam was said to be one of the largest masonry dams 
in the world—at 79.5 meter high and containing about 300,000 cubic yards of masonry, the dam 
was extraordinary for its time. Though construction began in 1910, the project saw many 
interruptions and halts due to the ongoing revolution. One engineer noted, “The political 
conditions of this country have added greatly to the troubles of engineering and construction.”132 
The storage capacity of La Boquilla rests at 3336 million cubic meters133 while the mean natural 
runoff is around 1,153 cubic hectometers annually.134 The reservoir has an evaporation rate of 
253.1 cubic hectometers per year and a water extraction rate of roughly 1.034.3 cubic 
hectometers per year.135 Additional statistics on the reservoir are displayed in Table 8.3. 
 
 
                                                 
131 Luis Aboites Aguilar, “The Transnational Dimensions of Mexican Irrigation 1900-1950,” Journal of Political 
Ecology 19 (2012): 70-80. 
132 Engineering and Contracting: The Construction of La Boquilla Dam, Mexico, Difficulties due to Revolutions. 
133 Conaqua, “Subdirección General Técnica (SGT),” IMTA-BANDAS, https://www.imta.gob.mx/bandas. 
134 Alberto Guitron, H. Pasell, J. Valdés, J. Aparicio, and J. Echeverría, “Water Sustainability and the Conchos,” 
Second International Symposium on Transboundary Waters Management,  http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/ 
getdocument.aspx?docnum=966981. 
135 Ibid.; Mexican Institute of Water Technology (IMTA), “Surface water distribution between Fort Quitman and 
Falcon Dam,” 2003. 
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Table 8.3. 
La Boquilla Reservoir Statistics 
Total capacity 2,903 cubic hectometers 
Conservation capacity 2,744 cubic hectometers 
Sediment capacity 159 cubic hectometers 
Design flood flow 11,000 cubic meters per second 
Intake flow 50 cubic meters per second 
Dam length 270 meters 
Maximum height 80 meters 
   Source: Alberto Guitron, H. Pasell, J. Valdés, J. Aparicio, and J. Echeverría, “Water Sustainability and the 
Conchos,” Second International Symposium on Transboundary Waters Management,  
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=966981. 
Impacts of the Reservoir in the Region 
Dams and reservoirs render enormous impacts upon the communities they serve. Benefits range 
from agriculture to industry to electricity. They also function as powerful economic development 
catalysts for the region. This has been the case of the la Boquilla Dam and Reservoir. While the 
purpose of the dam and reservoir in its original form was to generate hydroelectric power to 
support mining projects in a remote region of Mexico, the reservoir’s impact has permeated 
sectors beyond hydroelectricity. The reservoir has supported the growth of irrigation district 005 
in Delicias and had a ripple effect for development of the state of Chihuahua more broadly. 
Hydrologic Region 
The reservoir of La Boquilla, one of the largest in the world at the time, helped open up more 
than 100,000 new hectares of land for irrigation and cultivation. In 1927 the Mexican 
government decided to move forward with an irrigation project on the Rio Conchos that would 
help develop new irrigation districts in the northern lands of Mexico. Using the waters from the 
La Boquilla reservoir, Delicias was created. The maximum irrigated area of Delicias is 76,171 
hectares while the total irrigated area from 1988-2000 wavers around 63,000 hectares.136 Water 
volume used in this district between 1988-2000 was 1,049 cubic hectometers. 
The construction of the La Boquilla Dam and Reservoir in the early 1900s helped spur the 
development of Delicias, Chihuahua through irrigation projects promoted by the government of 
Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928).137 At the onset of irrigation development, the owners of the 
dam refused to submit to any projects that would use the water needed by their hydroelectric 
plant for irrigation purposes. They contended that they had been awarded this right to water use 
during the government of Porfirio Diaz and any other such uses of the water would be considered 
                                                 
136 Comisión Nacional del Agua, “Programa Hidraulico de Gran Vision, Estado de Chihuahua (1996-2020),” 1997, 
http://www.sequia.edu.mx/planhidra/. 
137 Luis Aboites Aguilar, “The Transnational Dimensions of Mexican Irrigation 1900-1950,” Journal of Political 
Ecology 19 (2012): 70-80. 
 50 
illegal. The company instead used the water released from the dam to make two additional 
hydroelectric plants on the river—Colina in 1928 and Rosetilla in 1930. The government then 
turned to the reservoir created by Boquilla Dam as their source for irrigating the northern 
borderlands. And thus, the irrigation region of northern Mexico was born. 
Similar to the rest of the region, the hydrological region of Chihuahua has experienced 
abnormally dry conditions over the past decade. In fact, Chihuahua’s precipitation is one of the 
lowest in the country. The limited precipitation coupled with high temperatures has maintained 
moderate drought conditions in this area. Table 8.4 shows the average monthly precipitation.138 
Table 8.4. 
Normal Monthly Precipitation in Chihuahua, 1971-2002 
In Millimeters 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Total 
17 13 7 7 12 39 112 108 75 31 16 21 456 
      Source: National Water Commission of Mexico, “Statistics on Water in Mexico, 2010 Edition,” June 2010, 
http://www.conagua.gob.mx/english07/publications/EAM2010Ingles_Baja.pdf. 
Socio-Economic Region 
As mentioned above, the Delicias Irrigation District was made possible by the waters of the La 
Boquilla dam and reservoir. It was not until 1960, however, that the Chihuahua State Congress 
recognized Delicias as a city. This incorporation made Delicias the fourth most populous city in 
the state. Population continued to grow during this time and the district continued to blossom as 
an agricultural center. Today is serves more as a manufacturing hub, attracting migrants for that 
purpose. Nonetheless, the area continues to see an increase in population. Population figures for 
Delicias, Chihuahua, and Mexico are shown in Table 8.5 and Figure 8.2. 
Table 8.5. 
Population in Delicias, Mexico, 1990-2015 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
87,412 94,001 98,615 108,187 118,071 129,500 
  Source: INEGI, “Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática,” http://www.inegi.org.mx/. 
The state of Chihuahua, where the La Boquilla dam is located, has one of the greatest regional 
disparities in Mexico, with the state’s income range wider than in any other Mexican state. This 
income disparity is fueled by the range of occupations within Chihuahua—occupations which the 
reservoir supports. Incomes tend to be higher in the districts with higher economic productivity. 
                                                 
138 National Water Commission of Mexico, “Statistics on Water in Mexico, 2010 Edition,” June 2010, 
http://www.conagua.gob.mx/english07/publications/EAM2010Ingles_Baja.pdf. 
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Management employees have earnings that fall between the two top income categories, while 
professional and technicians fall in the second and third income categories. 
Figure 8.2. 



























Forty-four percent of all industrial workers, however, earned less than three times the minimum 
wage (US$8.80/day). If the proportion is extended to three times the minimum wage 
(US$13.20), the rate is 71 percent of all industrial workers. For agricultural workers, the situation 
is even more grim—40 percent of employees in farming go unpaid and an additional 36 percent 
of farmers earn less than three times the minimum wage.139 These discrepancies in income are 
displayed in Figure 8.3. 
Despite the manufacturing and agriculture jobs created by the availability of water and the 
established industries that followed, marginalized neighborhoods persist, gender inequalities 
remain, and indigenous populations’ human development index (HDI) levels fall 26 percent 
below those of the nonindigenous population.140 
While the state of Chihuahua is characterized by income inequality and regional disparities, in 
terms of education, Delicias, the municipality in which La Boquilla is located, experiences an 
above average trend (8.7 percent) for total population with a university degree, while the state’s 
average is 7.5 percent. Due to concentrations such as this, over 90 percent of Chihuahua’s 
university degrees are located in 10 percent of its municipalities, which are Chihuahua City, 
Juárez, Delicias, Parral, Cuauhtémoc, and Nuevo Casas Grandes.141 
The reservoir triggered a tremendous amount of activity in Chihuahua’s development, especially 
in sectors such as agriculture and mining. Farming represents the largest source of jobs and 
income for just over 220,000 farmers. Agriculture continues to have a large share of the state 
economy. A rise in growth rates in both these sectors was the trend since construction of the 
reservoir until about the 1990s. During the 1990s, however, agriculture and mining saw a decline 
in growth rates.142 Rather it was industries such as manufacturing, service, construction, and 
transportation that experienced substantial growth. There is no doubt, of course, that agriculture 
continues to be an important economic generator in the irrigation districts around La Boquilla 
where crops such as maize, winter wheat, alfalfa, cotton, and pecans are produced.  A changing 
economic base, however, should be noted. This change can be explained by the devaluation of 
the Mexican peso, competition from U.S. products, inefficient production methods, and the 
persistent drought. 
Governance and Treaties Covering the Reservoir and Region 
The irrigation politics at the time of dam construction were characterized by an emphasis on the 
northern region. The government aimed to increase population close to the border with the 
United States. After years of debate regarding what role the government would play in such 
affairs, the 1926 Irrigation Law broke the model of previous governments and contended direct  
government intervention was unavoidable. This was the stance that the U.S. had taken with the 
                                                 




141 INEGI, “Sistema Estatal y Municipal de Bases de Datos (SIMBAD), Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía 
e Informática, Mexico,” 2005, accessed 15 June 2011, http://sc.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/cobdem/. 
142 Kelly, “The Rio Conchos: A Preliminary Overview.” 
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establishment of the Bureau of Reclamation. Yet despite the converging positions between the 
two countries, there is no reference to the Bureau of Reclamation in the 1926 Irrigation Law. 
Mexican emphasis on the northern border was designed to take advantage of the tributaries of the 
Rio Grande/Rio Bravo, particularly the Conchos and Salado rivers. The aim was to utilize these 
waters before they emptied into the main course and were at the disposal of the U.S. This 
standpoint on division is a product of the 1906 Water Convention. Regardless of whether these 
interpretations hold true or not, the Mexican irrigation policy of this time derived from this 
strategic thought process. 
In addition to the strategy surrounding the development of irrigation districts around the 
reservoir, the Mexican government promoted the idea of repatriation of Mexicans living in the 
United States to live and work in new irrigation districts in the planned northern region. This 
policy of repatriation created the influx of thousands of Mexicans back into northern Mexico 
who brought back with them new agricultural knowledge and practices. Actively recruited by the 
Comision Nacional de Agua (CNA), they were a catalyst for development of agriculture in the 
region. 
But in order to have these thriving irrigation districts, the Mexican government needed water to 
provide. They were able to do this by using the reservoir created by the La Boquilla Dam. But 
the agreement process between the Mexican government, foreign-owned companies, and the 
United States was not easy. There has been speculation that the strong opposition from the 
Canadian owners of the dam was not due to an aversion to water use by agriculture but rather an 
agreement with Texas farmers.143 Farmers in Texas were anxious that irrigation in Chihuahua 
would limit access to water for their own crops. Despite the apprehension, the CNA was able to 
reach an agreement with the Canadian hydroelectric company under which the water from the 
Toronto Lake would be used collaboratively for both agriculture and electricity. With this 
agreement, the Mexican government was able to allocate more water from the Conchos, held in 
the reservoir, to development of a new irrigation zone. 
As time moved on, the two countries came together in 1944 in attempts to collaborate on strategy 
and arrive at a more formal agreement regarding water sharing. The Rio Conchos and its sub 
basin reservoirs play a major role in meeting the allocations under the 1944 Water Treaty. 
Prolonged drought in the region and an increasing use of surface water, however, have 
highlighted shortcomings in the management of water, both nationally and bi-nationally. The 
decade between 1993-2003 saw immense challenges due to the persistent drought. Reservoir 
recovery has not yet been possible and the reservoir continues to rest shy of its storage capacity. 
Scarcity remains an issue as population and economic development exacerbated the situation 
even further.144 In addition to these national effects, drought has caused deep tensions bi-
nationally as well. These issues are addressed further in the following Drought and Governance 
section. 
                                                 
143 Luis Aboites Aguilar, “The Transnational Dimensions of Mexican Irrigation 1900-1950,” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 19 (2012): 70-80. 
144 Guitron et al., “Water Sustainability and the Conchos.” 
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Problems: Drought and Governance, Sanitation and Sedimentation 
Drought and Governance 
The prolonged drought in northeast Mexico has reduced stream flows and reservoir storage 
levels among other secondary socio-economic impacts. The northern states of Mexico, such as 
Chihuahua, are particularly vulnerable to drought shocks. The reservoirs in this basin reached 
some of the lowest points in their history, especially La Boquilla. Due to the drought, the 
Mexican National Water Commission has concluded there is little if any opportunity to build a 
new reservoir on the Conchos basin. There has, however, been discussion of increasing the 
height of the dam at La Boquilla to increase storage capacity. Figure 8.4 displays the range of 
storage levels in the La Boquilla reservoir from 1977 to 1999. 
Figure 8.4. 
Historical Reservoir Storage Levels at La Boquilla 
    Source: Constance L. Danner, Daene C. McKinney, Rebecca L. Teasley, and Samuel Sandoval‐Solis 
“Documentation and Testing of the WEAP Model for the Rio Grande/Bravo Basin,” The University of 
Texas at Austin, 2006, https://www.crwr.utexas.edu/reports/pdf/2006/rtp06-08.pdf. 
The persistent drought and low storage levels of the reservoir have led to disagreements over 
binational allocations as well. There is debate whether Mexico now owes a large amount of 
water to the U.S. under the 1944 Water Treaty that governs the allocations of the Rio 
Grande/Bravo and Colorado. On the Texas side, farmers and stakeholders claim that Mexico has 
been in violation of the treaty while those on the Mexican side argue this is not the case. In 
addition to instances of low levels, there is also disagreement over what constitutes allocations of 
conserved water as well. According to Minute 309 as negotiated by the IBWC, conserved waters 
should be released to the Rio Bravo from the Rio Conchos. The lack of agreement, however, on 
what constitutes “savings” has led to a lack of enforcement of this matter. Farmers in the 
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Delicias District of Chihuahua have been reluctant in releasing supplemental water to the United 
States.  
Diana Liverman, a researcher at the University of Arizona, notes that communities built around 
large reservoirs in arid regions tend to be more vulnerable to drought in the long term because 
reservoirs permit a level of irrigation that is unsustainable in the environment when reservoir 
levels decline. This has been the case with La Boquilla. During drought years, farmers and 
communities in the irrigation districts face grave hardships. Recent data from CNA shows that 
irrigation in this area sees drastic reductions during drought periods.145 The clamor has seized 
attention in both Washington, D.C., and Mexico City. As population growth and industrialization 
continue to pressurize the already delicate drought situation, focus will sharpen on how best to 
address the challenges facing the Conchos and allocations between the two nations. 
Options for Dealing with Water Scarcity 
As this reservoir assessment notes, the waters of the Rio Conchos, including those of La 
Boquilla, are vital to the economic wellbeing of both Mexico and the United States. The 
Conchos—a major tributary for the Rio Grande—is not only the source of water for 1.3 million 
people in Chihuahua but provides water to 200 hectares of fields in other districts and border 
towns as well as 100,000 hectares of fields in irrigation districts and border towns in the U.S.146 
The codependency between the U.S. and Mexico requires that measures are taken to allow for a 
more stable future characterized by increased water scarcity. 
In addition to binational measures, national measures must also be taken. Climate change is 
expected to increase the frequency and severity of droughts in the region. Preventative initiatives 
for the future should be explored before severe consequences become reality. With increased 
water scarcity, water pumping will increase as reservoir levels and aquifer recharge rates 
decrease. The following recommendations are suggested for the La Boquilla/Chihuahua region to 
mitigate this future. 
1) Make information more readily available and accessible. More information regarding 
how much water is in streams, aquifers, and watersheds in the basin must be shared and 
incorporated in planning and policy on both sides of the border. This information should 
include changing patterns in water demands and current water use practices. Texas, 
especially water users in the Lower Rio Grande basin, must acknowledge their intertwined 
and mutually dependent relationship with the Conchos. Efforts should be made in eliminating 
the information gaps and promoting feedback loops in Conchos basin management. 
2) Localize water policy. While it is important that institutions such as the IBWC exist, 
policymakers should not lose sight of the importance of locally driven policy-making. In 
order to address water scarcity in this reservoir and region, the Chihuahua water management 
system must be strengthened. Policy makers should explore a multi-level approach 
incorporating international, national, and local actors while further decentralizing water 
                                                 
145 Kelly, “The Rio Conchos: A Preliminary Overview.” 
146 Brian Thomson, “Saving water, saving the river: Chihuahua, Mexico,” June 7,  2006, 
http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?69260/Saving-water-saving-the-river-Chihuahua-Mexico. 
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policy. This will strengthen the local management and regulation systems in the water 
sector.147 
3) Invest in new technology and more efficient farming practices. Chihuahua’s main use of 
water remains agriculture yet only low levels of technology are employed in the sector. There 
is a range of farms from small to large that operate in the district. Depending on the size of 
the farm, the farming practices differ drastically with large farms using more efficient 
measures. Farming practices remain sub-optimal in the reservoir region. To address water 
scarcity, the excessive water use, cultivation methods that encourage erosion, overstocking, 
and non-optimal mixes of crops should be eliminated. Large farms often adopt and utilize the 
most recent technology; it is small farms that must be addressed. If modernizing agriculture 
is to be addressed, so too must farmers’ access to credit in order to fund these changes. 
  
                                                 
147 OECD, “OECD Territorial Reviews: Chihuahua, Mexico 2012.” 
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Chapter 9. Amistad and Falcón Dams 
by Marimar Miguel 
The Rio Grande river is named the Río Bravo in Spanish because of the heavy and dangerous 
currents it carries. However, this would not come to mind when looking at the current state of the 
river from Elephant Butte to Fort Quitman. Because of the municipal and agricultural use, the 
river is knee high, at best. Further downstream, once the Rio Conchos makes contact with the 
Rio Grande as its largest tributary, the currents pick up again and the downstream area allows for 
the increasing population of South Texas and Northern Mexico to continue growing. 
This chapter looks at the history, impact, and future of two dams, the Amistad and Falcón Dams, 
in the lower Rio Grande that play a major role for economy and water policy of the region. This 
analysis divides the river into segments defined by reservoirs. Below Fort Quitman, Amistad and 
Falcón reservoirs define the physical water region and the sociocultural impact region of the 
river. 
Amistad Dam 
Open since late 1969, Amistad Dam is located about 150 miles west of the city of San Antonio in 
a semi-arid region of Texas.148 Located in Val Verde County, the dam serves as the connection 
between Del Rio, Texas, and Ciudad Acuña, Coahuila, in Mexico. Amistad Dam is the Rio 
Grande’s largest dam and reservoir. The dam is 32,022 feet long (9,760 meters) and 254 feet 
(77.4 meters) high. The reservoir extends 75 miles up the Rio Grande. The surface area measures 
65,000 acres (26,300 hectares) and has a volume of 3,124,260 acre-feet (3,886,578,000 cubic 
meters).149 
History 
The history of Amistad Dam cannot be narrated without mentioning that the geographical region 
where the dam was built was inhabited by the Coahuiltecan tribes that lived in the caves and 
canyons of the region and along the Rio Grande.150 As the state of Texas began to be settled and 
the westward expansion began, the native people were displaced from their land in an effort to 
settle the American West. There was a rich, pictorial history on the walls of the caves that were 
documented prior to the building of the dam, but with its construction, they were inundated and 
many of those histories were lost.151 
                                                 148 M.C. Peel, B.L. Finlayson, and T.A. McMahon, “Updated world map of the Köppen-Geiger climate 
classification,” Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 11(5) (2007): 1633-1644, doi:10.5194/hess-11-1633-2007. 149 International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), “Amistad Dam,” http://www.ibwc.state.gov/ 




Satellite View of Amistad Dam and Reservoir 
                  Source: Created by author using ARC GIS, April 2016. 
Planning and Goals 
Pursuant to the Mexico-U.S. Water Treaty of 1944, Amistad and Falcón Dams were built to 
provide conservation, storage, and regulation of the flows of the Rio Grande. With flood control 
in mind, the dam was built to help prevent displacement and loss of life as floods in the 1950s 
had done to the people of the area. Power generation was also one of the major functions of the 
dam. Two hydroelectric plants, one on each side of the border, generate up to 323 million 
kilowatt hours to be divided by the United States and Mexico.152 With two major tributaries, the 
Devils River and the Pecos River, the dam site was strategically placed in its current location to 
retain flows that feed into the Rio Grande. Minutes 207 and 210 of the International Boundary 
and Water Commission (IBWC) review the recommendations for construction of the dam by 
both countries after assessments from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Mexican 
Ministry of Hydraulic Resources. 




Upon agreeing to the construction of the dam, the cost was divided among the two nations based 
on the proportion of conservation capacity of the reservoir.153 The United States paid for 4/7 of 
the dam, which was about US$43.8 million, and Mexico paid for 3/7 of the dam, which was the 
equivalent of about US$34.2 million, totaling approximately US$78 million.154 
Construction/Engineering  
The dam was planned as a concrete channel section and an earth embankment, with each   
country’s share of principal quantities as follows: 
 Principal quantities of the work allocated to the U.S. are 6 million cubic yards of earth 
embankment construction, 1.3 million cubic yards of rock excavation, the placing of 
approximately 900,000 cubic yards of concrete, and the furnishing and installing of 10 
million pounds of structural steel, including the 16 Tainter gates. 
 Principal quantities of the Mexican work are 7.5 million cubic yards of earth 
embankment construction, 1.8 million cubic yards of rock excavation, the placing of 
about 765,000 cubic yards of concrete, and the furnishing and installation of 3 million 
pounds of structural steel.155 
Amistad construction began in 1963 and was completed in early 1969. The dam was dedicated in 
1969 by U.S. President Richard Nixon and Mexican President Gustavo Diaz Ordáz. As stated by 
President Nixon in his remarks at the dedication ceremony, the previous name of the Diablo Dam 
(rooted in the name of the Rio Grande River’s tributary) was ominous and therefore the name of 
Amistad (meaning “friendship” in Spanish) was taken to represent the furtherance of an ideal 
friendship that the two nations hoped to share.156 
Maintenance 
Amistad Dam is maintained by the Mexico and U.S. sections of the International Boundary and 
Water Commission. A binational project established in 1848 as temporary joint commission to 
survey, map, and demarcate the boundaries of the United States and Mexico is the root to what 
would become the IBWC. The International Boundary Commission (IBC) was established in 
1889 and evolved into the commission that exists today.157 In an effort to stabilize the river 
flows, the IBWC has been involved with transboundary dam projects since the signing of the 
                                                 153 Ibid. 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid.  156 Richard Nixon, “Remarks at the Dedication of the Amistad Dam on the Rio Grande,” September 8, 1969, in 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
ws/?pid=2224. 
157 IBWC, “History of the International Boundary and Water Commission,” http://www.ibwc.state.gov/About_Us/ 
history.html. 
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1944 Water Treaty. It is tasked with boundary preservation and demarcation, water conveyance, 
water quality management, and resource and asset management.158 
Geography 
Amistad Dam is located at the edge of the South Texas brush country, the Texas Hill Country, 
and the canyon-rich area of Texas. The semi-arid climate of the region calls for special attention 
to water usage because of the high humidity and long, hot months.  
Flood Control 
One of the most compelling reasons for construction of Amistad and Falcón Dams was flood 
control. With villages and towns being destroyed by powerful rainfall, the dams were designed to 
prevent future destruction of the lands. Water released by the dams’ floodgates helps mitigate the 
possibility of severe river flooding on both sides of the border. In the summer months, during the 
Gulf of Mexico’s hurricane season, the monitoring of the pool levels for both of the dams is 
increased to quickly initiate emergency management. 
Recreational Use 
Amistad reservoir provides an ideal environment for camping, swimming, fishing, and other 
water-based activities. With temperatures reaching well over 100° F in the summer months, 
water activities are popular to provide relief from the heat. Texas Parks and Wildlife monitors 
the shoreline of the reservoir and is tasked with the monitoring of the habitat for use in 
recreational activities. Per the most recent report, the reservoir’s habitat led to lower aquatic 
vegetation coverage. Largemouth bass and shad sunfish, along with channel, blue and flathead 
catfishes, striped bass, and smallmouth bass all attract the fishing population that visits the 
reservoir.159 With hundreds of fishing competitions held per year, it is difficult to deny the 
importance of the recreational use of the reservoir. On the Mexican side, the reservoir serves as 
one of the major attractions for Ciudad Acuña, Coahuila, as both a historic site and a recreational 
space. 
Falcón Dam 
Falcón Dam, finished in 1954, is located just south of the city of Laredo, Texas, in a semi-arid 
region of the Texas.160 The dam serves as the boundary between Falcón Heights, Texas, in the 
Texas counties of Starr and Zapata, and Nueva Ciudad Guerrero, Tamaulipas, Mexico. The 
Falcón Dam is the last major engineered structure downstream on the Rio Grande, and as the 
lowest international storage dam before reaching the Gulf of Mexico estuary, it is a significant 
marker for use in the purpose of water allocation between the U.S. and Mexico per the Treaty of 
1944. The dam is 26,294 feet long (8,014 meters) and 150 feet (45.72 meters) high, leading to a 
                                                 158 IBWC, “Strategic Plan: FY 2010-2016,” http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Strategic_Plan.pdf. 159 Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, “2014 Fisheries Management Survey Report,” 2015.  160 Peel et al., “Updated world map of the Köppen-Geiger climate classification.” 
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reservoir 60 miles long and 11 miles wide with a surface area of 83,653 acres (33,854 
hectares).161 
History 
The area of Falcón Heights and Falcón, Texas, and the number of lives lost in this area, both by 
flooding and displacement, are crucial to the history of Falcón Dam. Dating back to the 1700s, 
the Ramirez and Falcón families were influential in the subsistence of the village of Falcón, 
Texas. The flooding of the villages and towns along the river prior to the building of Falcón Dam 
and after its construction have played a major role in the sentiment toward the U.S. government 
by the people of the region.162 IBWC Minutes 182 and 187 deal with the history and governance 
of Falcón Dam and reservoir.  
Figure 9.2. 
Satellite View of Falcón Dam and Reservoir 
 
          Source: Created by author using ARC GIS, April 2016. 
                                                 
161 IBWC, “Falcon Dam and Power Plant Brochure,” n.d. 162 Patsy Jeanne Byfield, Falcon Dam and the Lost Towns of Zapata (Austin: Texas Memorial Museum, 1966). 
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Planning and Goals 
Pursuant to the Water Treaty of 1944, Falcón Dam was built to achieve the purpose of providing 
conservation, storage, and regulation of the flows of the Rio Grande by being the lowest major 
international storage dam to be built on the river.163 The previously planned site of Salineño was 
not economical, and recommendations from the Joint Engineering Conference called for the 
Falcón Heights area to be used as the site for construction. 
Considering the major functions of Falcón Dam to maximize transboundary waters for the two 
nations for agricultural, private, and industrial use, as well as minimize flood damage as a result 
of previous damage to the city of Zapata and the region, the recommendations made for 
construction of the dam by both countries after assessments from the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers and the Mexican Ministry of Hydraulic Resources were deemed adequate to start 
construction. 
Construction 
The dam was planned as a concrete channel section and an earth embankment, with the features 
of the dam as follows:  
 Type: rolled earth fill embankment;  Earth fill: 12.6 million cubic yards;  Riprap: 360,000 cubic yards;  Concrete: 282,000 cubic yards; and  Reinforcing steel: 10,300 tons.164 
The dam construction began in 1950 and went through early 1953. The Falcón Dam dedication 
took place in October 1953 on the dam itself by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and President 
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines.165 Shortly after, the dam began to fill and the electricity generation began. 
The name of the dam has origins in recognition of Margarita de la Garza Falcón, who was the 
wife of the founder of the city of Falcón, Texas. The total U.S. share of the cost was around $35 
million.166 
While planning for the dam had assumed it would take several years to reach capacity, the first 
hurricane of 1954, Hurricane Alice, provided enough rainfall to fill the reservoir in a few days 
and prevent major flooding in the Lower Rio Grande Valley. 
Maintenance 
Like Amistad Dam, Falcón Dam is maintained by both the U.S. section and the Mexican section 
of the IBWC. Many of the same functions for maintenance that occur with Amistad Dam occur 
                                                 163 IBWC, “Minute 197,” 1951, http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min197.pdf. 164 IBWC, “Falcon Dam and Power Plant Brochure.” 165 Texas Archive, “Falcon Dam Dedication,” 1953, http://www.texasarchive.org/library/index.php/2013_00972. 
166 IBWC, “Falcon Dam and Power Plant Brochure.” 
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with Falcón Dam. The IBWC monitors the total conservancy capacity biweekly to determine the 
shares of the parties involved.167 
Geography  
Falcón Dam is located in the middle of the Texas brush plains and the coastal plains of the Rio 
Grande Valley and the state of Tamaulipas, Mexico. The climate of the region is semi-arid, and 
like Amistad Dam calls for special attention to water usage because of the high humidity and 
long, hot months. The area’s brush land is dominated by mesquite-acacia savanna with grassy 
areas, depending on the wet and dry seasons of the region.  
Flood Control 
Prior to construction of the Falcón Dam, flooding in the Lower Rio Grande Valley had been 
frequent, causing widespread damage to communities and farms in the region. Both Amistad and 
Falcón Dams are essential to the safety and well-being of the communities below the location of 
the dams.  
Recreational Use 
Both Amistad and Falcón Dams are available for recreational use, including camping, 
swimming, fishing, and other water-based activities. Like in the Amistad reservoir, water 
activities on Falcón Lake provide relief from the heat to citizens and tourists on both sides of the 
U.S.-Mexico border. 
The flooded terrestrial vegetation that is prominent in the reservoir sets the stage for a different 
landscape than the Amistad reservoir. Trees and brush that would normally thrive on dry land 
have survived largely under water, making it a unique ecosystem. Per the most recent report, the 
composition of the reservoir included largemouth bass, which provided for more than 90% of the 
total fishing effort, gizzard and threadfin shad, alligator gar, blue and channel catfish, white bass, 
black crappie, and largemouth bass.168 
The Impact Area of Both Dams 
The distance between Amistad Dam and Falcón reservoir measures 330 miles. From Falcón 
reservoir to the Laguna Madre discharge in the Gulf of Mexico is 280 miles. In both river 
segments water is shared between the U.S. and Mexico. The river supplies the water needed for 
the sustainability of the region.169 
The flow from the Rio Grande below Fort Quitman and the Rio Conchos account for two-thirds 
of the Rio Grande flow entering Amistad reservoir. Quick changes in weather and flows has 
                                                 167 Texas Water Development Board, “Water Data for Texas,” http://waterdatafortexas.org/reservoirs/ 
individual/falcon. 168 Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, “2013 Fisheries Management Survey Report- Falcón Reservoir,” 2014. 
169 IBWC, “2010 Basin Highlights Report for the Rio Grande Basin in Texas,” April 2010, http://pecosbasin.tamu. 
edu/ media/381534/2010%20basin%20highlights.pdf. 
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caused high salinity and increased variability in the amount of water in the reservoir conservation 
pool.170 
In the deltaic floodplain of the Lower Rio Grande Valley, south of Falcón Dam, the water is 
distributed by multiple irrigation channels, including the resacas, river channels that become 
more common as the river approaches the Gulf of Mexico. 
Figure 9.3. 
Satellite View of the Lower Rio Grande Valley Region of Texas 
         Source: Created by author using ARC GIS, April 2016. 
Dam Discharge 
Discharges from Amistad and Falcón Dams are typically higher during irrigation season, 
however, there are variations in flows from the Rio Grande dams based on weather patterns and 
flow activity of the tributaries. Table 9.1 shows significant discharges, followed by a time series 
of the historical means for the two dams until 2011 in Figures 9.4 and 9.5. 
                                                 170 Ibid. 
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Distribution of River Water and Diversion Dams 
From Falcón Dam to the Gulf of Mexico, the water is distributed using river channels and the 
irrigation channels that support the economy of the U.S. and Mexican communities in the basin. 
Below the Amistad and Falcón Dams, there are two more dams that serve the purpose of 
providing and regulating irrigation waters.171 The Anzalduas Dam is located in the city of 
Mission in the Lower Rio Grande Valley. The purpose of building the dam was to divert U.S. 
floodwaters to the interior floodway and the diversion of waters to Mexico’s main irrigation 
canal.172 The other one, Retamal Dam, is located south of the city of Donna in the Lower Rio 
Grande Valley, which allows Mexico to divert its share of floodwaters to its interior floodway 
and limit the flows at Brownsville-Matamoros to the safe capacity of the Rio Grande.173 
Hydropower 
The Amistad Dam powers two hydroelectric power generating plants. For both the United States 
and Mexico, there are about 161 million kilowatt hours generated by each plant.174 The Falcón 
Dam powers two hydroelectric power generating plants, as well, one on the U.S. side and the 
other on the Mexican side. For both the U.S. and Mexico, there are about 3,000 to 10,500 
kilowatt hours generated by each plant.175 The Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) 
administers energy generated in the U.S. by the dams. Unlike major plants, the remote location 
of the dams from major grids allows WAPA to draft tailored contracts to specific clients.176 
Table. 9.1. 
Significant Discharges from Amistad and Falcón Dams 
 
Falcón Dam Amistad Dam 
Date Discharge (m3/s) Date Discharge (m3/s) 
Average  2070.871  3143.973 
Minimum 8/20/1953 1.8 5/31/1968 1.2 
Maximum 10/18/1958 4300.7 9/22/1974 5990.7 
Source: IBWC, “Falcón and Amistad Historical Mean Daily Discharge,” http://www.ibwc.gov/ 
Water_Data/Reports/RG_Storage_Conditions.htm#. 
                                                 171 IBWC, “Diversion Dams and Related Structures,” http://www.ibwc.gov/Mission_Operations/Diversion_ 




Falcón Dam Historical Mean Daily Discharge 
Source: IBWC, “Falcón Dam Historical Mean Daily Discharge,” http://www.ibwc.gov/ 
Water_Data/Reports/RG_Storage_Conditions.htm#. 
Figure 9.4. 
Amistad Dam Historical Mean Daily Discharge 
Source: IBWC, “Amistad Dam Historical Mean Daily Discharge,” http://www.ibwc.gov/ 
Water_Data/Reports/RG_Storage_Conditions.htm#. 
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Water Use and Irrigation Data 
Per the Water Treaty of 1944, the joint use of international waters should be prioritized in the 
following way: “1) Domestic and municipal uses, 2) Agriculture and stock-raising, 3) Electric 
power, 4) Other industrial uses, 5) Navigation, 6) Fishing and hunting, and 7) Any other 
beneficial uses which may be determined by the [International Boundary and Water] 
Commission.”177 
The Texas Water Development Board is legislatively directed to plan for, and to assist 
financially, the development and management of the water resources of Texas.178 In 2013, for 
example, 527,620 acre-feet of Rio Grande water were used for irrigation on the U.S. side of the 
border.179 
Ecology 
The basin between Amistad Dam and the Gulf of Mexico is ecologically highly diverse. The 
region holds one of the last remaining Sabal palm tree habitats, hence the previous nomenclature 
of the Rio De Palmas (River of Palms). There are over 150 species of birds, making the region 
ideal for the annual birding festival, which attracts visitors from around the world.180 
The modifications of the river and the effects of urbanization have resulted in many species of 
animals and native plants becoming endangered and/or extinct. The ocelot and the jaguarondi are 
two species that are endangered. The upper limit of their tropical habitat lies in the Rio Grande 
basin. The border fence fragments the habitat of animals and plants of the region.181 The 
expansion of the border fence, beginning in 2006, has had a significant impact on the 
environment of the region.182 
Farming 
Agribusiness is a large source of income for the middle and lower sub-basin of the Rio Grande/ 
Rio Bravo. Furrow irrigation is still the most common practice, but the Texas AgriLife Extension 
Project provides training and best practices to improve efficiency of water use.183 
In the areas along the river between Amistad and Falcón Dam, the dry pasture provides excellent 
grazing grounds for cattle. Further south, the land is used for irrigated farming. In the Lower Rio 
Grande Valley, the production of sugarcane and citrus fruits make up almost half of all crops in 
                                                 177 Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico, “Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana 
Rivers of the Rio Grande” (Washington, D.C.: Stat. 1219, TS 944, 1944), Article 3.  178 Texas Water Development Board, “Agriculture and Irrigation Data,” https://www.twdb.texas.gov/conservation/ 
agriculture/irrigation/. 179 Texas Water Development Board, 2014, “Water Use Survey - Historical Summary Estimates by Basin.” 180 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, “Lower Rio Grande Valley Species List.” 181 Lindsay Eriksson and Melinda Taylor, “The Environmental Impacts of the Border Wall between Texas and 
Mexico,” 2008, https://law.utexas.edu/humanrights/borderwall/analysis/briefing-The-Environmental-Impacts-of-the-
Border-Wall.pdf. 182 Secure Fence Act of 2006. 2006-H.R. 6061. 183 Texas A&M AgriLife Extension, “Irrigation District Engineering and Assistance,” http://idea.tamu.edu/. 
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the region.184 The Rio Grande Valley area, including the sister region across the river in Mexico, 
had its early beginnings thanks to agribusiness. Prior to the use of irrigation technologies, the 
majority of the land in the region was used for cattle grazing. However, the ability to divert and 
control the waters flowing in the Rio Grande enabled the 4,000-plus square miles to be used for 
agriculture, giving rise to migration and economic development in the region. The region quickly 
became a market for farmers, and, as such, transitioned to an agrarian economy. 
Ground Water and Water Supply 
The presence of brackish groundwater has resulted in the construction of desalination plants in 
Webb, Hidalgo, and Cameron counties in Texas. The strain of municipal and agricultural water 
demand has encouraged the region to research the possibility for more desalination plants for 
both groundwater and ocean water to supplement drinking water supplies for the area.185 
While the region does use groundwater pumping to supplement surface water supply, the costs 
associated with desalination and pumping are high, so that river water remains the principal 
source for irrigation, municipal use, and drinking water. Increasing water quality issues call for 
special attention to the availability and sustainability of water supply from the Rio Grande.186 
Water Quality 
Water quality concerns along the river reach far beyond the pollution caused by maquiladoras 
and cities. Studies have documented bacteria concerns since 1996 for the basin down to the delta 
in the Laguna Madre. The parameters of concern vary by river section as shown in Table 9.2. 
The water quality of each sub-section of the river limits the use of that river section, particularly 
the recreational use, as high levels of bacteria and the presence of toxic substances in the water 
compromise human use.  
Irrigation Districts 
There are 31 irrigation districts on the U.S. side of the Rio Grande and five irrigation districts on 
the Mexican side of the river. There is insufficient data available to assess the efficiency of water 
distribution from the river to the districts  
 
  
                                                 184 Ibid. 185 IBWC, “2010 Basin Highlights Report for the Rio Grande Basin in Texas.” 186 IBWC, Binational Study Regarding the Intensive Monitoring of the Rio Grande Waters in the Vicinity of Laredo, 




Water Quality of Rio Grande Segments 
Segment Segment Name Parameter(s) Impaired Parameter(s) of Concern 
2305 International Amistad Reservoir No impairment Nitrate 
2304 RG below Amistad International 
Reservoir 
Bacteria Toxicity in ambient water 





2302 RG below Falcón Reservoir Bacteria Mercury in edible tissue 
Depressed dissolved oxygen 
Ammonia 
2301 Rio Grande Tidal No impairment Bacteria 
Chlorophyll-a 
    Source:  IBWC, “Basin Highlights Report for the Rio Grande Basin in Texas,” 2010, http://pecosbasin.tamu. 
edu/media/381534/2010%20basin%20highlights.pdf. 
Population and Economy 
While the population is growing faster closer to the Gulf of Mexico, the demographics of the 
region between Amistad and Falcón dams are similar. A majority of the racial makeup is white 
with over 80% of the population identifying as Hispanic or Latino.187 Many school districts are 
underperforming and a few of the counties in the region are listed as the poorest in the nation.188 
The economy of the region is based mostly on agriculture, although in the years since the free 
trade agreements between the U.S. and Mexico, many companies have relocated to the border 
region, making some of the growth rates as high as 39.3% between 1995 and 2005.189 Using 
subsidiary plants known as maquiladoras, private companies manufacture and assemble raw 
products into finished items to be shipped to their home countries. The maquiladora industry 
brought substantial growth to the region, but like many of the poorly regulated industries along 
the river in this region, it is widely suspected and occasionally documented that maquiladoras 
contribute to the degradation of the water quality in the Rio Grande Basin through illegal 
dumping of hazardous waste.190 
                                                 187 U.S. Census Bureau, “Fact Finder,” http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml. 188 U.S. Census Bureau, “2011 American Community Survey,” https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/ 
data.html. 189 CNN Money, “10 Fastest Growing U.S. Cities,” 2012, http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2012/real_estate/1204/ 
gallery.US-Cities/7.html. 190 Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, Regional Assessment of Water Quality in the Rio Grande 
Basin including the Pecos River, the Devils River, the Arroyo Colorado and the Lower Laguna Madre (Austin, Tex.: 
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, 1996). 
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Water Demand 
As we move south along the river basin, the rate of growth of the population is exponential.191 
The river’s ecology and supply are burdened with the ecological stress placed on the river waters 
by urbanization of the region, particularly in the cities of Laredo, McAllen, and Brownsville, 
along with their sister cities, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, and Matamoros. The section below Falcón 
Dam known as the Rio Grande Valley is a metro region that includes these cities. With an 
increase in the population, the demand for water for agricultural purposes and municipal use will 
continue to grow.  
According to the 2016 Regional Water Demand Projections for 2020-2070, Region M, which 
covers Amistad and Falcón dams down to the Gulf of Mexico, the water demand is projected to 
be as shown in Table 9.3. 
Table. 9.3. 
Future Water Demand for Region M, 2020-2070 
Demand Category 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 
Irrigation 1,144,135 1,093,749 1,040,789 983,283 924,558 924,558 
Livestock 4,986 4,986 4,986 4,986 4,986 4,986 
Manufacturing 10,433 11,292 12,147 12,898 13,896 14,971 
Mining 17,051 16,480 14,952 12,823 10,458 10,361 
Municipal 311,591 368,997 427,611 488,449 550,830 612,127 
Hydro Power 16,972 19,842 23,340 27,605 32,806 38,916 
Region M  Total 1,505,168 1,515,346 1,523,825 1,530,044 1,537,534 1,605,919 
   Source: Texas Water Development Board, 2016 Regional Water Plan - Water Demand Projections for 2020-2070 
Regional Summary, http://www2.twdb.texas.gov/ReportServerExt/Pages/ReportViewer.aspx?%2f 
Projections%2f2-demand_region&rs:Command=Render. 
The table shows that irrigation demand will go down while municipal use will go up, as the 
population is projected to grow. Based on the allocation priorities as set forth by the Water 
Treaty of 1944, municipal use has precedence over any of the other potential uses of the water 
available from the river.192 
The lack of growth projections for Mexican cities below Amistad Dam leaves us with the 
conservative estimate that the Mexican counterparts of U.S. cities will grow at least at the same 
rate. As a result of security problems, demographic shifts in the population, and changes in 
industrial employment, there have been many re-adjustments in the projections of population in 
recent years. In 1995, NAFTA promised to bring many jobs for the border regions, but some of 
                                                 191 U.S. Census Bureau, “Fact Finder.” 192 Water Treaty of 1944, Article 3. 
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the industries that moved in created fewer jobs than expected, and the economic landscape is 
constantly changing.193 
Governance 
Both sides of the river infrastructure are maintained by the binational agreement between the 
United States and Mexico, specifically by the International Boundary and Water Commission, 
which was created in 1944 to execute the terms set forth by the Water Treaty of February 
1944.194 
Binational Treaty 
The 1944 Water Treaty stipulates that the water in the Rio Grande along the U.S.-Mexico border 
be allocated to the two countries based on a formula. Mexico is entitled to two-thirds of the water 
reaching the Rio Grande from certain tributaries originating on its side and the United States the 
remaining one-third. Annually 350,000 acre-feet of Conchos water is to be delivered to the 
United States.195 In exchange, Mexico receives water from the Colorado river. Each country is 
entitled to half of the water that was not specifically allocated by the Treaty between Fort 
Quitman and the lowest international storage dam (currently Falcón Dam). Below the lowest 
international storage dam, both countries are entitled to one-half of the flows in the main 
channel.196 
Water Master Program 
The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality administers the water rights in Texas south of 
Amistad Lake. Water distributions south of the Amistad reservoir vary from year to year as 
established by the Water Treaty of 1944 in its proportionality clauses in Article 3.197 The Water 
Master program is tasked with monitoring stream flows, reservoir levels, and water use in the 
Lower Rio Grande Valley region of the State of Texas.198 
Nongovernmental Initiatives 
There are several organizations that provide additional insight to policymakers and engage the 
community members of different areas of the Rio Grande basin on the U.S. side of the river. The 
Basin Advisory Committee pulls in key stakeholders to ensure issues and concerns in the 
community are addressed.199 The Texas Stream Team are volunteers who work to ensure the 
                                                 
193 Vicente Lopez, “Lecture: IMIP – Juarez Municipality,” Paso del Norte Water Task Force Workshop, University 
of Texas – El Paso, El Paso, Texas, May 2016. 194 Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico, “Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana 
Rivers of the Rio Grande” (Washington, D.C.: Stat. 1219, TS 944, 1944), Article 2.  195 Treaty of 1944, Article 4.  
196 Ibid. 197 Ibid. 198 Carlos Rubinstein, “The Texas Water Master Program,” Lecture, The LBJ School of Public Affairs, Austin, 
Texas, October 6, 2015. 199 IBWC, “2010 Basin Highlights Report for the Rio Grande Basin in Texas.” 
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information produced by the water governance agencies is available to the general public to 
maximize engagement. 
The Friends of the Rio Grande was an initiative in 2009 that harnessed organizing talent and 
engaged community members to promote environmental awareness along the Rio Grande. The 
partnerships developed through this outreach initiative made it possible to host various 
engagement meetings in schools, museums, and local organization meetings, among other 
places.200 
Is Impact of Climate Change Considered? 
The region’s cities have strategic plans for managing the growth of their city. Many cities have 
adopted measures to conserve water by providing resources through fairs and awareness events, 
while others have set schedules for garden watering to ensure the most efficient use of water by 
the inhabitants. Texas state agencies hesitate to attribute declines in water supply explicitly to 
climate change. 
On the Mexican side, CONAGUA, the Mexican National Water Commission, has issued 
development plans for cities and agriculture along the border.201 
Conclusion 
The population in the Rio Grande basin from the Amistad Dam and reservoir to the Gulf of 
Mexico is growing and will continue to grow, requiring increased municipal water supply. This 
calls for action at all levels of government on the U.S. and Mexican sides of the border. The 
analysis set forth in this chapter serves as a starting point to assessing the realities of water 
supply and demand in a rapidly growing region. 
 
                                                 200 Ibid.  
201 Comisión Nacional del Agua, “Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2013-2018,” Programa Nacional Hídrico,  
http://www.conagua.gob.mx/conagua07/contenido/documentos/PNH2014-2018.pdf. 
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Chapter 10. Reservoir Impact Assessment Findings 
Marcos Duran and Melissa Stelter 
Euphrates-Tigris Basin 
History 
All of the dams reviewed in this report were completed prior to 1990 and, with the exception of 
the Keban Dam, they all support agricultural activities, produce hydropower, and are utilized to 
regulate flow. The Mosul and Tabqa dams are also used for municipal water use. The 
hydropower benefits of these dams contribute to the entire country and the local regions benefit 
from flood control, municipal water, and irrigation for agriculture. 
Governmental Agreements 
The region frequently faces disputes regarding flow rates. Of the dams covered in this report, 
some are international and some are upstream of the international boundary. Most of these dams 
were constructed with the assistance of international engineering support and financial assistance 
from foreign countries and development agencies. In some cases, the involvement of foreign 
cash is what facilitated international agreements regarding river flow rates. These agreements are 
frequently violated and there are few repercussions. Prolonged tensions and repeated violations 
have led to threats of hostilities, though nothing has yet resulted from these conflicts. 
Many dams were constructed on karstic soil, which has been an issue in both the construction 
and maintenance of these dams. Some dams require constant maintenance to fill sinkholes and 
cracks that compromise the safety of the dam and, as with Mosul dam, threaten the lives and 
livelihood of at least a million people downstream in addition to essential national infrastructure. 
Effects of the Dams 
The construction of these dams led to displacement of whole villages. Governments commonly 
offered financial compensation to land owners, but many residents did not own land and were 
forced out of their homes without compensation. Without any money to resettle or agricultural 
land to replace what they lost, many displaced people were much worse off as they didn’t have 
the necessary skills to enter the workforce. Once the upstream reservoirs were filled, many 
archeological sites were destroyed. 
After the completion of these dams, the region gained affordable and reliable power, and most 
dams expanded agricultural production in the region and a few provided drinking water to nearby 
municipalities. The boon to agriculture has helped develop more rural regions of Turkey, Syria, 
and Iraq raise the standard of living, and has helped develop more modern cities through 
providing plentiful food and energy. 
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Challenges 
These regions are still not fully industrialized so pollution levels remain relatively low. Siltation 
is a concern in the region, but it has not yet resulted in serious problems. Salinization of soils and 
reduced water availability will increase as the region uses more water and as climate change 
worsens. The structural integrity of these dams will be a continuing challenge as many are built 
upon problem-ridden foundations. 
Rio Grande/Bravo-Conchos Basins 
Four RIAs were completed for dams in the Rio Grande/Bravo-Conchos basins. Beginning at 
Cochiti Dam in the middle Rio Grande basin, the Rio Grande flows down to Elephant Butte and  
Caballo dams. Together, these two dams regulate water flow downstream through the Paso del 
Norte region. It is at this point that the Rio Grande becomes the transnational boundary between 
Mexico and the United States. The river is fully allocated and its flow nearly terminates before 
Fort Quitman. Below Fort Quitman, water from the Conchos River replenishes the channel. La 
Boquilla Dam lies on the Conchos River in Mexico and is an important water source in the 
region. From Fort Quitman onward the Rio Grande/Bravo passes through the Amistad and 
Falcón dams, eventually finding its way to the Gulf of Mexico. 
History of the Dams 
The two oldest dams that were examined are Elephant Butte Dam and La Boquilla Dam—both 
were finished in 1916. La Boquilla was originally intended primarily to produce hydroelectric 
power for nearby mining districts but it also served to open up additional land for irrigation. 
Elephant Butte was designed to address erratic and unreliable surface water flows but it also 
doubled as a hydroelectric power source. In 1936, Caballo Dam was completed just below 
Elephant Butte. This companion reservoir created additional water storage capacity and also 
allowed Elephant Butte to release water year round in order to generate electricity. North of 
Elephant Butte, Cochiti Dam was constructed in 1928 and helped manage irrigation needs 
between the Cochiti and Elephant Butte dams. However, in 1960 Cochiti dam was rebuilt to 
mitigate flooding and prevent some sedimentation from reaching and filling the reservoir at 
Elephant Butte. 
The Amistad and Falcón dams were constructed in a joint effort by the United States and Mexico 
as agreed upon in the 1944 treaty. Falcón was built first in 1953 and Amistad followed in 1969. 
Both dams are operated in tandem. They were designed to mitigate flooding, increase 
agricultural production, and supply drinking water to cities. 
Displacement of People 
Several dams generated resentment by displacing peoples. Cochiti Dam was built in an area that 
was traditionally cultivated by the Pueblo people. The Pueblo people sued the Army Corps of 
Engineers because seepage from the Cochiti Dam flooded their agricultural area. When Amistad 
Dam was built the Coahuiltecan, another indigenous people, were displaced and their pictorial 
history was inundated and lost. Lastly, when Falcón Dam was built local people were displaced. 
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To this day the history of displacement affects attitudes towards the United States and Mexico in 
the region. 
Floods and Droughts 
The Rio Bravo/Grande basin has historically been characterized by erratic water flows. Droughts 
and floods were common enough that economic advancement in the area was continually 
disrupted, especially by raging floods. Today, after the construction of the dams, flooding is 
rarely a concern. This has led to consistent cultivation and increased population in the region. 
Although the issue of flooding seems to have been greatly mitigated by the construction of the 
dams, extended droughts are still a concern. A review of water levels along the Rio 
Grande/Bravo show erratic increases and decreases over time. Since the early 2000s, extended 
drought has strained the region, especially the Elephant Butte Reservoir. Extended droughts have 
also hit Mexico and La Boquilla dam. The basin seems to lack a coordinated plan for drought 
conditions. 
Socioeconomic Region and Water Use 
Agriculture accounts for the majority of water use in the river basin. In the case of La Boquilla 
Dam, the importance of the mining districts it was created to supply electricity for faded and 
many people began to populate and cultivate the surrounding area. Furthermore, because of the 
reservoir at Elephant Butte, land has been consistently cultivated all the way to El Paso. In fact, 
hardly any of Elephant Butte’s water is used for municipal use as the cities in the region 
primarily rely on groundwater sources. This is different from the region around Amistad and 
Falcón, which do use surface water for municipal use. 
The population along the Rio Grande/Bravo basin has greatly increased over time. This growth 
has been slower in New Mexico, between Elephant Butte and El Paso. In contrast, the City of El 
Paso itself has grown rapidly in recent decades, and so has the city of Juárez. Likewise, in the 
Lower Valley of the Rio Bravo, Amistad and Falcón supply water to growing populations. These 
communities, which lie along the U.S. Mexican border, have enjoyed rapid growth due to free 
trade agreements between the two countries. However, it is likely that these developments would 
not have occurred without the infrastructure of the dams in place to provide protection from 
floods and provide a steady and regulated supply of water. 
In Mexico, the population along the border has increased drastically since the construction of the 
dams. However, a review of the growth in the state of Chihuahua, where la Boquilla Dam and 
Juárez reside, suggests that population growth in the basin is comparable to the population 
growth rate of the country of Mexico as a whole. This is further evidence that even though the 
dams are essential to the communities along the border, constructing the dams in and of 
themselves did not necessarily serve as the impetus for the influx of peoples to the region. 
Intergovernmental Conflict 
The basin is governed by both interstate and international agreements. In the case of the Rio 
Grande Compact, the interstate agreement between Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas, there is a 
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history of upstream riparians accruing water debts to states downstream. This illustrates the 
difficulty of enforcing interstate agreements. These states were able to use the mechanism of a 
higher court, the Supreme Court of the United States, to try to resolve their conflicts. However, 
history shows that the rains sometimes return quicker than these mechanisms can resolve water 
conflicts. In the future, this poses serious questions as to the effectiveness of governing 
agreements in the basin during drought conditions. 
On the international stage, there have also been water debts accrued by Mexico to the United 
States. However, in the matter of international agreements, there is no higher authority to 
mitigate between the two riparians. Therefore, we see very little progress on water debt issues in 
the basin. 
The increase of conflict between state and national governments during times of drought is 
further evidence that a comprehensive plan for managing drought conditions is needed between 
all parties in the basin. 
Intergovernmental Cooperation 
One interesting aspect of dam construction in the region is the cooperation between Mexico and 
the United States. Through the mechanism of the International Boundary and Water Commission 
(IBWC) established by treaty between the two countries, dam projects were designed and 
constructed together. The costs and responsibilities of these dams were not always shared 
equally, but were often stipulated specifically in the minute system used by the agency in the 
implementation of its duties. Because of this, the IBWC may exemplify a way that riparian states 
can build diplomatic capacity while executing joint projects along their borders, specifically 
through the construction of dams to help regulate the flow of surface water. 
Basin Issues 
Sedimentation has become an issue in the Rio Grande/Bravo basin. Sedimentation decreases a 
reservoir’s capacity over time. The general response to sedimentation issues in the region has 
been to construct additional dams to make up for lost capacity. This occurred with the 
construction of Caballo Dam just south of Elephant Butte Dam. Additionally, Cochiti Dam was 
constructed in such a way that it would reduce sedimentation inflow from tributaries. It is 
important to note that in recent decades the rate of sedimentation seems to have slowed in the 
Upper Rio Grande Basin as rainfall has decreased. 
Another concern is evidence that growing use of groundwater along the banks of the Rio Grande 
in New Mexico has disrupted natural flows between surface water and shallow ground water. 
Texas is currently suing New Mexico, arguing that New Mexico has overdrawn ground water 
and thereby reduced the surface water available to be allocated to Texas. This suggests that 
surface water agreements may need to establish controls on ground water usage in order to be 
effective. 
Finally, climate change models predict that the region will see reduced surface water flows in the 
future. Currently, with the existence of water debts between riparians, and the over- 
appropriation of water seen in some states, the region does not seem prepared to proactively 
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address the possibility of increased water scarcity. Since most water debts and subsequent 
litigation occurs as a result of drought years and reduced water flows, it can be estimated that 
tensions between riparians will increase in the future. Furthermore, relations between states and 
countries seem to indicate that the status quo will not be changed until tensions increase 
substantially. 
Comparison of Reservoir Assessments from ET and RG Basins 
Dam Costs and Benefits 
The benefits of the dams in both basins are self-evident. In both the ET and RG Basin, the dams 
serve as an essential water source for agriculture, hydropower, and drinking water. Though there 
are some differences to the extent that surface water is used for drinking water, nearly every dam 
is utilized to provide electricity. 
During the construction of most dams in the ET and RG basins, construction costs were shared 
between multiple governments. In the case of the ET basin, foreign money was used to 
incentivize cooperative agreements between countries in the region over the allocation and flow 
of water. In the RG basin, the United States and Mexico shared the costs of building dams along 
the international border. The U.S. paid for the costs of building Elephant Butte and Cochiti, but 
La Boquilla dam in interior Mexico was initially built and owned by a Canadian mining 
company. 
One unfortunate trend that the RIA reveals is the displacement of peoples in the region where 
dams are constructed. These peoples are often marginalized even before dam construction. In the 
U.S. native peoples suffered with the construction of Cochiti Dam and Amistad Dam. Other 
marginalized peoples were displaced during the construction of Falcón. In the ET basin, local, 
often unskilled workers, were displaced in order to construct the dams. Often these marginalized 
groups are worse off after the dams are constructed, since they struggle to enter the workforce 
due to lack of skills. Furthermore, even when landowners are compensated for any potential 
damages, these marginalized groups often do not benefit from the government programs, since 
they are too poor to own land. 
Dam Management 
In the RG basin, dam management seems to produce minimal concern. Even though the dams are 
growing older, the dams seem to be adequately maintained. The dams were well planned and 
constructed to withstand raging floods. However, in the ET basin, some dams are in serious need 
of repair. Many of the dams were built on questionable foundations and constantly need attention 
to repair cracks and sinkholes. 
Intergovernmental Agreements and Issues 
In the RG basin, there are both interstate and international agreements that govern the allocation 
of water throughout the basin. There are also intergovernmental agreements in the ET basin. In 
both cases, these agreements are often violated. This leads to tension between governments. 
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However, despite the use of diplomacy, threat of violence, or litigation, disputes are rarely 
settled. 
Basin Challenges 
Sedimentation continues to be a problem for most dams in both basins. Neither basin has found a 
solution to this issue. However, in the case of the richer RG basin, additional dams are 
sometimes built to make up for lost reservoir capacity and also to prevent sedimentation from 
reaching areas further downstream. 
Neither the RG nor the ET basin seem to have developed policies to adequately address drought 
conditions. As temperatures continue to grow in the future, this may cause greater conflict 
between governments in both regions. Climate change may reduce what has traditionally been 
regarded as normal precipitation and water flow. Given the difficulty of enforcing current 


















Chapter 11. War on the Euphrates-Tigris: How the Syrian Conflict Started (and Will End) with Water 
by Anne Kilroy 
Introduction 
The impact of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin on the stability, development, and livelihood of 
the Middle East is huge. The Euphrates flows for 3,000 kilometers and contains 580,000 square 
kilometers of drainage area, while the Tigris is 1,850 kilometers long and has a drainage area of 
370,000 square kilometers. The nearly 1 million square kilometer basin created by the two rivers 
is shared among six countries and is home to more than 54 million people in Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
and Turkey (see Figures 11.1 and 11.2). The Euphrates and Tigris provide nearly 100 percent of 
Iraq’s surface water supply, 65 percent in Syria, and 28.5 percent in Turkey. With these waters 
making such a significant impact on the livelihood of so many Middle Easterners, it is not hard 
to imagine how the current crisis in Syria and the Levant can be traced back to the way these 
rivers were managed. 
Figure 11.1 













  Source: Bernhard Lehner, Kristine Verdin, and Andy Jarvis, “New Global Hydrography Derived From Spaceborne 
Elevation Data,” Eos 89(10) (March 2008): 93-94. 
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Figure 11.2 
Population of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin 
 
   Source: Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University, and Centro 
Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT), “Gridded Population of the World, Version 3 (GPWv3): 
Population Density Grid,” NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC), 2005,  
http://dx.doi.org/10.7927/H4XK8CG2. 
Population growth and agricultural expansion in the last several decades have increased water 
demand in the region. Climate change, salinization, sedimentation, and excessive extractions due 
to overzealous water development policies have significantly diminished the available water 
supply. Although the riparian governments have primary control over agricultural and 
hydrological development, their focus on sovereign rights of river water has prevented them 
from implementing an equitable, functional, and sustainable basin-wide water management 
policy. As a result, water scarcity became pronounced during the multi-year drought in the late 
2000s and significantly contributed to the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War that currently has 
displaced over 11 million people. 
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The lack of efficient water development oversight in the basin made the region especially 
vulnerable to drought, and the lack of a basin-wide drought response plan made the effects of the 
drought much more severe. Without relief from federal agencies, feelings of discontent spread 
among citizens as sectarian groups clashed with one another in the competition for resources. 
Once the region succumbed to wide-ranging civil warfare, non-state actors like ISIS were able to 
effectively seize and control territory by targeting water infrastructures. The humanitarian crisis 
is so severe that the availability of drinking water has declined by an additional 50 percent, and 
villages and water officials in the region have willingly surrendered to these groups in exchange 
for access to water.202 If Syria, Iraq, and Turkey hope to ever regain control of the region and 
avoid another tragedy like this in the future, they must recognize water’s central role in the 
conflict and cooperate on an effective and cohesive water management strategy. 
Historical Context 
From a purely utilitarian perspective, the three riparian countries have sound social and 
economic justifications for utilizing the resources of the river for their respective domestic 
interests.  During the Cold War, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey sought to reduce their dependency on 
foreign imports through large-scale hydropower and irrigation development projects. With the 
waters provided by the Euphrates and Tigris being the only sources of freshwater in the country, 
the riparians developed the basin with an expansive irrigation network. In the 1950s, Iraq was the 
first of the three to invest heavily in modern flood control and irrigation infrastructure on the 
Euphrates-Tigris, with the aim of decreasing its dependency on foreign food imports through 
investments in domestic agricultural production. Syria followed suit and launched a series of 
policies aimed at achieving agricultural self-sufficiency, an ambitious goal for a country where 
over half of the total land is classified as desert or steppe and crop irrigation was (at the time) 
almost completely dependent on rainfall. Turkey was last to catch on, and initially invested 
primarily in hydroelectric power generation projects along the river in hopes of reducing its 
dependence on foreign oil. By the late 1970s, Turkey had shifted its focus towards regional 
development and began investing in irrigation and water retention with a series of projects 
known as the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP).203 See Figure 11.3 for location of dams on 
Euphrates and Tigris. 
However, during this resource-conquering period known as the Hydraulic Mission, the water 
development goals of the riparians were inherently competitive and contradictory. While the 
flows of the river were dammed upstream, the downstream riparians were extracting the 
remaining flows at unsustainable rates. From 1975 to 2005, Syria’s water consumption increased 
from 3.74 cubic kilometers per year to 16.76 cubic kilometers per year.204 Similarly, Iraq’s water 
consumption jumped from 40.56 cubic kilometers per year in 1975 to 66 cubic kilometers per 
                                                 
202 European Commission, “Elements for an EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da’Esh Threat,” 
June 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/news/20150206_JOIN_en.pdf. 
203 M. Dohrmann and R. Hatem, “The Impact of Hydro-Politics on the Relations of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria,” The 
Middle East Journal 68(4) (2008). 
204 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “AQUASTAT,” 2016, 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm. 
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year by 2000205 (see Figure 11.4). By 2003, the overdevelopment had resulted in a water 
deficiency in the Euphrates basin of 12 cubic kilometers per year.206 
Figure 11.3. 
Dams on the Euphrates-Tigris
 
  Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “AQUASTAT,” 2016, http://www.fao. 
org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm. 
                                                 
205 Ibid. 
206 Dogan Altinbilek, “Development and management of the Euphrates–Tigris basin,” International Journal of 
Water Resources Development 20(1) (2014): 15-33. 
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Figure 11.4. 
Water Withdrawal in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin 
 
  Source: F. Gassert, M. Luck, M. Landis, P. Reig, and T. Shiao, “Aqueduct Global Maps 2.0,” Working Paper, 
World Resources Institute, 2013, http://wri.org/publication/aqueduct-global-maps-20. 
The repercussions of these disjointed projects were exacerbated by inefficient and destructive 
irrigation practices that have reduced both water quantity and water quality in the region. The 
three countries have often come close to open conflict with one another over the water supply (or 
lack thereof) entering their countries. While this did not happen, after nearly 60 years of 
negotiations, they remain unable to reach a consensus on how to sustainably manage the basin. 
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Competitive Policies 
Attempts to collaborate on a basin-wide water management strategy are complicated by the 
differences in terms of resource and organizational capacities between the riparians (see Table 
11.1 for differences in basin area).207 Both the Euphrates and Tigris rivers originate in the 
temperate, humid, mountainous region of Southeastern Turkey, which receives an average 400-
600 millimeters of rainfall per year. As a result, snowmelt in Turkey accounts for 60-70 percent 
of the runoff for the rivers, and Turkey provides the Euphrates with 90 percent of its mean 
annual discharge of 32 billion cubic meters. Turkey is also responsible for 40 percent of the 
annual flow of the Tigris, which discharges 52 billion cubic meters per year. 
Once the rivers reach Eastern Syria and Northwestern Iraq, the climate of the basin is much the 
opposite. Midstream, the arid and semi-arid lands are dry, hot, and poorly drained. The 
Mesopotamian Plain receives less than 200 millimeters of rainfall per year and summer 
temperatures can climb above 50 degrees Celsius, contributing to high levels of evaporation and 
salinization on the rivers. Syria contributes only 10 percent of the Euphrates’ annual discharge, 
leaving the waters of the Euphrates in Iraq entirely dependent upon the leftover discharge from 
its upstream neighbors. Iraq, however, contributes 51 percent of the flow of the Tigris, but Syria 
hardly contributes to the Tigris at all and is thus similarly at the mercy of the discharge supplied 
by its neighbors (see Table 11.1 for riparian contributions to the waters of the Euphrates and 
Tigris). 
Table 11.1. 
Euphrates-Tigris Basin Area by Country 
  
Area of Country in 
Basin (km2) 
As Percent of Total 
Area of the Basin 
As Percent of Total 
Area of Country 
Iraq 407,880 46.40% 93.10% 
Turkey 192,190 21.80% 24.50% 
Iran 166,240 18.90% 9.50% 
Syria 96,240 11.00% 52.10% 
Saudi Arabia 16,840 1.90% 0.80% 
Jordan 220 0.03% 0.20% 
  Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “AQUASTAT,” 2016, http://www.fao. 
org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm. 
The prospect of effective basin-wide management is also complicated by differences in each 
riparian’s economic dependence on the waters supplied by the Euphrates and Tigris. Because of 
the country’s relatively small size and lack of freshwater diversity, Syria only has 16.8 cubic 
kilometers of total renewable water resources (defined as “the maximum theoretical yearly 
amount of water actually available for a country at a given moment”), while Iraq has 89.86 cubic 
kilometers and Turkey 211.6 cubic kilometers (see Figure 11.5 for Total Blue Water).208 Of these 
                                                 
207 Ayşegül Kibaroğlu, Building A Regime for The Waters of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin (Boston: Kluwer 
Law International, 2012), 259-260. 
208 United Nations Environment Program, “The UNEP Environmental Data Explorer,” as compiled from FAO, 
AQUASTAT, 2016, http://ede.grid.unep.ch. 
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resources, Syria and Iraq are extremely dependent upon water that originates outside of their 
countries’ borders (see Table 11.2). 
Figure 11.5. 
Total Blue Water in Cubic Meters 
 
  Source: F. Gassert, M. Luck, M. Landis, P. Reig, and T. Shiao, “Aqueduct Global Maps 2.0,” Working Paper, 
World Resources Institute, 2013, http://wri.org/publication/aqueduct-global-maps-20. 
The two rivers constitute 28.5 percent of all surface water supply in Turkey, 65 percent in Syria, 
and nearly 100 percent of all supply in Iraq. For all of these reasons, the three countries value the 
water of these rivers in varying degrees due to their potential for hydropower generation and 













































Syria 7.13 9.67 16.82 11.13 0.34 n/a 28.52 31.73 n/a 0.72 
Iraq 35.20 54.58 89.86 0.08 n/a 3.28 61.33 n/a 88.58 0.61 
Turkey 227.00 -14.20 211.60 0.00 11.00 67.80 1.80 60.12 171.80 0.02 
  Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “AQUASTAT,” 2016, http://www.fao. 
org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm. 
  * Percent of total renewable water resources originating outside the country. 
These dissimilarities in terms of resource endowments and dependence on the rivers have 
produced national water policy perspectives that are often in opposition of one another. Because 
institutional frameworks in the basin are mostly administered using a top-down approach, water 
and irrigation authorities within a district have little choice but to adopt the perspectives taken at 
the national level, regardless of their contradiction with the realities of the basin. This has further 
contributed to inefficient and ineffective management practices in the basin, as irrigation 
associations have little legal capacity for building or maintaining infrastructure that will ensure 
sustainability.209 
Unchecked Inefficiencies 
While development projects of the Hydraulic Mission period were seen as fostering economic 
and agricultural development on the domestic level, these uncoordinated and overly aggressive 
projects have had a negative impact on the basin as a whole. As agricultural production increased 
under state-run economic policies, the governments actively encouraged its citizens to contribute 
to the country’s agricultural production by providing subsidies for ecologically damaging 
fertilizer and diesel fuel for high-intensity irrigation. The lack of an effective water-pricing 
model in the region provides no incentive for implementing water-saving techniques and fails to 
generate an adequate source of revenue that could help finance water-saving techniques. The 
irrigation network that the governments built has also proven to be extremely inefficient, poorly 
designed, and wasteful. As a result, the amount of water consumed in the basin has outpaced the 
rate at which the water can be renewed. 
In Syria, for example, the country’s annual renewable water availability per capita has been 
slashed from over 5,550 cubic meters per person per year in 1950 to less than 760 cubic meters 
                                                 
209 Ayşegül Kibaroğlu, “Euphrates-Tigris River Basin Report,” Sustainability of Engineered Rivers in Arid Lands, 
Houston Advanced Research Center, 2014, http://www.harcresearch.org/sites/default/files/Project_Documents/ 
Reports1-EuphratesTigris.pdf. 
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per person per year in 2012 (see Figure 11.6).210 However, this decline in available water per 
capita is not solely due to increasing populations. From 2003 to 2009, GRACE Satellite findings 
showed an alarming decrease in total groundwater storage in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. The 
satellite detected a decrease of 144 cubic kilometers, which is nearly equivalent to the total 
volume of the Dead Sea (average volume of the Dead Sea is 147 cubic kilometers).211 
Figure 11.6 
Total Renewable Water Resources Per Capita 
   Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “AQUASTAT,” 2016, http://www.fao. 
org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm. 
The construction of dams and artificial reservoirs for water storage also increases the surface 
area of the water subject to evaporation. Increasing global temperatures due to climate change 
exacerbate this problem, as higher temperatures lead to a decline in soil moisture and higher 
levels of evaporation. The GRACE Satellite study estimated that 20 percent of all water loss 
observed from 2003 to 2009 could be attributed to surface water evaporation.212 One study 
estimated that if the three countries could coordinate a joint reservoir operation, they could 
potentially minimize water loss due to evaporation and save up to 6-7 cubic kilometers per 
year.213 
In addition to this substantial decrease in surface water, the availability of groundwater in the 
region has also rapidly declined. Of the 144 cubic kilometers of water loss that the GRACE 
satellites observed, nearly 63 percent can be attributed to groundwater extraction.214 Since the 
                                                 
210 Peter Gleick, “Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria,” Weather, Climate, and Society, 6(3) 
(2015): 331-40. 
211 Katalyn Voss, J. Famiglietti, M. Lo, C. de Linage, M. Rodell, and C. Swenson, “Groundwater Depletion in The 
Middle East from Grace with Implications for Transboundary Water Management in The Tigris-Euphrates-Western 
Iran Region,” Water Resources Research 49(2) (2013): 904-914. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Altinbilek, “Development and management of the Euphrates-Tigris basin.” 





















1960s, many farmers have resorted (legally or otherwise) to using their own diesel motor pumps 
to extract water from wells. The lack of oversight or enforcement from water agencies typically 
means that farmers are extracting water at rates that exceed the available supply, contributing to 
the alarming rate of groundwater depletion in the last several decades. In 1994 the FAO 
estimated that wells accounted for 80 percent of irrigated land in the basin.215 A 2012 FAO study 
indicated that half of all of the wells in the basin extract groundwater.216 The number of 
groundwater wells increased from around 135,000 in 1999 to nearly 230,000 in 2010.217 This is 
especially problematic for the basin’s long-term water supply because groundwater resources 
take significantly longer than surface water to replenish and renew once the water has been 
extracted. 
Furthermore, the irrigation networks constructed and utilized on a daily basis in the three riparian 
countries are typically wasteful and inefficient, especially in Syria and Iraq. In 2011, Iraq 
Business News reported that up to 50 percent of the country’s water resources are wasted due to 
seepage, leakage, and irrigation system inefficiencies.218 In Syria, up to 40 percent of all water 
consumed is actually lost due to seepage and evaporation.219 As a result of technical deficiencies 
and poor planning around unstable subsoils, many irrigation canals have collapsed.220 An 
estimated 21 dams in Syria are in need of “immediate” repair, and one even collapsed in 2003 
(see Figure 11.7 for map of irrigated area).221 
Because regional water institutions in Syria and Iraq have little administrative or legal capacities 
with which to execute repairs, these neglected and dilapidated systems are significantly 
contributing to the water deficit in the region. Each riparian has many water institutions, and 
while many of their responsibilities overlap, there is little coordination or communication 
between them. Often, they rival one another while navigating their state’s bureaucratic 
administration system.222 Administrative districts are often divided in terms of agro-climatic 
zones, which distorts the reality of water situations on the ground because water management 
districts are not organized by the amount of irrigated water supplied to the area but only by the 
amount of annual precipitation.223 This kind of organizational structure is ripe with opportunities 
for corruption and unequal distribution of water resources because they can continue to allocate 
water to the areas with the lowest rainfall even if those areas are already receiving the most 
                                                 
215 Francesca de Châtel, “The Role of Drought and Climate Change in The Syrian Uprising: Untangling The 
Triggers of the Revolution,” Middle Eastern Studies 50(4) (2014): 521-535. 
216 FAO, “Syrian Arab Republic Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment (JRFSNA),” 2012 , 
http://www.fao.org/giews/english/otherpub/JRFSNA_Syrian2012.pdf. 
217 de Châtel, “The role of Drought and Climate Change in The Syrian Uprising.” 
218 Iraq Business News, “Half of Iraq’s Water Is Wasted,” March 22, 2011, http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/ 
2011/03/22/half-of-iraqs-water-is-wasted/. 
219 Frederick Lorenz and Edward J. Erickson (eds.), Strategic Water: Iraq and Security Planning in The Euphrates-
Tigris Basin (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2013). 
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water. A collaborative, international water management scheme would no doubt increase 
accountability, data accuracy, and transparency, and allow for a more equitable and sustainable 
allocation of the rivers’ resources. 
Figure 11.7. 
Irrigated Lands in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin 
   Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “AQUASTAT,” 2016, http://www.fao. 
org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm. 
These structural inefficiencies are especially problematic considering agriculture accounts for an 
overwhelming majority of the basin’s total water consumption (see Table 11.3 and Figure 11.8). 
An estimated 80 percent of irrigated farms use flood irrigation, which is wasteful not only for the 
large quantities of water it requires but also for the runoff that pollutes the water downstream 
(see Table 11.4).224 In 2004, Altinbilek estimated that the application of water-saving techniques 
in irrigation could help reduce water demand by as much as 20 percent.225,226 
                                                 
224 FAO, “Syrian Arab Republic Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment.” 
225 Altinbilek, “Development and management of the Euphrates–Tigris basin.” 
226 FAO, “Syrian Arab Republic Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment.” 
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Table 11.3 
Water Withdrawal by Sector 
  









Syria (2005) 87.53% 8.80% 3.67% 16.76 862.8 m3 18,502,000 
Iraq (2000) 78.79% 6.52% 14.70% 66 2,646 m3 36,423,000 
Turkey (2003) 73.82% 15.46% 10.72% 40.1 576.9 m3 78,666,000 
 Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “AQUASTAT,” 2016, http://www.fao. 
org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm. 
Table 11.4. 











Syria (2010) 1,043,000 77.78% 187,100 13.95% 110,900 8.27% 1,341,000 
Iraq (2003) 7,432,000 85.43% 280,000 3.22% 420,000 4.83% 8,700,000 
Turkey (2012) 4,690,000 87.83% 500,000 9.36% 150,000 2.81% 5,340,000 
 Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “AQUASTAT,” 2016, http://www.fao. 
org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm. 
Salinization, another side effect of building dams, has also significantly reduced the quality of 
the water in the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. According to the World Health Organization, water 
with salinity levels exceeding 1,000 parts per million (ppm) is unfit for human consumption, and 
salinity levels exceeding 2,000 ppm are unsuitable for crop irrigation. In the Euphrates, the 
upstream salinity levels are relatively low at 260 ppm but increase dramatically to 1,100 ppm by 
the time the waters reach the Syrian border.227 In the city of Nassiriyah, 225 miles southeast of 
Baghdad, salinity levels peak at 4,000 ppm. A similar trend has been observed on the Tigris, 
where salinity levels upstream average 275 ppm but jump to 2,250 ppm in Ali al-Sharki just 
before merging with the Euphrates at the Shatt al-Arab.228 See Figure 11.9 for a representation of 
the return flow ratio on the Euphrates-Tigris rivers, where the red areas receive higher quantities 
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World Resources Institute, 2013, http://wri.org/publication/aqueduct-global-maps-20. 
Evaporation, salinization, agricultural runoff, and the dumping of untreated sewage in the 
Euphrates and its tributaries have increased nutrient levels and coliform bacteria counts in the 
water in all three riparian countries.229 In the first half of 2010 there were 360,000 reported cases 
of diarrhea due to polluted water in Iraq, where the ailment is the second largest cause of death 
for children less than five years old.230 Since the outbreak of civil war, a typhoid outbreak has 
threatened the lives of thousands of internally displaced people in the neighborhood of the 
Yarmouk refugee camp, near Damascus. 
                                                 
229 Kibaroğlu, “Euphrates-Tigris River Basin Report.” 




Despite a growing water supply deficit, diplomatic efforts to implement a trilateral basin 
management strategy have been thwarted by competition over water rights, opposing regional 
alliances, and political mistrust. Historically, Syria and Turkey have had a less-than-amicable 
relationship that is based on Syria’s reliance on water supplied from Turkey and Turkey’s 
opinion that they should have full rights to the water within their borders. Contradictory alliances 
during the Cold War, the Arab-Israeli wars, and conflicts with Kurdish forces have also fueled 
political mistrust and competition. As a result, the riparians have come to view water security as 
an issue of national security and sovereignty, which has resulted in decades of unsuccessful 
negotiations.231 
The Joint Technical Committee 
In 1964, after the Hydraulic Mission led to fierce competition among riparians over water rights, 
Iraq insisted that a minimum downstream flow of 350 cubic meters per second be released from 
Turkey while dams were impounding upstream, provided the river’s flow was “adequate.” This 
led to the establishment of the Joint Technical Committee, which was to be responsible for 
measuring each country’s water needs in order to facilitate an agreement on equitable water 
allocations.232 Although the Joint Economic Commission and the Joint Technical Committee met 
16 times between 1981 and 1992, the organization failed to produce any serious bilateral 
agreements. Most discussions ended in stalemates due to rivalrous regional alignments and 
fundamental disagreements regarding the extent of the basin. 
Although all three parties did meet in Baghdad in 1965 and again several times throughout the 
1970s, no trilateral agreement was reached, and Syria and Turkey unilaterally planned and 
executed their own impoundment programs for their respective reservoirs.233 The failure of the 
riparians to agree on a trilateral solution implied that two parties could meet to discuss water 
allocations in terms of their own respective interests and irrespective of the needs of the excluded 
third party. As a result, these disjointed and uncoordinated development projects continued to 
compete for resources along the basin without regard to sustainability or impact on the basin as a 
whole.  
In 1987, for example, Syria and Turkey met regarding the ongoing development of dams in 
Turkey and the two parties agreed on a monthly average flow of 500 cubic meters per second. 
However, actual flows from Turkey fluctuated after the agreement was made. During the filling 
of the Ataturk dam in 1990, for example, Turkey reduced water flow to Iraq and Syria from 500 
cubic meters per second to 165 cubic meters per second without warning. While the agreement 
stated that Turkey could make up for any monthly deficit in future periods, the unpredictability 
of flow levels from Turkey caused serious problems for Syria and Iraq, even though Iraq was not 
a party to the agreement. 
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In 1990, Syria and Iraq met in Baghdad to revisit their previous agreement on the proportion of 
water to be released to Iraq, and Syria increased its share of the flow from 40 percent to 42 
percent. However, this policy failed to consider the variability in upstream flow to be released by 
Turkey and did not include a strategy for drought management. As a result, it is widely accepted 
that “the JTC meetings… did not make an effective contribution to the settlement of the regional 
water dispute” because the agreements were bilateral in nature and failed to adopt an integrated 
approach to the aspects of water needs that extend beyond a stated minimum quantity 
requirement.234 
Recent Negotiations 
Efforts to re-launch negotiations in the 1990s and early 2000s were also largely unsuccessful due 
to the dramatic shifts of political and military power in both Syria and Iraq and the rise in 
violence with non-state actors in the region. Those years were plagued with violence and 
political unrest, and water resource management took a back seat to national security issues. By 
2008, much of the basin’s critical infrastructure was in disrepair and each country’s capacity for 
efficient water resource management was considerably diminished.235 
In December 2009, Turkey and Syria issued a bilateral memorandum of understanding that 
permitted Syria to extract 1.25 billion cubic meters of water annually from the Tigris. After 
nearly 40 years of unilateral basin development, this was the first agreement that included 
measures for demand management, drought planning, irrigation efficiencies, and water 
conservation.236 Although the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council that facilitated this 
agreement made some promising progress during that same year, relations between Syria and 
Turkey quickly dissolved after Turkey sided with Syrian opposition forces against Bassar-Al 
Assad’s regime when civil war broke out in 2011.237 Furthermore, while this memorandum was 
the first to include policies on water demand management and drought planning, Syria was 
already in the midst of the worst drought in observable record. 
Opposing Perspectives 
Much of the reason they were not able to ever agree on a comprehensive policy was rooted in 
each riparian’s contrasting beliefs regarding each country’s entitlement to the waters of the river. 
Turkey took the stance that, as the upstream riparian responsible for 90 percent of the discharge 
of the Euphrates and 40 percent of the Tigris, downstream states do not have “rights” to water 
that is generated and contained within Turkey’s borders.238 Iraq cited historical and ancestral 
development of the river as a basis for sovereign or “acquired right” to water on the Tigris and 
refused to consider the Euphrates and Tigris as a single basin, nor did they accept Turkey’s offer 
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to supply a surplus to the Tigris to make up for the scarcity on the Euphrates.239 On the other 
hand, Syria and Turkey argued that the Euphrates-Tigris should be viewed as one single 
watercourse system and basin because the two rivers merge at Shatt-al-Arab and also at the man-
made Thartar Canal. 
The riparians also disagreed on how to define the river basin in terms of international law. 
Turkey defined the rivers as transboundary watercourses, which should be utilized and allocated 
among three parties based on water need, while Syria and Iraq viewed the rivers as international 
rivers that must be shared.240 Syria and Iraq accused Turkey of prioritizing control over a 
majority of the Euphrates waters upstream instead of considering the rivers to be collective 
international property.241 Syria disagreed on the definition of the basin and insisted that the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers be allocated as “international watercourses” instead of shared as 
“transboundary rivers,” the former of which implies water-sharing based on quotas and declared 
demands in accordance with international law.242 As a result of these fundamental disagreements, 
much of the negotiation process never got past the introductory stages, and water losses in each 
country continued to compound. 
Most importantly, these agreements failed to implement a cooperative method of monitoring 
water supply and demand, which made it impossible to execute any water-sharing agreement. 
Inaccurate and unshared data collection on water resource management was partly due to 
competitive politics but also due to issues of national security. When states depend on other 
states for water supplies in times of shortages and there are few alternative sources of water, the 
resource is more likely to become an issue of national sovereignty and security.243 Because of the 
mistrust among the riparians, reliable data on water demand and use within the three riparians is 
not made public, and water is such a sensitive topic it is almost rarely discussed openly.244 As a 
result, water ministries and irrigation districts in the basin often produce contradictory results, in 
the event that they exchange data at all. This lack of reliable data in tandem with a complicated 
administration system leads to a lack of transparency and accountability and opens the door for 
corruption among the complex network of water authorities and irrigation associations. 
The Drought 
As a result of wasteful water use practices, this arid region became even more vulnerable to 
drought and water shortages, and without functional water institutions or international 
agreements, the riparian governments had no formal drought mitigation strategy. This lack of 
foresight had devastating consequences when the agriculturally-dependent region fell victim to 
the worst drought in observable record in 2007. Average rainfall in Syria dropped to 66 percent 
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of the long-term average during the 2007-2008 season, and some areas saw no rain at all.245 By 
the end of that year, the flow of the Euphrates River had decreased to approximately 70 percent 
of its normal flow by the time it crossed into Iraq246 and employment in the Syrian agricultural 
sector had dropped by 33 percent.247 It is estimated that 1.3 million people were affected by the 
drought and that 800,000 “severely affected” people lost their livelihoods and basic food 
supports.248 By 2010, the UN estimated that 3.7 million people, or 17 percent of Syria’s 
population was food insecure.249 
Even more so than its basin neighbors, the consequences of the drought for the Syrian economy 
were devastating because of the country’s near complete reliance on the flows of the Euphrates-
Tigris as well as its rapid decline in groundwater resources.250 The long-term average wheat 
harvest in Syria is typically around 4.7 million tons, of which 3.8 million tons is consumed 
internally. By contrast, the wheat yield for the 2007-2008 season came in at just 2.1 million 
tons.251 After consecutive seasons without crop yields, problems with agricultural productivity 
continued because farmers had no seeds with which to plant future harvests. As a result, the 
average yield of basic crops declined 32 percent in irrigated areas and up to 79 percent in non-
irrigated (rain fed) areas.252 By 2010, yields for wheat and barley, Syria’s two major cash crops, 
dropped by 47 percent and 67 percent, respectively.253  
As a result, Syria was forced to import wheat for the first time in over 15 years.254 The region 
was also forced to absorb the brunt of world-wide food inflation. In just the first year of drought, 
wheat, rice, and feed prices more than doubled.255 In an effort to alleviate the budget deficit and 
to increase their presence on a global economic stage, Syria abolished diesel and fertilizer 
subsidies in 2008. Diesel was essential to Syrian farmers, not only for transporting harvest to the 
markets but also for extracting groundwater from wells for irrigation. Overnight, the price of 
diesel jumped from $0.14 per liter to $0.53, instantly putting thousands of farms out of 
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commission.256 The regime’s failure to put in place economic measures to alleviate the effects of 
drought was a critical driver in propelling the massive mobilizations of dissent.257 
Climate Change 
Significant decreases in precipitation in the region in the last decades, mostly due to a 
combination of natural variability and a long-term drying trend, are consistent with trends of 
global warming.258 Climate change is considered a “threat multiplier” in the intelligence 
community, particularly in states that have fragile governments but experience rapid population 
growth, as is the case in the Euphrates-Tigris basin.259 Every standard deviation of change in 
climate toward warmer temperatures or more extreme rainfall increases interpersonal violence 
and intergroup conflict by measured amounts.260 Furthermore, it is estimated that increasing 
global temperatures, decreasing precipitation rates, and increased surface evaporation will 
decrease the surface runoff in the basin in Turkey by 23.5 percent on the Euphrates and 28.5 
percent on the Tigris, implying a high risk for future conflicts in the region if the riparians cannot 
formulate an adequate drought-response strategy.261 
However, it is not beneficial to blame the current crisis in the Levant entirely on climate change 
or drought and downplay the role of the governments in causing this conflict. For starters, when 
controlling for natural drying trends and climate change, researchers have concluded that the 
drought in the Middle East was largely due to human factors, such as exploitative policies, 
inefficient practices, and inadequate drought preparation.262 Secondly, the governments’ initial 
encouragement of agricultural production and subsequent lack of support or relief for their 
agricultural industries in the wake of the drought has resulted in catastrophic socioeconomic 
consequences for the citizens of the basin. As a result, citizens in the basin revolted against their 
respective authorities and sent the region into political chaos. In the midst of the chaos, ISIS was 
able to capitalize on the precious resource and utilize water as a means of exercising effective 
control over the region. 
Mass Migrations 
The lack of preventative measures or strategic planning with regards to drought forced millions 
of people out of their livelihoods and out of their homes. This massive migration of people 
displaced by the drought intensified historical ethnic tensions in the region and fueled anti-
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government sentiments. Before the Syrian government withdrew their subsidies, political 
instability, violence, and water insecurity in Iraq had already been forcing millions of Iraqis 
away from their homes and into neighboring countries like Syria and Turkey. Between 2003 and 
2007, an estimated 1.5 million Iraqi refugees migrated to Syria alone.263 An additional 1.5 
million herders and farmers from northeastern Syria were internally displaced due to the drought, 
and a vast majority of them concentrated in urban areas in hopes of finding employment.264 
By 2010, the year before the Syrian uprising, internally displaced Syrians and Iraqi refugees 
compromised 20 percent of the country’s entire urban population. While Syria’s population has 
expanded rapidly (from 3 million in 1950 to 22 million in 2012), the population growth in 
Syria’s urban centers exceeds that of the national average. From 2002 to 2010, Syria’s urban 
population increased dramatically, from 8.9 million to 13.8 million.265 
Furthermore, rapidly increasing populations in urban areas can do even more damage to the 
water supply downstream, due to inefficient and ineffective wastewater treatment methods 
poorly managed by the government.266 This forced even more rural farmers downstream to 
relocate to urban centers for employment. Once they arrived, these urban areas did not have the 
available infrastructure to accommodate such large migrations, and the areas were plagued with 
poor living conditions, overcrowding, and rampant crime.267 Socioeconomic crises like these fuel 
anti-government sentiments and weaken the legitimacy of state powers, increasing the chances 
for ethnic conflicts and military coups.268 As such, it is no coincidence that the nonviolent 
protests that sparked the Civil War occurred within these urban areas. 
While Syrians in the Dara’a province initially took to the streets in 2011 over the arrest of 15 
children, later demonstrations emphasized their complaints over well licensing and groundwater 
use policies mandated by the government. Furthermore, citizens in Dier ez-Zour complained 
specifically about the lack of help from the government in dealing with the drought, mandating 
which crops to grow, and monopolizing their choice in crops. This was not a hyperbolic 
complaint, as 60-70 percent of villages in Deir ez-Zor and Hassakeh were deserted by 2009. 
Syrian citizens faced unemployment, forced migration, poverty, and food scarcity. They 
followed the trend of the Arab Spring and made their grievances with the government known. 
Ethnic and Sectarian Conflict 
Since their establishment after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the three governments have 
managed their nationalized water sector while remaining largely fragmented along secular and 
ethnic lines. The massive population shift that resulted from the drought was thus especially 
problematic for the Euphrates-Tigris basin because it is home to a diverse array of ethnic and 
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religious groups, many of which have extremely volatile relationships with other groups in the 
region (see Figure 11.10 for map of ethnic groups in the region). Because the water crisis has 
affected the region in varying degrees, the mass displacement and unemployment of millions of 
people in the face of a historic drought has incited feelings of ethnic marginalization and political 
discontent among the citizens in the region. 
Figure 11.10. 
Main Ethnic Groups in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin Region 
     Source: Nils B. Weidmann, Jan Ketil Rød, and Lars-Erik Cederman, “Representing ethnic groups in space: A new 
dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 47 (4) (July 2010): 491-499. 
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For example, the majority of the inhabitants in the Euphrates-Tigris basin are ethnic Kurds, who 
have a long-standing animosity towards the Turkish government. Part of this animosity stems 
from the displacement of thousands of native Kurds during the Southeastern Anatolia Project and 
their subsequent treatment by the Turkish government. Between 1988 and 1997, 11,000 Kurds 
were displaced following the construction of the Ataturk Dam alone,269 and up to 78,000 
primarily Kurdish people were displaced with the construction of the Ilisu Dam.270 In Syria, 
Sunni and Kurdish farmers who were disproportionately affected by the drought were forced into 
the poor living conditions of Syrian cities that were primarily controlled by the rival Alawite 
religion, intensifying the level of dissatisfaction within Syria’s major cities.271 Similarly in Iraq, 
where military and government power has shifted from Sunni to Shia control, Sunni farmers felt 
that they had been deprived of basic services by their new government, including access to 
water.272 Eventually, Sunnis launched a rebellion against the Shia government in 2013, opening 
the door for non-state actors to seize large swaths of territory in the region. 
The EU’s regional strategy for the conflict in Syria emphasizes that “there will not be lasting 
peace in Syria if the specific grievances of all ethnic and religious groups are not equally 
addressed and the country’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious character is not maintained.”273 
When regional water issues are related to asymmetries between ethnic groups, the potential for 
widespread violent conflict is especially high.274 Because water is not only essential for life and 
food but also for economic and industrial development, water scarcity is and has always been a 
driving factor of sectarianism, a side effect of the drought that has served as a catalyst for radical 
groups such as ISIS.275 As water resources diminished and entire villages were forced to migrate, 
real and perceived inequalities in water, irrigation, and land allocation exacerbated sectarian 
tensions and contributed to the radicalization that gave rise to ISIS.  
ISIS: Fueled by Water 
ISIS’s Prioritization of Water Infrastructure 
By March 2011, civil war had officially broken out in Syria due in part to water scarcity and the 
effect of one of the worst droughts in the region’s history. ISIS seized the opportunity to control 
territory in the conflicted region by joining the fight against the Assad regime. Various accounts 
of major ISIS battles report that ISIS’s strategy to besiege a city starts with seizing control of the 
police and municipal buildings, followed by securing core infrastructure such as water and 
electricity, quickly giving them complete control over all of the resources within the region.276 
Maps of ISIS-held territory indicate that they are strategically positioning themselves along the 
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rivers in the basin (see Figures 11.11 and 11.12). Within a year of the outbreak of civil war, ISIS 
and Syrian rebel forces controlled most of the country’s major dams, including the Tishrin Dam, 
the Tabqa Dam, and the Baath Dam.277 Since 2013, ISIS has launched over 20 major attacks on 
Syrian and Iraqi water infrastructure.278 
Figure 11.11 
Sites of Islamic State Water Manipulation 
   Source: Stratfor, “The Water Wars Waged by the Islamic State,” Nov. 25, 2015, https://www.stratfor.com/ 
weekly/water-wars-waged-islamic-state. Republished with permission of Stratfor. 
The Beirut Center for Middle East studies also confirmed that ISIS considers controlling the 
dams and rivers in the basin to be “a weapon more important than oil.”279 Once ISIS gains 
control over the water, they weaponize the resource by deliberately flooding towns, polluting 
bodies of water, destroying desalinization plants, and shutting off electricity and irrigation 
pipelines to the civilian populations. In 2014, for example, ISIS was able to shut down Fallujah’s 
Nuaimiyah Dam, and the subsequent flooding destroyed 200 square kilometers of Iraqi fields and 
villages.280 
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Figure 11.12 
ISIS-Controlled Territorry, 2016 
  Source: Institute for the Study of War, “ISIS Sanctuary Map,” 2016,  http://www.understandingwar.org/ 
backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-map-july-1-2016. 
Controlling the water in war-stricken Syria has also been used as a recruitment strategy for ISIS, 
as they utilize water provisions as a system of rewards and punishments for civilians, which 
enables them to hold and maintain territory far more effectively than other terrorist organizations 
like Al-Qaeda. Additionally, fears of potential water contamination and chemical warfare 
downstream are not far-fetched. In December 2014, reports came from the Balad district of 
Salahaddin Governorate (south of Tikrit) that ISIS deliberately contaminated water with crude 
oil, while reports of poisoned water supplies came from Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and 
Baghdad.281 
Impact of ISIS 
When ISIS took over the Ramadi Dam in 2015, the flow of water in the Euphrates River 
reaching Babel, Karbala, Najaf, and Qadisiyah provinces dropped below 50 percent of its normal 
rate and forced many the Arabs living in the Anbar province to flee.282 The restrained flow of the 
Euphrates River has also had a serious impact on the southern marshlands in the Dhi Qar 
Province, causing large swaths of ecologically rich wetlands to be completely dried up and 
threatening a cholera outbreak due to increasing levels of salinization and poor sanitization. 
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UNICEF reports that the average availability of drinking water in the region has declined by 50 
percent,283 and some highly populated areas, such as Aleppo and Hamah, have seen their average 
water availability decline by as much as 80 percent.284 The IAU reported that in the first six 
months of 2010, there were over 360,000 diarrhea cases as a result of polluted drinking water 
and poor hygiene practices, and 8 percent of the rural population use saline shallow village wells 
as a main source of drinking water.285 With ISIS controlling virtually all of the water supply in 
the area, the number of casualties due to waterborne diseases is expected to increase 
dramatically. As a result of the threatened and polluted water supply, typhoid fever has erupted 
in the refugee camp of Yarmouk outside of Damascus. 
Conclusion 
The riparians must recognize that their inability to effectively manage their infrastructure or 
protect their citizens from the consequences of water shortages has played a significant role in 
the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East. The lack of effective oversight and management has 
set up the states for economic and social failure and paved the way for radical non-state actors to 
effectively seize and maintain territory by controlling the basic resource that is essential to all 
life. In order to retake the region and save the lives of millions of people, riparians must put their 
sovereign differences aside and cooperate on an effective and cohesive water management 
strategy that results in equitable and sustainable distribution. If these governments continue to 
debate water rights as if they were economic commodities and thereby neglect the logistics of 
sustainable supply and demand management, the region may never know peace. 
While the consequences of resource scarcity often disproportionately affect disadvantaged and 
impoverished groups, “the water wars will not spare anyone.” However, the main difference 
between waging wars over water and the current situation of fighting wars with water is that two 
states fighting over water have typically eventually ceded in some kind of arrangement. Even the 
most optimistic international diplomats cannot hope for this kind of outcome with ISIS. If Syria, 
Iraq, and Turkey hope to ever regain control of the region and avoid another tragedy like this in 
the future, they are going to have to cooperate on a cohesive, sustainable, and equitable water 
management strategy.  
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Chapter 12. The Energy-Water-Food Nexus and the Syrian Civil War 
by Ryan Brown 
Introduction 
The generally held belief, offered by Western media, is that the Syrian civil war and the rise of 
non-state actors such as ISIS were either an uprising in reaction to the brutality of the Bashar al-
Assad  regime or a byproduct of  the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Both of these viewpoints, 
though partly valid, offer only a superficial look at the internal politics of Syria. There is no 
arguing that Syria is a failed state, but this failure was a result of the inability of Bashar al-
Assad’s authoritarian regime to adapt to three crises that he inherited after assuming power in 
2000. First, Syria was approaching peak oil and natural gas production, and thus needed to plan 
for a reduction of a substantial revenue stream. Second, ineffective water policy that prioritized 
self-sufficiency in wheat production, rather than sustainability, depleted the water table in a 
drought-prone region. Third, climate change was increasing the regional frequency and intensity 
of drought, yet Syria did not plan accordingly. The inflexible Syrian state was subject to what 
has been defined as the “resource curse,” where its reliance on oil wealth to provide services and 
maintain stability created weak institutions that promoted unsustainable energy and water policy. 
This chapter examines the role of energy and water policy mismanagement, which led to a 
myriad of internal crises including drought, famine, migration, and ultimately civil conflict. 
The chapter first describes the domestic situation prior to the conflict—declining state revenues 
from fossil  fuel extraction and simultaneously decreased access to water and depressed 
agricultural production. Second, the academic literature is examined to explain why weak 
institutions formed and how leadership continued with status quo policies rather than adapting to 
changing circumstances. Third, energy and water policies are studied to show how states 
dependent on resource wealth are unsustainable in the long run. 
Peak Oil Production and Declining Revenues 
Syrian oil production started in the 1980s and peaked at nearly 600,000 barrels per day in 1996, 
or 0.5 percent of world production (see Figure 12.1). Oil production follows a bell-shaped curve 
consistent with economic theories regarding exhaustible resources. Due to the finite nature of 
any resource, the rate of production grows, peaks, and then declines. The exhaustibility of a 
country’s resources assumes that no new reserves are found and no new technology is discovered 
that would unlock previously unobtainable reserves. 
Syria became a net oil importer in 2009. This should not have been a surprise, as a 2005 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) report estimated that the state would become a net importer 
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in 2010 and that gross revenues would peak in 2006.286 Even though production was declining, 
prior to the conflict proceeds from oil exports still made up roughly a quarter of government 
spending, which was possible due to high prices on the world market.287 
Starting during the regime of Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, oil revenues were spent on 
irrigation projects used to promote agricultural self-sufficiency and also to subsidize consumer 
goods. The state subsidized the refined petroleum product, gasoil, and also paid a production 
subsidy to farmers. These policies created market distortions making consumers dependent on 
low priced oil and farmers dependent on state purchases of agricultural production above world 
prices. Both policies drained foreign reserves that were obtained from the sale of fossil fuels. As 
oil revenues declined and population increased, continued state subsidies were no longer 
realistic. 
Figure 12.1 
Syrian Peak Oil Production 
   Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Country Report: Syria,” last updated June 2015, 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=SYR. 
In addition, rather than using oil revenues to diversity Syria’s energy mix, the state used oil to 
produce electricity. This created an unsustainable domestic reliance on oil for electricity 
generation, which ideally would have been exported to benefit the Syrian people. As shown in 
                                                 286 International Monetary Fund, “IMF Country Report No. 05/356, Syrian Arab Republic: 2005 Article IV 
Consultation-Staff Report; and Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Decision,” October 2005, 




Figure 12.2, 94 percent of Syria’s electricity production was fossil fuel-based. Hydroelectric 
power played a small role, providing about 6 percent of Syria’s electricity. Beginning in the 
1990s, there was some transfer to natural gas for electricity production, but this only exemplifies 
the inability of the state to adapt, relying once again on an exhaustible resource. Syria became a 
net natural gas importer in 2008.288 Now that Syria had to import oil and natural gas to provide 
electricity, the state was forced to purchase fossil fuels from abroad, putting the state in debt and 
reducing its ability to provide services to its citizens. 
Figure 12.2 
Syrian Energy Mix 




The 2006-2010 drought was the most severe in the recorded history of Syria, and preceded the 
beginning of the civil war.289 Precipitation rates during this period were half of the historic long-
term average.290 The rural economy was severely affected as crops failed and much of the 
region’s livestock died. Northeast Syria, where most of Syrian agricultural production occurred, 
was hit dramatically hard, with 75 percent of crops failing. A UN Food and Agricultural 
Organization report stated that the provinces of al-Raqqah, al-Hasakah, and Dair al-Zur were 
                                                 288 Ibid. 289 Kelley et al., “Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian Drought.” 290 Vivian Tou’meh, “Drought exhausts affected communities in Syria,” International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies, August 19, 2014, http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/drought-exhausts-affected-
communities-syria. 
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plagued by “total crop failure” during the 2007-2008 growing season.291 Syria’s economy was 
crippled due to the droughts, creating substantial hardship and forcing farmers to migrate in 
search of employment. 
Prior to 2007, agriculture accounted for 25 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.292 
During the drought, farmers in the northeast region lost 90 percent of their income and 80 
percent of their livestock.293 In 2007-2008, the drought reduced yearly wheat production to 2.1 
million tons, compared to the long-term average of 4.7 million (see Figure 12.3). Syria was 
forced to import wheat, its staple crop, for the first time in 15 years.294 Internally displaced 
persons from these regions largely moved to Syria’s cities, increasing the country’s urban 
population by 20 percent and turning these cities into centers of unemployment and unrest. An 
estimated 1.5 million Syrians moved from rural to urban centers or left the country all 
together.295 
Figure 12.3. 
The Effects of Drought on Syrian Wheat Production 
 
   Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, “Commodity Intelligence Report,” 
July 23, 2015, http://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2015/07/Syria/Index.htm.  
                                                 291 Fred H. Lawson, Global Security Watch: Syria (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 49. 292 Ibid. 293 Tou’meh, “Drought exhausts affected communities in Syria.” 294 Ibid. 295 Lawson, Global Security Watch: Syria. 
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Climate Change Intensified Water Scarcity 
Arid regions such as the Middle East, which are prone to drought, are increasingly at risk due to 
the effects of climate change. In Syria, westerly winds bringing moist air from the Mediterranean 
have decreased, while temperatures have increased.296 Less moisture in the air reduces 
precipitation and higher temperatures increase reservoir evaporation, both of which reduce the 
amount of water available for human consumption or agricultural use. Figure 12.4 shows these 
trends culminating in a negative Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI), with a negative three 
indicating severe drought.297 Climate change made the drought three times as likely to occur as 
compared to natural variability and intensified the drought’s severity.298 
Figure 11.4. 
Climate Trends in the Fertile Crescent 
 
   Source: Colin P. Kelley, Shahrzad Mohtadib, Mark A. Canec, Richard Seagerc, and Yochanan Kushnir, “Climate 
change in the fertile crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 112(11) (March 17, 2015): 3241-3246. 
                                                 296 Kelley et al., “Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian Drought.” 297 Climate Prediction Center, National Weather Service, “Drought Indices Explanation,” 
http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_monitoring/cdus/palmer_drought/wpdanote.shtml 298 Kelley et al., “Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian Drought.” 
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The Resource Curse and Authoritarian Regimes  
An often-cited article by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner defines what is known in economic 
literature as the resource curse.299 Many countries that are endowed with abundant natural 
resources grow slower economically than natural resource-scarce countries.300 A variety of 
potential causes exist for the squandering of resource revenues, including corruption, weak 
institutions, and a lack of fiscal linkage to productive industries. Resource revenues are more 
likely to be consumed, either by corrupt or inept leadership, rather than invested properly. Often, 
resource revenues are used to maintain control of the citizenry instead of investing in the human 
or physical capital of the state. 
Political scientist Michael L. Ross built upon the theory of the resource curse when he looked at 
the reasons why resource-rich authoritarian regimes are unlikely to become democracies. He 
defines the effects of resource wealth, which are discussed below and then applied to the Syrian 
state. 
Resource-rich governments use low taxes and directed spending to maintain power and reduce 
calls for accountability; this can be described as the rentier effect.301 The fiscally weak Syrian 
regime could not properly respond to the drought or declining oil production, and therefore was 
unable to continue to pay for consumer or production subsidies. Without the benefit of low 
priced consumer goods or proper access to water, the support of Syrian citizens could no longer 
be bought off. 
States with substantial oil revenues tend to spend heavily on internal security, using coercion to 
control its people. Ross defines this as the repression effect. States that are dependent on oil 
revenues are prone to instability when oil production dips. The market distortions, created by 
unsustainable policies, create dependency and once government revenues can no longer fund 
state-sponsored programs, the dependency turns to desperation and eventual civil unrest. The 
authoritarian state must then resort to coercive force to maintain power.302 
Syria also suffered from the modernization effect, where resource-rich states do not invest in the 
social or cultural changes required for proper development. These changes would include 
occupational specialization, urbanization, and education.303 Production subsidies in the 
agricultural sectors reduce the likelihood for these changes to occur. For example, these 
subsidies motivated Syrians to go into the agricultural sector because they were paid higher than 
world market price for their production, and thus were not motivated to learn other trades or 
move to urban areas. In addition, children are likely to be put to work in the field rather than sent 
to school in this situation. Overall, these agricultural subsidies stunted the development of the 
Syrian economy. 
                                                 299 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “The Curse of Natural Resources,” European Economic Review 45 
(2001): 827-838. 300 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, Working Paper 
5398,” December 1995, National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/papers/w5398. 301 Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53 (2001): 325-361. 302 Ibid. 303 Ibid. 
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The following sections will look at the ineffective policies aimed to maintain the rentier effect 
and how those policies hastened the decline of the Syrian state, eventually forcing the regime to 
use violence to maintain control. 
Promotion of Agricultural Self Sufficiency led to Water Scarcity 
The Syrian economy has traditionally been agricultural, and 90 percent of the state’s water is 
used in irrigation.304 When oil production took off in the 1980s, the regime of Hafez al-Assad 
chose to invest to increase agricultural production with the hope of attaining food self-
sufficiency. State policies directed toward the agricultural sector made sense politically, as rural 
citizens, who worked in this sector, made up the base of Ba’ath party power.305 
The water scarcity of Syria is largely a result of Ba’ath party policies promoting food self-
sufficiency via the expansion of irrigation.306 These policies served the short-run goal of 
maintaining the Ba’ath party’s base of power, but in the long run, unsustainable water policy 
produced drought and hardship for those involved in agriculture. Simply put, the goal of food 
self-sufficiency produced a negative externality: water scarcity. 
In addition, the Ba’ath party’s focus on subsidizing and promoting agriculture produced a culture 
of dependence, where farmers relied on state assistance to maintain their livelihoods. The culture 
of dependence was inherent in the creation of a civil society based solely on promoting 
agriculture policy. The government created a pro-Ba’ath sub-elite, called the Peasants’ Union, 
which was able to mobilize the rural areas. This group lobbied for support of the agricultural 
sector and even campaigned against groundwater pumping limitations.307 The current Assad 
regime was caught in a dilemma when it promoted unsustainable water management in order to 
keep the support of the Peasants’ Union, but over the long run, these same policies magnified 
water quantity issues and worsened the poverty in rural areas. 
The policies of both the current and former Assad regimes laid the groundwork for the 
humanitarian crisis. The other states in the region were able to adapt to the change in water 
availability, and large-scale migration and malnutrition happened only in Syria.308 Fifty years of 
unsustainable water management created a situation where the state could not respond properly 
to the drought. 
Strategic Crop Subsidies 
Syria sets prices and quantities of seven “strategic crops” including wheat, barley, cotton, sugar 
beet, tobacco, and lentils. The state buys these goods from domestic producers above the world 
                                                 304 Jessica Barnes, “Managing the Waters of Ba’ath Country: The Politics of Water Scarcity in Syria,” Geopolitics 
14 (2009): 510-530. 305 Aysegül Kibaroğlu and Sezin Iba Gürsoy, “Water-energy-food nexus in a transboundary context: the Euphrates-
Tigris river basin as a case study,” Water International 40 (2015): 824-838. 306 Barnes, “Managing the Waters of Ba’ath Country: The Politics of Water Scarcity in Syria.” 307 Ibid. 308 Francesca De Chatel, “The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: Untangling the Triggers 
of Revolution,” Middle Eastern Studies 50 (2014): 521-535. 
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market price in order to increase production and promote self-sufficiency.309 For example, the 
state will pay farmers 60 percent above the world price for its main staple crop, wheat.310 This 
policy promoted wheat production and successfully achieved self-sufficiency in the country’s 
staple crop, but the long-term effects of such a market distortion were water table depletion and 
an agricultural sector reliant on subsidies funded by an exhaustible resource. 
The inability to respond to the reduction in annual precipitation was due to a tradition of 
unsustainable water policy featuring unregulated water table access and large-scale state 
irrigation projects. Syria subsidized the production of many strategic crops in order to create self-
sufficiency and increase production, depleting the water table in the process. Further, the state 
subsidized the price of domestically consumed oil, promoting increased pumping of 
groundwater. The effects of climate change further magnified the effects of the drought. The 
natural occurrence of drought in the region was intensified by unsustainable water policy by 
Syria coupled with the natural process of desertification, a result of climate change. 
Removal of Gasoil Subsidies 
The Syrian state subsidized the price of its domestically consumed petroleum product, gasoil. It 
is used for transportation, heating, and agricultural purposes. These subsidies kept fuel prices low 
for Syrian citizens but created a dependence on low price oil that was difficult to break after oil 
production dropped since its peak in 1996. The Assad regime has been forced to spend its 
foreign reserves to maintain price stability in order to mitigate civil unrest, but in the context of 
declining oil revenues, the policy was unsustainable. 
Syria made efforts to reduce gasoil subsidies in order to aid the budget shortfall and liberalize the 
economy preparing for WTO accession. In 2008, the state tripled the price of gasoil from 
US$0.15 to US$0.45 per liter, while the Syrian state imported the refined product for $1 per liter, 
costing the state US$9 billion per year.311 To put this number in perspective, the Syrian GDP in 
2007 was only $40 billion.312 The gasoil subsidy alone cost the Syrian government nearly a 
fourth of its GDP. In addition, the subsidized gasoil price created a black market for smuggling 
the product to neighboring states, such as Lebanon.313 The Syrian government then increased the 
price of state-provided gasoil hoping to provide the state with more fiscal security while also 
reducing the motivation for black market operations. 
Higher gasoil prices were a hardship for the average Syrian citizen and potentially lead to unrest. 
The government hoped to aid in the cost of this vital living expense by raising public sector 
salaries by 25 percent.314 The agricultural sector was particularly susceptible to a price increase 
as gasoil is used for irrigation pumps and transport of produce. In response, the Assad regime 
                                                 309 Barnes, “Managing the Waters of Ba’ath Country: The Politics of Water Scarcity in Syria.” 310 Ibid. 311 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria slashes oil gas subsidy, tripling price,” Reuters, May 3, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-subsidies-idUSL0319586220080503. 312 The World Bank, “Syrian Arab Republic, Data,” http://data.worldbank.org/country/syrian-arab-republic. 313 Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections, “Syria can no longer afford fuel subsidy,” December 15, 2007, 
http://www.gasandoil.com/news/2008/01/ntm80365,. 314 Oweis, “Syria slashes oil gas subsidy, tripling price.” 
 113 
announced that it would increase production subsidies for strategic crops, such as wheat and 
cotton.315 In 2009, direct cash transfers by the Agricultural Support Fund mitigated the impacts 
of the increase in gasoil price and the liberalization of Syria’s fertilizer market.316 The Assad 
regime attempted to reduce the market distortions in the gasoil market but furthered government 
intervention in the labor and strategic crop markets. These are the actions of a regime desperately 
hoping to maintain power. 
Conclusion 
The Syrian state was highly reliant on oil proceeds to maintain control. The state used fossil fuel 
revenues to subsidize consumer goods rather than creating sustainable energy and water policies. 
A reduction in revenues due to peak oil production made state subsidies unsustainable. 
Investments in irrigation and production subsidies to promote self-sufficiency in wheat 
production depleted water tables. This depletion coupled with the effects of climate change led to 
a crippling drought causing famine and internal instability. The state responded with violence 
because it was unable to continue with policies used to maintain control. 
After taking control in 1999, the Bashar al-Assad regime should have invested in sustainable 
energy production and realistic water management, but this was not possible due to the weak 
institutions and corrupt practices typical of resource-rich authoritarian states.  In the short run, 
the state was able to maintain control, but over the long term, it was inevitable that the state 
would fail. Currently, oil and natural gas extraction are almost non-existent and overcrowded 
urban centers are even less likely to provide access to food and water for their residents. Today, 
this failed regime faces a loss of autonomy to external forces, such as Russia and Iran, or the 
threat to be overthrown by non-state actors such as ISIS. 
 
 
                                                 315 Ibid. 316 International Monetary Fund, “Syrian Arab Republic: 2009 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report; and Public 
Information Notice,” IMF Country Report: Syria No. 10/86, March 2010, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ 
ft/scr/2010/cr1086.pdf. 
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Chapter 13. Shifting Demographics as a Result of Dam Construction in Southeast Turkey 
by Rachel Weinheimer 
Introduction and Problem Statement 
The Southeastern Anatolia Project (in Turkish, Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi or GAP) was started 
in 1976 and has yet to reach full completion. The primary objective of this system of 22 dams 
was to generate hydroelectric power to most of Turkey and irrigate 1.7 million hectares of land 
in Turkey’s most underdeveloped region. The construction of these dams saw sizeable shifts in 
Turkey’s population, both in terms of populations displaced due to flooding and those attracted 
to the massive project seeking work. 
This chapter explores various aspects of the effects on the population in Southeast Turkey caused 
by the dam. The demographics of the region are mapped and then correlated to provinces that 
experienced the most impact. One of the cornerstones of the analysis in this project involved 
correlating population decrease and growth within a given time period (1990-2010) in the dam 
region. As part of this analysis, rural and urban demographic shifts are also calculated. 
Has the region witnessed an increase or decrease in population since the beginning of GAP 
construction in the early 1990s? The hypothesis is that the region decreased in population, which 
would indicate a negative correlation between the dam projects in Southeast Turkey and the 
economic success of dams in the region. 
Southeast Region of Turkey 
Turkey has a population of approximately 78 million people.317 Out of this total, approximately 
8.25 million people live in Turkey’s Southeast Anatolia Region. Figure 13.1 shows the nine 
provinces in Southeast Turkey where GAP is located. Several provinces lie on the international 
border between Syria and/or Iraq. 
Turkey does not collect statistics on the ethnicity or identity of its population, but it’s well 
known that this area is home to a mix of Kurdish, Turkish, and Arabic populations.318 It’s 
important to note that the majority of Kurds also identify as Turks and most are fully conversant 
in Turkish, which is the official language of Turkey. In order to approximate Kurdish ethnic 
identity within Turkey, a map was constructed with recent (June 2015) voting data depicting the 
percentage of people at the provincial level who voted for Peoples’ Democratic Party (in 
Turkish, Halkların Demokratik Partisi or HDP). The HDP represents a left-wing party that 
sympathizes with minority and Kurdish issues. As can be seen in Figure 13.2, the HDP’s voting 
base is concentrated exclusively in Turkey’s Southeast. It follows that the GAP region is 
                                                 317 Turkish Statistical Institute, “Main Statistics; Populations Statistics; Population of Provinces by Years” (Excel 
file), accessed May 2016, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do. 318 Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Turkey: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1995). 
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primarily located within Kurdish-majority areas, but the Kurdish population extends beyond the 
provinces of the GAP region.  
Figure 13.1. 
Southeastern Anatolia Project Provinces, Turkey 
           Source:  Created by author. 
Shifting Demographics 
Figure 13.3 displays Turkey’s shifts in demographics during the two-decade period when dam 
construction was most active. The map shows percent changes in population between 1990 and 
2010, when dam-building had the most impact on the region.319 During these two decades, the 
GAP region experienced a dramatic growth in population. Turkey’s major western cities 
(Istanbul, Antalya, Izmir, and Bursa) also experienced exceptional growth during this period. 
Table 13.1 is a graphical presentation of Figure 13.3. Since data was not available below the 
provincial labels, this table was constructed to include shifts from rural to urban populations 
during Turkey’s dam-building period in the provinces most impacted by the GAP.  
                                                 319 It should also be noted that although the dam-building regime continues to impact this region, the map and table 
only take into account the population up to the year 2010. Beginning in 2011, neighboring Syria devolved into civil 
war, which caused millions to flee from violence. At the time of this writing, Turkey has accepted over 2.5 million 
refugees, many of whom were settled in refugee camps in the provinces of Gaziantep and Kilis, which would 
encompass the GAP region. 
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Figure 13.2. 
June 2015 HDP Election Results 
  Source:  Created by author. 
Though Table 13.1 captures the trends of Turkish population growth and urbanization, this is not 
to say that growth or decline can be solely attributed to the dam project. Of particular note is 
civilian displacement due to violence in Turkey’s southeast. From August 1984 until the present, 
Turkey has experienced waves of internal violence attributed to clashes between Turkish 
Security Forces and the separatist guerilla movement Partia Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK).320 
Residents in the southeast are commonly caught in the crossfire of either police or terrorist 
violence, and an estimated two million civilians were displaced in the early 1990s.321 These 
populations were often forced from their homes and fled to larger cities (both in the southeast 
and Turkey’s west), which would also affect the urban to rural shift. These trends are well-
documented in contemporary Turkish press and government statements.322,323 
 
                                                 320 Christopher Panico, “Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds From Southeastern Turkey,” Human Rights 
Watch/Helsinki 6(12) (October 1994), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/TURKEY94O.PDF. 321 Ibid. 322 Kenneth Katzmann, “Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors,” CRS Report for Congress, August 
1998, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/crs/Cterror2.htm. 323 U.S. Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Situation of Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and 
Iran: Briefing of the commission on security and cooperation in Europe” (Washington, D.C.: Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1993). 
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Figure 13.3 
Percent Population Change 1990-2010 
Source:  Created by author. 
Table 13.1. 






















Adıyaman 513,131 219,304 293,827 590,935 347,236 243,699 15 58 -17 
Şanlıurfa 1,001,455 551,124 450,331 1,663,371 922,539 740,832 66 67 65 
Mardin 557,727 249,032 308,685 744,606 428,899 315,707 34 72 2 
Gaziantep 1,140,594 821,127 319,467 1,823,898 1,587,489 236,409 60 93 -26 
Siirt 243,435 110,139 133,296 300,695 181,410 119,285 24 65 -11 
Diyarbakır 1,094,996 600,640 494,356 1,528,958 1,090,172 438,786 40 82 -11 
Turkey 56,473,035 33,326,351 23,146,684 73,722,988 56,222,356 12,500,632 31 69 -24 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, “Main Statistics; Populations Statistics; Population of Provinces by Years” 
(Excel file), accessed May 2016, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do. 
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Connecting Demographic Shifts to the Dam Project 
Due to the dams, there was also a dramatic shift in the physical environment of Southeast 
Turkey, specifically in terms of land use and land cover. The photographs in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 
in Chapter 3 show how the construction of the Atatürk Dam altered the landscape of the adjacent 
area from 1993 to 2002, creating fertile land for irrigation known as the Harran Plains. 
In general, populations tended to increase in areas that enjoy higher percentages of irrigated 
lands, compared to rates prior to dam construction. Though it can be argued that the dams 
promote agricultural expansion, the inverse could reasonably be expected to be true, in that 
population growth was driven by agricultural expansion. The accepted theory is summarized by 
Meyer and Turner: 
“...given sustained growth in population, agricultural land use expands and 
intensifies, involving conversion and modification of land cover. Sustained 
population decline has the opposite effect. The lessons are that agricultural land 
uses and covers have much to do with the character of the economy, but that a key 
element of demand in the economy is the level of population.”324 
In Turkey’s case, those settled in irrigation areas gained the most, while those living in the future 
reservoir area were forced to move. The government offered cash or land as compensation, and 
the vast majority chose cash.325 
Demographic Engineering 
Demographic engineering is defined as the state-directed movement of ethnic groups.326 The 
motivations for these actions vary; some have no qualitative component, such as instances of 
resettlement after a natural disaster. Others involve state-directed expulsions against the will of 
certain populations, such as ethnic or religious minorities. The means vary as well, and can 
involve both incentives (land, cash, jobs) or forced expulsion. 
Turkey’s GAP has been accused in both print media and academic articles of engendering a 
component of demographic engineering. The widely-publicized story of Hasankeyf, a Kurdish-
majority town with historical significance slated to be flooded by the end of the Ilısu project’s 
(the final component of the GAP) completion, illustrates this point. Though the flooding of 
Hasankeyf remains a deeply controversial issue and appears frequently in Turkish and 
international headlines,327 demographic engineering does not appear to be the primary purpose of 
                                                 324 William B. Meyer and B. L. Turner II, “Human Population Growth and Global Land-Use/Cover Change,” 
Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 23(1) (1992): 55. 325 Ryo Fujikura and Mikiyasu Nakayama, “The long-term impacts of resettlement programmes resulting from dam 
construction projects in Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Sri Lanka and Turkey: A comparison of land-for-land and cash 
compensation schemes,”  International Journal of Water Resources Development 29(1) (2013): 4-13. 326 John McGarry, “‘Demographic Engineering’: The state-directed movement of ethnic groups as a technique of 
conflict regulation,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 21(4) (June 1998): 613-638. 327 Harte, Julia, “New Dam in Turkey Threatens to Flood Ancient City and Archaeological Sites,” National 
Geographic, February 2014, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/02/140221-tigris-river-dam-hasankeyf-
turkey-iraq-water/  
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the GAP. Though arguments have been published that the flooded reservoir sites will disrupt 
PKK logistics and movement,328 economic development remains the primary purpose of the dam 
regime. That said, the PKK has used terror tactics to slow or halt the completion of the Ilısu dam 
and little progress is currently being made on the project due to regional violence and security 
threats.329 
Conclusion 
Mapping of the GAP region shows that Turkey experienced sizeable population shifts during the 
two-decade period of dam construction. Despite an uptick in regional violence during this time, 
Turkey’s southeast experienced population growth and urbanization. This disproves my initial 
hypothesis. In future studies, Turkey’s urbanization trends could be further analyzed in order to 
deduce possible explanations for these trends. Field research and the use of surveys, in particular, 
would benefit the current body of literature that exists on this topic. 
 
                                                 328 Yavuz, Ramazan, “PKK'ya karşı planlanan o barajlardan ikisi tamam,” Milliyet, October 26, 2011, 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/pkk-ya-karsi-planlanan-o-barajlardan-ikisi-tamam-/gundem/gundemdetay/26.10. 
2011/1455488/default.htm. 329 Agence France-Presse, “Kurdish militants threaten to attack Turkey dams,” July 12, 2015, 
http://news.yahoo.com/kurdish-militants-threaten-attack-turkey-dams-134949094.html.  
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Chapter 14. Alternative Irrigation Management Practices in the Euphrates-Tigris basin of Turkey 
by Melissa Stelter 
This chapter reviews current irrigation management practices in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin 
of Turkey and discusses other management tools that could be implemented in this region. The 
lessons learned from various regions of Turkey and case studies from other countries are applied 
to the Tigris-Euphrates basin. This information helps to develop an equitable and efficient plan 
to price water in a way that accounts for the economic best use of water and encourages farmers 
to conserve water while cultivating crops for which they have a competitive advantage in the 
global market. 
Background 
Geography of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin 
Both the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers originate in Eastern Turkey. The Euphrates is fed by 
snowpack in the mountainous region between the Black Sea and Lake Van and its river basin 
covers 879,790 square kilometers, 22 percent of which is located within Turkey. The river forms 
from the confluence of the Murat and Karasu tributaries. Downstream, after joining the Tigris 
River, both form the Shatt Al-Arab River, which drains into the Persian Gulf.330 
History 
The Euphrates-Tigris river basin is managed by the General Directorate of State Hydraulics 
Works (DSI). Its functions gained in importance from the GAP project. The DSI was created in 
1954 to manage both hydropower and irrigation water. The GAP project was established in 1977 
to develop the water resources of the southeast Anatolia region to improve social welfare. GAP 
led to the construction of 22 dams and 1.8 million hectares of irrigated land in the region.331 
In the early 1960s the DSI began transferring the management of irrigation schemes and fee 
collection to local irrigation districts or water user associations. The transfer rates accelerated in 
the 1990s and it has since been found that irrigation managed by local water user associations or 
irrigation districts have more success in assessing and collecting fees.332 This element of local 
management is important to policy and administrative decisions because the fees assessed to 
farmers are determined by each water user association and the revenues are allocated in different 
ways.  
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Benefits 
The rapid construction of dams and expansion of irrigation networks has proven successful as 65 
percent of villages in the Şanlıurfa-Harran Plains region increased their income while non-
irrigating villages saw only a 46 percent increase in income. Miyata and Fujii also found that 
villages with irrigation saw an increase in their access to different types of food, that women had 
more leisure time, and that villages with irrigation were more likely to grow high-value crops 
like cotton.333 These improvements in social welfare, income, and health are one important result 
of the GAP program. 
Necessity, Challenges, and Considerations 
Irrigation in Southeast Turkey is necessary because the majority of rain falls from October to 
March, outside of the summer growing season. These irrigation services are not free of charge to 
the farmers; Turkey currently attempts to cover the costs of operations and management through 
a fee, based on crop type and the amount of land in production. However, fees are thought to fall 
short in covering the costs by about ten dollars per decar. In addition to raising inadequate funds, 
this method does not promote the economical use of water or efficient on-farm water 
applications.334 Despite concerns about revenue shortfalls, farmers are seeing their profit margins 
decrease as water prices are increasing in proportion to their declining income. Due to this, they 
are less likely to invest in better irrigation infrastructure that could both boost water use 
efficiency and farmer incomes.335  
To further increase the conflicting interests of farmer welfare and economic efficiency, there 
have been decreases in stream flows and less precipitation resulting in reduced groundwater 
recharges336 while water use per capita has increased from 98 liters per day to 270 liters per day 
in the last two decades.337 Compounding the issue of increased water-use-per-capita, the 
population of Turkey is growing at 2.2 percent per year and the estimated population in 2025 
will exceed 91 million people.338 The diminishing water resources, increasing demand, growing 
population, and the tremendous benefits of irrigation necessitate government intervention to 
protect this resource and ensure that it is utilized to increase the welfare of farmers. To address 
these issues, I will review different policy options to balance these multiple and incongruent 
goals. 
When considering what plans to implement, there are several issues to consider. The Agriculture 
Reform Implementation Project removed some supports for farmers that resulted in higher 
fertilizer costs and subsequently less fertilizer use. Cultivated area declined and, as profits fell, 
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farmers began using traction (livestock or manual labor to plow fields) over machinery to 
cultivate their fields. This has resulted in increased poverty rates in the rural regions of the 
Southeast. While a change in irrigation policy cannot address the effects of the Agriculture 
Reform Implementation Program, it is essential to protect the revenue of small farmers. In 
addition to concerns about farmer welfare, the water used for irrigation is also used in 
hydroelectric energy production.339 Water releases from dams on the Euphrates-Tigris River are 
influenced by the country’s energy needs and so at time there may be too much or too little water 
supplied to farmers.340 These issues further emphasize the need for more efficient irrigation 
techniques and management practices. 
Current Practices 
A survey conducted on the GAP region by Aksit and Akcay provides background information on 
current practices and how they are viewed by farmers. At present, 22.6 percent of farmers use 
sprinkler irrigation,341 which is 75-85 percent efficient.342 They use this more expensive but 
efficient form of irrigation because they are required to do so by the DSI. Of those that didn’t use 
sprinkler irrigation, about 6.2 percent used flood irrigation, 29.4 percent used furrows, and 41.8 
percent used basin irrigation. The traditional irrigation methods (basin and flood) were employed 
for several reasons. Farmers typically lacked level land or equipment to level their land as is 
required for more sophisticated irrigation techniques, so it saved labor to utilize these less 
efficient but more easily implemented irrigation schemes. Farmers also didn’t know that these 
methods improved yields over non-irrigated farming. However, of those who irrigated, only 18.3 
percent learned how to do so from an extension agent, indicating that there is a dearth of 
irrigation knowledge in these villages.343 
On average, farmers spent between one-third to one-fourth of their total expenditures on 
irrigation costs and only 38 percent felt that these charges were too high; 21 percent stated this 
was fair, and 41 percent stated that prices were too low. When discussing the collection of 
payments and the consequences of late payments, 37.5 percent felt that, in the case of late 
payments, the water supply should be stopped; 38.1 percent suggested high fines and 9 percent 
suggested that the land be confiscated. Compared to the current 10 percent late fee, these 
consequences are very harsh, but stricter punishments for late payments could improve 
efficiency. When asked about how water should be charged, 96 percent approved of the current 
method, which is based on the size of the land and the crop type, and only 3.4 percent approved 
of volumetric charges.344 
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The survey provides good insight into the current practices and perceptions of farmers. Farmers 
typically adopt more efficient irrigation techniques if they are required to do so by the DSI, they 
are willing to pay more for their water, and are supportive of harsher penalties for late payments. 
However, they are lacking adequate education on irrigation methods and are skeptical of volume-
based pricing. These insights will guide my selection of different policy tools. 
Proposed Solutions 
Agriculture Extension 
The first need to be addressed is the lack of education about different irrigation techniques. The 
survey by Aksit and Akcay provides excellent information about how farmers learn about 
irrigation, and offers guidance as to what type of extension support the farmers are seeking. The 
results indicate that the majority would prefer training (44 percent) and field demonstrations (39 
percent) while only 2.9 percent would like written materials or information delivered via 
television. Approximately 11.2 percent would like a combination of these services. Most farmers 
would prefer training during the winter (48.4 percent) which is a convenient time compared to 
summer (19.2 percent), spring (14.3 percent), or autumn (4.8 percent). One troubling result is 
that 84 percent agree that women should not be trained and that only male children should 
benefit from extension services (91 percent).345 As with the low support for volumetric-based 
pricing, this might be an area where the ideal decision does not have popular support. While the 
men who responded to these surveys might prefer for women to not be included in extension 
programs, these services should be available to all citizens in the region. An increase in 
extension programs will not likely lead to an increase of pressurized (drip or sprinkler) irrigation, 
but it will provide farmers with accurate information. These irrigation extension programs, in 
tandem with other interventions, will ensure that individual farmers properly implement new 
irrigation techniques. 
Water Pricing 
In addition to providing more agriculture extension services to educate farmers, I will review the 
effects of water pricing and subsidies to improve irrigation technology as means for promoting 
water conservation and aiding farmers. Ideally, the price for water should cover the costs of 
operations and management, opportunity costs, and environmental effects of water abstraction. 
By assigning a price to water, users are made more aware of the value of water and are 
encouraged to use water efficiently. As mentioned in the above cited Unver article, the DSI has 
the legal right to charge for water based on article 26 of DSI law which states that “all 
expenditures done to operate the scheme are paid by the beneficiaries themselves (except flood 
protection facilities, reclamation facilities, and facilities which make navigation convenient).” 
The article also suggests that the implementation of water pricing would allow for the 
development of a water market within the basin and encourage nighttime irrigation that is more 
efficient. One of the largest challenges to implementing a volume-based pricing scheme is the 
installation of water meters. This could be accomplished through government mandate or 
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subsidy. In the development of new irrigation schemes, water metering should be a pre-
requisite.346 
The price for water can be implemented in different ways and the literature indicates that an 
increasing block price model is the most effective pricing structure. Increasing blocks charge 
users based on the amount of water they use. Use quantities are divided into blocks and when a 
consumer moves from one block to the next, the price per unit jumps upwards. This has been 
shown to be effective for reducing water use without overburdening small farmers in Israel.347 
The other alternative is a uniform price. When comparing these two pricing structures, Bar-Shira 
found that a switch from a uniform price to a block rate resulted in a 7 percent reduction in water 
use while maintaining the same average price as a uniform structure. In addition to these 
decreases, the following year resulted in an additional 62 to 81 percent reduction. The block 
price doubles the reduction in used water when compared to the uniform price.348 In addition to 
reducing applied water, Medellín-Azuara found that doubling the price of water in California 
reduces applied rates by 33 percent, increased infrastructure investment by 12 percent, and 
yielded a total reduction of 17.7 percent in applied water use.349 In short, block rate prices reduce 
consumption at less cost to the producer and encourage investment in improved irrigation 
technology. 
While an increasing block rate structure is more efficient and better for small farmers, it does 
lead to a decrease in farmer income. Although a switch from an area-based fee to volumetric 
pricing could, depending on the price, lower income, it would likely affect larger farms and 
possibly benefit smaller farms. The article by Bar-Shira finds that, in general, small farmers do 
better under block-rate prices versus a uniform pricing system.350 Another potential issue is that, 
while water pricing models promote efficiency and capital investment in irrigation infrastructure, 
these improvements in efficiencies reduce the return flows from the soil to the water basin.351 
These issues will be addressed in a later section but the overall effect of block rate pricing is to 
more effectively promote water conservation at a lower cost to farmers, while encouraging 
investment. 
Subsidies 
Any irrigation method will improve yields and hopefully improve incomes, but the more 
expensive and efficient irrigation systems of sprinkler irrigation and drip irrigation should be 
promoted. Sprinkler irrigation systems are 75 to 85 percent efficient in their water use and drip 
irrigation, in addition to being 90 percent efficient, can deliver fertilizer to the plants and results 
in a reduced dependency on fungicides.352 When compared to the water use efficiency of surface 
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irrigation (40 percent), these methods are clearly better and, if Turkey switches to a volumetric 
pricing system, these systems could save money. To promote on-farm technology, the 
government could provide subsidies. In the article by Medellin-Azuara, they find that in 
California, a 50 percent subsidy of irrigation capital results in a 1 percent increase in land use, a 
44 percent increase in capital investments, a 16 percent increase in effective water use, and $130 
million increase in revenue.353 While the aim of these policies would be to increase farm 
revenue, the secondary goal of promoting water conservation must be considered. Seeing as 
subsidies increase effective water use, over-abstraction of surface water must be monitored. 
Overall, it is estimated that the adoption of pressurized (drip and sprinkler) irrigation systems 
would boost water use efficiency by 50 percent,354 raise farm income, increase crop yields, and 
reduce applied water.355 
Water Masters 
In Texas, the lower Rio Grande is managed by state employees commonly called “water 
masters.” While the water from the Rio Grande is allocated by water rights, which is not the case 
in Turkey, the water master program could be applicable to Turkey. Under this system, a water 
master, appointed by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, interprets the rules of the 
state and assists in allocating water resources according to the landowner’s water rights. A 
farmer will purchase the right to abstract a certain amount of water annually but, in the event of a 
drought, the water master has the power to reduce the amount of water received. Farmers pay an 
annual fee based on their allocated water rights and, if there is a water shortage, no portion of 
this fee is refunded.356  
On a daily basis the water master will receive requests for water allotments and then, after 
confirming that the farmer has a right to that water, the water master will release the appropriate 
amount of water to satisfy that day’s needs. An additional volume of water is released to account 
for losses in conveyance due to absorption into the soil or evaporation.357 This system is similar 
to one that Unver suggested for Turkey: “Therefore, volumetric charges would allow a water 
market to develop directly. Each tertiary would be entitled to a given total volume of water in a 
season, and to a given maximum volume in peak periods. Sales of water within a tertiary would 
be direct and simple. Sales between tertiaries, or between the irrigation management 
organization, would be dependent on irrigation system capacity constraints, but would not be 
difficult to manage, once volume measurement and systems were in place.”358 
His suggestion is a mix of a volumetric based price and water rights allocated to each irrigation 
district rather than to the individual farmer. Each irrigation district purchases an allotment of 
water and then sells that water to its farmers. By putting the irrigation districts in charge of 
requesting water allocations and then selling this water to its farmers, this system is taking on 
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characteristics of the water master system in the Rio Grande. This proposal could be an effective 
extension of the DSI’s initiative to transfer management to the irrigation districts. However, this 
plan would require more training for irrigation district employees and capital investment for 
water meters.  
Recommendations 
The shortcomings of both the subsidization of irrigation infrastructure and water pricing plans 
are that farmers have to pay more and that improved efficiency reduces return flows to the river. 
These are important concerns that can be mitigated through a well-formed program. The current 
area-based fee is insufficient in covering the operations and management costs, does not promote 
efficient on-farm water use, and does not account for the economic value of water. Based on 
conservation gains and improvements in efficiency seen through pressurized irrigation systems 
and water pricing models, I suggest that Turkey implement a block-rate water-pricing schedule 
alongside a subsidy program for improved irrigation methods. 
The subsidy could be distributed as a loan, a lump-sum transfer, or farmers could finance their 
irrigation improvements through an additional fee or per-unit price increase on their water. The 
implementation of water meters could be mandated by the government and administrated by the 
water user associations or it could be bundled with the infrastructure development subsidies. The 
investment in irrigation technology will boost yields and incomes for small farmers and alleviate 
stress on the nation’s water resources. With the addition of water metering, the associations can 
assess a volumetric price and farmers will have more information and control over their water 
use. 
Because the main goal of the GAP program is to improve farmer income, I suggest that block-
rate prices are implemented at a rate that does not immediately affect average farmer income. 
Block rate prices are shown to redistribute more of the costs to higher income farmers, so even 
without a constraint to maintain the current financial burden, a block-rate system will be more 
equitable than the current area-based fee. After farmers are provided an opportunity to adjust to 
the new pricing system and have been granted time to adopt more efficient irrigation practices, 
prices could be raised to cover the true operations and management costs of each irrigation 
district. This will require cooperation from the irrigation districts and the water user 
organizations in addition to guidance in setting the price. 
Farmers will oppose the implementation of a block-rate fee, as noted in the Aksit and Akjay 
survey, however they also stated that they were either happy with the current price of water or 
that it was too low. A system that does not drastically affect their incomes will be an area of 
compromise between the interests of farmers and promoting an efficient and equitable system. 
The survey also found that the 10 percent fee for late payments was judged to be an inadequate 
deterrent. While this would not likely affect water use rates, in the interest of maintaining a well-
run system, an increased penalty or an alternative and more effective penalty for late payments 
should be assessed.  
In addition to implementing the block-rate in an incremental manner and creating a program to 
mitigate the cost of irrigation infrastructure updates, there is a clear need for more agriculture 
extension work. By conducting more in-person training and field demonstrations, the extension 
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service can ensure that farmers using both traditional and pressurized irrigation techniques are 
doing so in the most water-efficient and cost-effective manner. These trainings should be 
available to men, women, and children who are engaged in agricultural work. 
The GAP project continues to elevate the social welfare and incomes of farmers in the Southeast 
Anatolia region, but with increased demand and reduced supply in the Euphrates-Tigris basin, 
the DSI must implement new policies to promote efficiency in water use. A properly 
implemented water-pricing model can maintain farmer income levels for a given period while 
they are provided the opportunity to improve their irrigation systems through government 
subsidies. With proper education by the agriculture extension service and increased pressure 
from the water pricing system, more farmers will adopt efficient irrigation techniques that will 
boost their income and reduce their ecological footprint. These practices, in conjunction with a 
management similar to that suggested by Unver or the water master system of the Rio Grande 
will prepare the Euphrates Tigris basin for climate change, improve water efficiency, and help 

















Chapter 15. Toward a Sustainable Management of the Rio Grande/Bravo and Colorado Rivers: Treaties, Institutions, and Minutes 
by Podie Chitan 
Introduction 
The 1944 Treaty for the Utilization of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande 
(1944 Treaty) may be viewed as the product of decades of institution-building.359,360 This process 
encouraged more cooperation in U.S.-Mexico cross-border water relations than we might 
otherwise have seen. This argument will be constructed through the juxtaposition of the spirits of 
the Harmon Doctrine of 1896 and a series of synchronous institutions that served as direct or 
indirect precursors to the 1944 Treaty. 
We set up an analytical framework that highlights the importance of gradual and pragmatic 
institution-building to bilateral cooperation, all the while admitting the “discounting effect of a 
“state of nature” brand of realism in international relations. We then provide an extensive review 
of the antecedents to the 1944 Treaty as a possible explanation for 1) the spirit in which said 
Treaty was concluded and 2) the institutions created by the Treaty: the International Boundary 
and Water Commission (IBWC; in Spanish Comisión Internacional de Límites y Aguas, CILA) 
and the minute process. 
We then employ its analytical framework to analyze post-1944 developments as they relate to the 
1944 Treaty and the IBWC. These developments, made possible by the Treaty’s minute process, 
will be viewed as analogous to the pre-1944 institution-building as discussed in the section on 
antecedents.  
We suggest that continued and incremental cooperation, through the IBWC’s minute process, 
will encourage a brand of cooperation that is “functional” and relies progressively less on selfish 
interpretations of “sovereignty” and “national interest.” We conclude with a discussion of a “new 
21st Century Minute”361 and its benefits to transboundary water relations between the U.S. and 
Mexico. 
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While an exposition of political philosophy is not the primary objective of this chapter, the 
following discussion serves to position and streamline our analysis. First we present working 
definitions of the three theories that we consider most relevant to the arguments advanced in this 
chapter. It is important to note that none of these theories represent “absolute truths.” For 
example, Jack Donnely argues that “Rather than a general theory of international relations, 
realism is best seen as a philosophical orientation or research program that emphasizes—in an 
insightful yet one-sided way—the constraints imposed by individual and national egoism and 
international anarchy.”362 Hence, our decision to use historical institutionalism, international 
relations functionalism, and realism is simply an attempt to take advantage of their respective 
“relative truths,” their analytical strengths, as it relates to the 1944 Treaty, the IBWC, and the 
minute process. Together, the three theories constitute our analytical framework. 
 Historical institutionalism. “Today’s sovereignty norms and practices are the result of an 
institutionalization process over more than three centuries, with salient elements of path 
dependency as well as historical contingency.... Yet such path-dependent patterns of 
development, in which initial choices preclude future options, do not exclude variations 
in the practices of sovereignty.”363  
 International relations functionalism. “The classic functionalist approach to world order 
is based on the assumption that states can create a peaceful world society through 
gradualistic and pragmatic cooperation with one another in technical and economic 
sectors of activity. Functionalism offers an alternative model of international order to the 
power politics approach to international relations which is characteristic of realism. The 
idea is to eliminate nationalism which is seen as the root cause of war by attacking 
national sovereignty.”364 
 Realism. Skepticism toward international laws, institutions, and ideals that attempt to 
transcend or replace nationalism.365 The following passages from Thomas Hobbes’ 
Leviathan are discussed by Charles Covell and are instructive of classical realist thought 
as it applies to the “state of nature.”366 
To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; that 
nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice 
have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where 
no law, non in justice... It is consequent also to the same condition, that there 
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be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be 
every man’s, that he can get: and for so long, as he can keep it.367 
I need not say anything in this place; because the law of nations, and the law 
of nature, is the same thing. And every sovereign hath the same right, in 
procuring the safety of his people, that any particular man can have, in 
procuring the safety of his own body. And the same law, that dictateth to men 
that have no civil government, what they ought to do, and what to avoid in 
regard of one another, dictateth the same to commonwealths, that is, to the 
consciences of sovereign princes and sovereign assemblies; there being no 
court of natural justice, but in the conscience only.368 
The present analytical framework is built on the premise/qualitative research hypothesis that a 
history of gradual institution-building and cooperation (functionalism), and the path dependency 
occasioned by the creation of norms and customs (historical institutionalism) provides the 
“conscience” that takes the sovereigns from their “state of nature” by placing constraints on the 
unbridled self-interest-driven nature of the sovereign through things such as customs and 
institutions. 
The chapter also demonstrates the following: 
 The future of the 1944 Treaty depends on a continuation of meaningful incremental 
gains. 
 The minute process allows for such gains to be made where formal treaty revision is 
unlikely. 
 A 21st Century Policy Minute would introduce a modern policy framework; and could 
revitalize the IBWC’s role in the sustainable management of international rivers. 
The analytical framework presented here, though developed for the purpose of this chapter, is not 
contrived. The UN highlights that: 
Legal agreements on water sharing have been negotiated and maintained even as 
conflicts have persisted over other issues. Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and 
Vietnam have been able to cooperate since 1957 within the framework of the 
Mekong River Commission, and they had technical exchanges throughout the 
Vietnam War. Since 1955 Israel and Jordan have held regular talks on the sharing 
of the Jordan River, even as they were until recently in a legal state of war. The 
Indus River Commission survived two wars between India and Pakistan…. These 
cases reflect two important elements of international water resources cooperation: 
the need for an institution to effectively develop a process of engagement over 
                                                 367 Charles Covell, Hobbes, Realism, and the Tradition of International Law (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, 
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time (author’s emphasis); and well-funded third-party support trusted by all 
factions.369 
Figure 14.1. 
Chart Conveying Hypothesis 
   Source: Compiled by author.  
   Note: The figure visualizes the analytical framework described above—it conveys that as cooperation and 
institutions increase, the state of nature is altered and persists at less pernicious levels.  
Antecedents to the 1944 Treaty 
This section discusses the historical developments and contexts leading to the ratification of the 
1944 Treaty, and their implications within our analytical framework. As discussed previously, 
the 1944 Treaty is the result of decades of institution- and custom-building juxtaposed against an 
incipient international order that approximated a “state of nature.” 
1848 
On February 2, 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed marking the end of the 
Mexican-American War. As a product of its resounding defeat in the war, Mexico ceded 525,000 
square miles (1.3 million square kilometers) to the U.S. That parcel of ceded territory made up 
parts of modern-day Arizona California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. 
Mexico also gave up all claims to Texas and recognized the Rio Grande as America’s southern 
boundary in exchange for $15 million.370 
                                                 369 United Nations, “Transboundary Waters,” 2016,  http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/transboundary_ 
waters.shtml. 370 History.com, “Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,” 2016, http://www.history.com/topics/treaty-of-guadalupe-hidalgo. 
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The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo continues to be a sore spot for many Mexicans. Americans too 
were uncomfortable with the war. The Massachusetts legislature of the day considered it “a war 
of conquest” and “a crime.”371 
1853 
On December 30, 1853, James Gadsden was granted full powers to affect the “Gadsden 
Purchase,” which became necessary to facilitate the construction of the Southern Pacific 
Railroad. Under the 1848 Treaty, the Southern U.S. border was defined by the line of the Gila 
River and the Rio Grande. Plans for the Southern Pacific Railroad, key to developing the newly 
acquired territory (under the 1848 Treaty), would take the project south of the Gila River. 
Gadsden was able to purchase an additional 30,000 square miles (77,000 square kilometers) in 
what is today Southern New Mexico and Arizona.372 (See Figure 15.2 for territorial acquisitions 
and dates.) 
The resulting Treaty Relative to Boundary Line, Transit of Persons, Etc., Across the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec (1853 Treaty) is considered by some to be the most direct precursor to the 1944 
Treaty. Article 1 of the 1853 Treaty establishes: 
For the performance of this portion of the Treaty, each of the two Governments 
shall establish one Commissioner to the end that, by common consent (author’s 
emphasis), the two thus nominated having met in the City of El Paso del Norte, 
three months after the ratification of this Treaty may proceed to survey and mark 
out upon the land the dividing line stipulated by this article […]373 
 
Two things stand out from this excerpt from Article 1: 1) Commissioners would have to be 
equipped with certain technical expertise given the nature of their first task; 2) “common 
consent” is introduced and is today an important feature of public international law. 
On the issue of common consent, however, most would argue that this arrangement was made 
between two nations at distinct points in their national trajectories, and quite possibly with 
different notions about how much of their respective inputs would go into the “common 
consent.”374 
Article VII of the 1853 Treaty colorfully encourages the peaceful resolution of any disputes 
between Mexico and the U.S., using war only as a last resort. The actual text reads: “Should 
                                                 371 Historytoday.com, “The Gadsden Purchase,” 2016, http://www.historytoday.com/richard-cavendish/gadsden-
purchase. 372 Ibid. 373 International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), “Treaties between the U.S. and Mexico,” 2016,  
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Treaties_Minutes/treaties.html. 374 We do not wish to naively suggest that initial relations were founded entirely on goodwill and in the interest of 
comity. Our argument, however, is that despite its foundations, cooperative bilateral relations were conditioned by 
the early engagements. 
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there be any further period (which God forbid) occur any disagreements between the two 
Nations…”375 
Figure 15.2. 
U.S. Territorial Acquisitions 
   Source:  U.S. Department of the Interior, “U.S. Territorial Acquisitions,” National Atlas of the United States, 2006, 
accessed February 25, 2016, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:U.S._Territorial_Acquisitions.png. 
1882 
The July 29, 1882, Convention Providing for an International Boundary Survey to Relocate the 
Existing Frontier Line Between the Two Countries West of the Rio Grande (1882 Treaty) was 
concluded in an effort to restore, replace, and erect new monuments west of the Rio Grande so as 
to preclude any ambiguities and disputes. As was the case in the 1853 Treaty, Article II of the 
1882 Convention allowed each country to commission a survey party that would be headed by an 
“Engineer in Chief.” 
Article II of the 1882 Convention goes on to state: “The two parties so appointed shall meet at El 
Paso del Norte, or at any other convenient place to be agreed upon, within six months from the 
                                                 375 IBWC, “Treaties between the U.S. and Mexico.” 
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exchange of the ratifications hereof, and shall form, when combined, an ‘International 
Boundary Commission’” (author’s emphasis).376 
In describing the work of each section of the Commission, Article V of the 1882 Convention 
states: “On commencing operations, each section shall report to its government the plan of 
operations upon which they shall have jointly agreed; and they shall from time to time submit 
reports of the progress made by them in the said operations; and finally they shall present a full 
report, accompanied by the necessary drawings, signed by the Engineer in Chief and the two 
associate engineers on each side, as the official record of the International Boundary 
Commission.”377 
Indeed, the procedure just described, and its underlying rationale, are the precursors to the 
minute process of the 1944 Treaty. 
1884 
On November 12, 1884, another convention was concluded. According to the 1848 and 1853 
treaties “certain parts of the dividing line between the two countries follow the middle of the 
channel of the Rio Grande and the Rio Colorado. The 1884 Convention Touching the 
International Boundary Line Where it Follows the Bed of the Rio Colorado addressed what 
would happen to that dividing line as the river channels were altered either by forces of nature or 
by man-made activities. Article I of the 1884 Convention establishes that, “the dividing line shall 
forever be that described in the aforesaid Treaty and follow the center of the normal (author’s 
emphasis to show norms and customs) channel of the rivers named…”378 Article II makes much 
the same provisions for manmade changes. 
1889 
Article 1 of the March 1, 1889, Treaty Concerning the Water Boundary establishes that “All 
(author’s emphasis) differences of questions that may arise on that portion of the frontier 
between the United States of America and the United States of Mexico where the Rio Grande 
and the Colorado rivers form the boundary line…shall be submitted for examination and 
decision to an International Boundary Commission.”379 Articles II and III establish that each 
section should be headed by a commissioner, without specifying that they be engineers, to be 
supported by consulting engineers. The aforementioned articles also specify where and how 
meetings of the International Boundary Commission can take place. Interestingly, Article VII 
gives the International Boundary Commission (IBC) the power “to call for papers and 
information… relating to any boundary question.”380 
Article VIII goes on to state that “If both Commissioners shall agree to a decision, their 
judgment shall be considered binding upon both Governments, unless one of them shall 
                                                 376 Ibid. 377 Ibid. 378 History.com, “Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.” 379 IBWC, “Treaties between the U.S. and Mexico.” 380 Ibid. 
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disapprove it within one month reckoned from the day on which it shall have been pronounced. 
In the latter case, both Governments shall take cognizance of the matter, and shall decide it 
amicably.”381 
Much of the institutional framework laid out from 1853 to this Treaty of 1889 can be found, in 
some measure, in the 1944 Treaty. 
1906 
The Convention on the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande of May 21, 1906, 
though economical in text, is worthy of special attention. The Convention was the first attempt to 
divide the waters forming the international boundary. As Stephen Mumme points out, issues 
relating to the right of navigation were treated in the 1848 Treaty, but an apparent lack of 
foresight prevented the parties from conceiving water as a divisible and finite resource.382 That 
lack of foresight is probably fortuitous for bilateral water relations between the U.S. and Mexico. 
Mumme proceeds to explain that at the time (late 19th and early 20th centuries) upstream 
diversions began affecting downstream communities’ access to water, “international law was in 
its infancy, [and] nationalist attitudes provided few incentives for incorporating equitable 
considerations in diplomatic approaches.”383 
As such, we argue that had the two parties attempted to resolve the division of water prior to the 
institutional history and norms outlined above (1853-1906), it is likely that the matter would 
have been concluded in a less cooperative and amicable manner; that is, in a manner 
overwhelmingly consistent with what Thomas Hobbes would expect to see in an anarchic 
international system not dissimilar to his notion of a “state of nature.” 
However, by 1906 the two parties had become used to the notion of “common consent” as 
introduced in the 1853 Treaty; and had grown used to the operationalization of that common 
consent through the ad hoc International Boundary Commission of 1882 and the standing IBC 
created in 1889. So even as U.S. Attorney General Judson Harmon argued that based on the 
existing treaties, the U.S. had no obligation whatsoever to negotiate with Mexico on water (part 
of the more general Harmon Doctrine),384 reminiscent of the tone of international relations of the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, our argument is that the 1906 Treaty is a manifestation of a 
separate reality created by half a century of post-conflict bilateral cooperation that encouraged 
the considerations for the sake of comity that Harmon described as totally discretionary.385 
In 1896, the year of U.S. Attorney General Judson Harmon’s opinion, the IBC issued a report 
attributing water scarcity in Ciudad Juárez to upstream diversions in the U.S. The report called 
for the construction of an international dam just upstream of El Paso to secure to each nation its 
                                                 381 Ibid. 382 Stephen Mumme, From Equitable Utilization to Sustainable Development: Advancing Equity In U.S.-Mexico 
Border Water Management (Colorado State University, 2008). 383 Ibid. 384 Ibid. 385 Norris Hundley (1966), quoted in Stephen Mumme, From Equitable Utilization To Sustainable Development, 
23-24. 
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“legal and equitable rights” with the impounded waters to be divided equally between the two 
countries.386 Interests of the Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company would delay construction, 
however, and result in the dam being built at Elephant Butte in New Mexico from 1907 to 1916. 
Instead of the 50-50 split originally proposed by the IBC, the 1906 Convention allocated 60,000 
acre-feet to Mexico annually. This volume was based on the “maximum known uses of Mexican 
settlers in the Valle de Juárez.”387 Despite the eventual outcome, the spirit of the rationale used in 
dividing the water is at worst a compromise between the prevailing spirit of cooperation in the 
post-1953 institutions and the state of nature realism of a weak international regime388; or at best, 
60,000 acre-feet a year based on the “maximum known uses of Mexican settlers” was a bona fide 
attempt to give to the less-developed Mexico less water with no regard for the Harmon Doctrine. 
Whatever the case might be, state of nature realism did not prevail. Again, our argument is that 
the sovereigns’ conscience was influenced by the post Mexican-American war building of 
institutions and norms. 
We would trivialize our argument if we were to ignore the importance of geography as a push 
factor to the bilateral cooperation on international waterways between Mexico and the U.S.  
As a result of the proximity of El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, Mexico’s Consul General, José Zayas 
Guarneros, wrote to his Foreign Minister in 1894 expressing concern that in the absence of a 
remedy to the problem of water being deviated upstream in Colorado and New Mexico, both the 
Mexican Ciudad Juárez and El Paso in the U.S. would be decimated. In reality, and an important 
catalyst to the politics of the international border, any action in prejudice of Ciudad Juárez would 
also affect El Paso.389 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the possible correlation between 
geographic proximity of large population centers along the international border and the decades 
of cooperation previously outlined is irrelevant for the purposes of this paper. Indeed, even if 
geography is correlated to, or even causes, cooperation, it cannot be varied to suit our purposes. 
The incremental institution-building and the creation of norms and customs remain our central 
focus. 
A final observation is that the Supreme Court, in Kansas v. Colorado in 1907, found “that 
disputes between states of the United States over shared water resources were to be resolved in 
such a way as to achieve an equitable apportionment of those resources.”390 The Court held that 
“disputes between U.S. states were governed by principles of international law, among others, 
and—contrary to Colorado’s position of absolute territorial sovereignty—found that facts might 
exist that would justify its interposition.”391 It is not known to what extent this litigation may 
have influenced the U.S. government’s position in the dispute with Mexico, or vice versa, but the 
                                                 386 Ibid. 387 Neill Reynolds (1906), quoted in Stephen Mumme, From Equitable Utilization To Sustainable Development, 58. 388 The U.S. may have been uncertain as to the direction of international law, and was therefore keen to establish in 
the Convention (Article V) that no legal precedent was set, and that Mexico waived all claims for damages resulting 
from upstream diversions. 389 Stephen McCaffrey. The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not Praised, 1996, 
http://lawschool.unm.edu/nrj/volumes/36/4/13_mccaffrey_harmon.pdf. 390 Kansas v. Colorado 1907, 206. Ibid, 579. 391 Kansas v. Colorado 1907, 143 and 147. Ibid. 
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end result in both cases was an effort to apportion the waters in an equitable manner.392 This 
section suggests that the years immediately leading up to 1906 represent a point of inflection in 
the way North American neighbors would share waterways for non-navigational uses. 
1909 
So while no legal precedent denouncing the Harmon Doctrine was set in the 1906 Convention, 
the prevailing custom of the early 20th century was that neighboring countries and states would 
act in the spirit of comity. Interestingly, the unbridled use of the Harmon Doctrine would be 
inconvenient to the U.S. along its northern border with Canada vis-a-vis the Milk river which 
runs from Alberta to Montana. Stephen Mumme observes that “While the 1909 Treaty393 
partially incorporated Harmon’s perspective in upholding each nation’s right to control [and] 
divert tributary waters of boundary rivers and streams, it qualified this right by providing that 
any diversions in one country that injured a party or parties in the other country entitled the 
injured party the same right to sue as if the injury had occurred in the country in which the 
diversion was made.”394 
The 1909 Treaty divides the waters of the Milk and St. Mary’s rivers equally between the U.S. 
and Canada. It may appear, therefore, that Mexico might have gotten a “raw deal” in the 1906 
Treaty. However, it is worth noting that “Navigation treaties between the United States and 
Canada (represented by Great Britain) have existed since the birth of the United States.”395 This 
is to say that the two countries had years of prior institution- and confidence-building under their 
belts. The fact that the U.S. and Canada shared a colonial history, while Mexico’s history was 
significantly different, may also offer an explanation for differences in the interpretation of 
“equity” as in the 1906 Convention versus the 1909 Treaty. Though beyond the scope of this 
report, there are remarkable parallels between U.S.-Mexico, and U.S.-Canada relations if we 
were to compare the respective treaties, customs, and norms using our analytical framework.  
1922 and 1928 
With the signing of the Colorado River Compact in 1922, the interstate development of water396 
in the U.S. took primacy over international commitments to comity. Article 1 of the Compact 
states: 
The major purposes of this compact are to provide for the equitable division and 
apportionment of the use of the waters of the Colorado River System; to establish 
the relative importance of different beneficial uses of water, to promote interstate 
comity; to remove causes of present and future controversies; and to secure the 
                                                 392 Ibid. 393 The 1909 Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters, and Questions 
Arising Between the United States and Canada. This treaty also created an International Joint Commission. 394 Mumme, From Equitable Utilization To Sustainable Development. 395 Daniel Dewitt, “Great Words Needed for the Great Lakes: Reasons to Rewrite the Boundary Waters Treaty of 
1909,” Indiana University School of Law, 1994, http://ilj.law.indiana.edu/articles/69/69_1_Dewitt.pdf. 396 The signatories of the 1922 Compact were: Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and 
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expeditious agricultural and industrial development of the Colorado River Basin, 
the storage of its waters, and the protection of life and property from floods. To 
these ends the Colorado River Basin is divided into two Basins, and an 
apportionment of the use of part of the water of the Colorado River System is 
made to each of them with the provision that further equitable apportionments 
may be made.397 
At that juncture (1922), Mexico was still reeling from its defining revolution and little to no 
consideration was given to its needs relating to the downstream flows of the Colorado River 
system. At the end of the revolution, Mexico started developing the Rio Conchos and other 
tributaries of the Rio Grande. This set off alarms in the U.S., so in 1928 when Mexico 
approached the U.S. to form an International Water Commission, both parties had an interest in 
forming such an entity.398 Although the IWC was largely a failure, its creation was catalyzed by 
the need to address water sharing, an issue that had previously been outside the scope of the IBC 
and dealt with partially in the 1906 Convention. 
1933 
On February 1, 1933, the two governments signed the Treaty for the Rectification of the Rio 
Grande (1933 Treaty), where they agreed to jointly construct, operate, and maintain, through the 
IBC, the Rio Grande Rectification Project. 
The 1944 Treaty 
According to Stephen Mumme, “[it] is well known, the 1944 Treaty negotiation entailed 
Mexican concessions on the Rio Grande in exchange for U.S. concessions on the Colorado 
river.”399 By this time, rapid developments along the Colorado and on the Mexican side of the 
lower Rio Grande were sufficient to worry both parties. “In answering these questions the federal 
governments of both countries effectively abandoned any lingering inclination to claim absolute 
territorial sovereignty and proceeded pragmatically, acknowledging the reality of reciprocal 
sovereignty and informed by the growing international practice (author’s emphasis) of settling 
water disputes on the basis of equitable apportionment.”400 
The abovementioned “international practice” is without doubt the work that had led to the 1906 
Convention. We find parallel reasoning in a letter from Chas D. Walcott, Director of the U.S. 
Geological Survey, to the Secretary of the Interior: 
The public discussion of this matter has tended to the view that in the interests of 
international comity the question should not be decided upon its purely legal 
aspects, more particularly in view of the plans considered by the International 
                                                 397 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), “Colorado River Compact, 1922,” 2016, 
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(Water) Boundary Commission .... The effort of this commission has been to 
devise some means of obtaining a supply of water for the Mexican lands without 
unduly depriving lands within the limits of the United States.401 
The Treaty for the Utilization of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (1944 
Treaty) brought Mexico and the U.S. together on the issue of non-navigational uses of the waters 
of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) from Fort Quitman to the Gulf of Mexico as well as the Colorado 
further west. The 1906 Convention would continue to guarantee the delivery of at most 60,000 
acre feet annually at “the head works of the Acequia Madre, known as the Old Mexican Canal, 
(that) now exist above the city of Juárez, Mexico.”402 
Article II of the 1944 Treaty provides for the creation of the International Boundary and Water 
Commission (IBWC), building on the International Boundary Commission created in the 1889 
Treaty, which itself built on and expanded the mandate of the ad hoc Commission provided for 
in the 1882 Treaty; and the International Water Commission (IWC)403 created in 1928 as a first 
attempt to resolve controversy between Fort Quitman and the Gulf of Mexico. Article II also 
reintroduces the idea of the Engineer Commissioner first seen in the 1853 Treaty but not 
specified in the 1889 Treaty.404 Article III specifies the order of preference given to distinct uses, 
while Article IV speaks to the allocation of water, points which we will develop later.405 
Overview of the Minute Process 
An important caveat to the study of any instrument of public international law is that “public 
international law is built on the foundation of state consent.”406 This characteristic of 
international law necessarily requires the “common consent” referred to in the 1853 Treaty, and 
the cooperation between states exhibited in the events leading up to 1944. It goes without saying 
that a relatively robust international law regime is mutually exclusive to Hobbes’ “state of 
nature.” 
Article 39 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes: “A treaty may be 
amended by agreement between the parties.” The rules laid down in Part II apply to such an 
agreement except in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide. Very few treaties, if any, give 
broad interpretive powers to a body created by the treaty itself as is the case of the IBWC via the 
minute process to the 1944 Treaty. 
                                                 401 Letter from Chas D. Walcott (1905),quoted in Stephen McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years 
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Described simply, the minute process outlines the steps to be taken by the IBWC’s U.S. and 
Mexican sections to record decisions taken by the Commission subject to approval from the 
Department of State and the Mexican Foreign Ministry. Article 25 explains that, procedurally, 
minutes are produced in both English and Spanish, signed by both Commissioners, and 
forwarded to the respective governments within three days of being signed. In the absence of 
explicit rejection or acquiescence, a minute to which a government does not offer a response to 
the Commission within 30 days shall be deemed approved, unless explicit governmental 
approval is a requirement of the Treaty.407 
As Sally Spener described in an interview conducted on November 10, 2015, “the minute 
process starts when an issue is identified by the commission itself or a stakeholder who comes to 
the commission with a concern and then the IBWC gets together to act.”408 
Allie Umoff explains that “The Minute process has proven useful in situations where the Treaty, 
as originally written, was silent or vague. The Minute process also gives the Treaty the 
adaptability it needs, enabling the IBWC to secure long-term compliance through short-term 
flexibility.”409 
The above features of the minute process are essential to the ensuing discussion over the role of 
the minute process in the implementation of the 1944 Treaty by the IBWC. 
Table 15.1. 
Overview of Minutes Adjusting Allocation Schedules in Times of Emergency 
Minute # Date approved Summary 
318 2010 Adjustment of delivery schedules for water allotted to Mexico for the 
years 2010 through 2013 as a result of infrastructure damage in 
irrigation district 014, Rio Colorado, caused by the April 2010 
earthquake in the Mexicali valley, Baja California. 
310 2003 Emergency delivery of Colorado River water for use in Tijuana, Baja 
California, due to drought and poor infrastructure. 
293 1995 Emergency cooperative measures to supply municipal needs of Mexican 
communities located along the Rio Grande downstream of Amistad dam 
as a result of drought. 
240 1972 Emergency deliveries of Colorado River waters for use in Tijuana as a 
result of drought. 
   Source: IBWC, “Minutes between the United States and Mexican Sections of the IBWC,” http://www.ibwc.state. 
gov/Treaties_Minutes/Minutes.html.. 
Table 15.1 shows that the minute process has allowed for adjustment in allocation schedules in 
response to myriad shocks such as earthquake damage to infrastructure and drought. It is 
important to note that minutes related to allocations tend to include the clause “pursuant to 
                                                 407 IBWC, “Treaties Between the U.S. and Mexico.” 408 Sally Spener, International Boundary and Water Commission, telephone interview on the Minute Process, by 
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instructions of their respective governments to negotiate an agreement, subject to the approval of 
the two governments…” 
The IBWC 
Article II of the 1944 Treaty establishes that “The application of the present Treaty, the 
regulation and exercise of the rights and obligations which the two Governments assume 
thereunder, and the settlement of all disputes to which its observance and exercise may give rise 
are hereby entrusted to the International Boundary and Water Commission (author’s 
emphasis), which shall function in conformity with the powers and limitations set forth in this 
Treaty.”410 “The effectiveness of the 1944 Treaty has been repeatedly questioned; it suffers 
heightened criticism with each drought and with each water delivery deadline that goes 
unmet.”411 In Texas, farmers have voiced support for scrapping the Treaty altogether. The IBWC 
has been called a “dinosaur”412 and a “toothless wonder.”413 
Minute 318 
Steven Ingram argues that “the IBWC’s critical flaw is that its functions are tied to the outdated 
1944 Treaty between the United States and Mexico.”414 We would argue that the minute process, 
being an integral part of the 1944 Treaty, allows for incremental and pragmatic cooperation 
between Mexico and the U.S. on issues such as drought, climate change adaptation and/or 
mitigation, environmental and ecological uses of water, and others. The minute process also 
allows new customs and norms to be set based on the interpretation that the IBWC gives to the 
Treaty vis-a-vis the exigencies of the 21st century, and the IBWC’s willingness to engage civil 
society in its deliberations. In short, the minute process, even though focused on seemingly 
innocuous technical minutes, could serve to strengthen the institutions of bilateral cooperation on 
water in much the same way as cooperation on border issues from 1853 to 1906 did. 
While any changes to the current allocation regime would require the approval of both countries’ 
senates,415 matters relating to conservation, and response to drought and shortages due to natural 
disasters are well within the purview of the minute process. For example, section G of Minute 
308 does not read like the work of an “institutional dinosaur”: 
G.1. Measures of Cooperation on Drought Management—Mexico’s National 
Water Commission will present to the International Boundary and Water 
Commission a progress report on its studies concerning drought management 
planning to support the Commission as a forum under which the proper 
authorities in each country may coordinate their respective drought management 
plans. 
                                                 410 IBWC, “Treaties Between the U.S. and Mexico.” 411 Stephen Ingram, “In A Twenty-First Century Minute,” Natural Resources Journal 44 (Winter 2004): 163-211, 
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G.2. Sustainable Management of the Basin—The Commission took note of the 
desire of both Governments to convene a bi-national summit meeting of experts 
and water users from each country for the purpose of providing the proper 
authorities and stakeholders information concerning sustainable management of 
the Rio Grande Basin. Taking the recommendations of the summit into account, 
the two Governments will consider a binational sustainable management plan for 
the basin. 
G.3. International Advisory Council—The Commission, subject to the provision 
of financial and personnel resources to each Section by the respective 
governments as a step to strengthen the Commission’s role in the area of 
sustainable management of the basin and drought management planning, will 
establish a forum for the exchange of information and advice to the Commission 
from government and non-government organizations in their respective 
countries.416 
Similarly, minute 318 provides for the adjustment of delivery schedules to Mexico for the years 
2010 to 2013 in response to infrastructure damage in Irrigation District 014 caused by the April 
2010 earthquake. Minute 319 speaks to cooperative measures on the Colorado River that can 
benefit both countries. The most recent minute, Minute 320, regarding a General Framework for 
Binational Cooperation on Transboundary Issues in the Tijuana Basin, calls for “an inclusive 
process to obtain recommendations from stakeholder groups on transboundary issues in the 
Tijuana River Basin.”417 
As discussed in the concluding remarks on a “New 21st Century Minute,” these consultations 
with stakeholders are a feature of the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals and the OECD Best 
Practices on Water. The consultations also provide the Engineer-Commissioners with distinct 
points of view and therefore provide a solution to Ingram’s reference to the fact that the Engineer 
Commissioner has resulted in very few of the 320 minutes approved to date to create any policy. 
Specifically, Ingram points out that “throughout the 1900s and early years of the 21st century, 
the IBWC issued Minutes that were technical documents, focusing on allocation formulae, 
moving due dates, and changing scheduled amounts due…”418 Additionally Annelia Tinklenberg 
argues that much of the problem is that the 1944 Water Treaty does not define how the IBWC 
should interact with stakeholders and other border agencies or how it should release information 
to the public.419,420 
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The 1997 UN Convention 
In his paper “In a 21st Century Minute,” Steven Ingram argues that the IBWC is forced to 
operate within the constraints of the 1944 Treaty. He advocates for a “21st Century Minute, or 
Policy Minute” that will quickly bind the IBWC to “modern international principles of 
watercourse law as articulated in the U.N. Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses of 1997” (1997 Convention).421 
To date, there are only 36 states party to the 1997 Convention.422 Ingram relays the curious 
account of Mexico proposing the initial text for what was later adopted as the 1997 Convention, 
with the co-sponsorship of the U.S. The Convention was since adopted in the UN General 
Assembly and has gathered the requisite ratifications to enter into force without either the U.S. or 
Mexico being among the original ratifications nor the later accessions. Ratification in both 
countries would require congressional approval. 
Nonetheless, the 1997 Convention could be adopted as a framework for action in the policy 
minute that Ingram recommends. That international law that could and should inform the U.S.’ 
legislative process was articulated by the courts in what has been dubbed as the “Principle of 
Contemporaneity.”423 Essentially, the courts have shown an increasing willingness to be guided 
by international law when deciding on matters that are not clearly defined by U.S. domestic law. 
If the IBWC were to issue such a policy minute, it would be forced to have difficult 
conversations with legislators over issues such as the “equitable and reasonable utilization and 
participation” in the international watercourses in question as stipulated by Article 5.1 of the 
1997 Convention.424,425 A new set of norms and customs would be established and as we have 
argued to this point, history has shown that the institutions will quickly follow the prevailing 
practice. 
Article 6 of the 1997 Convention helps make our case for the incorporation of the Convention’s 
principles in a policy minute. In defining factors relevant to determining what is considered 
equitable and reasonable utilization, Article 6 highlights factors such as:  
1. Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner within 
the meaning of article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances, 
including:  
                                                 421 Ingram, “In A Twenty-First Century Minute.” 422 United Nations, “UNTC,” 2016, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
12&chapter=27&lang=en). 423 Ingram, “In A Twenty-First Century Minute.” 424 United Nations, “Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses,” 2016, 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf . 425 Article 5.1 of the 1997 Convention on Watercourses: “Watercourse States shall in their respective territories 
utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international 
watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable 
utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, 
consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.” 
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a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a 
natural character; 
b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; 
c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State; 
d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other 
watercourse States; 
e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; 
f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of 
the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect; 
g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or 
existing use. 
2015 UN Sustainable Development Goals 
In addition to the 1997 Convention, the Sustainable Development Goals adopted on September 
25, 2015, provide another policy framework, complementary to the 1997 Convention, for the 
IBWC’s operations which too can be implemented via a policy minute. The incorporation of 
Goal 6 in a policy minute would help set the way for the future of the IBWC and the 1944 
Treaty. 
 Target 6.1: By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable 
drinking water for all. 
 Target 6.5: By 2030, implement integrated water resources management at all levels, 
including through transboundary cooperation (author’s emphasis) as appropriate. 
 Target 6.6: By 2020, protect and restore water-related ecosystems, including mountains, 
forests, wetlands, rivers, aquifers, and lakes.426 
The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality’s Position 
The progress being made toward a 21st Century Minute, like the progress made toward the 
equitable distribution of the waters of the Rio Grande and the Colorado River in its time, is 
hindered by “state of nature” tendencies occasioned by the relative weakness of international 
law. So while custom and institutional history would dictate that the Harmon Doctrine, or similar 
notions, have no place in a civilized 21st century, we continue to witness battles between the 
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) and the IBWC over the interpretation of 
the 1906 Convention and the 1944 Treaty as it relates to the division of water between Acequia 
Madre and Fort Quitman. 
The TCEQ asserted that “Many government entities and water right holders firmly believe, and 
the evidence points to the fact that the waters of the Rio Grande below El Paso are allocated 
entirely to the United States under the 1906 Convention with Mexico. The IBWC has historically 
allocated 50 percent of this water to Mexico when it reaches Fort Quitman, Texas. Fort Quitman 
                                                 426 United Nations, “Sustainable Development Goals,” 2016,  http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/ 
sustainable-development-goals/. 
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is where the 1944 Treaty on the Rio Grande begins. We believe this water belongs entirely to the 
United States. Allocating the water to Mexico deprives our Texas users of their water 
supplies.”427 Needless to say, the TCEQ does not have a comparable history of bilateral 
cooperation with Mexico as does the IBWC. 
Drought 
Another set of issues, as observed by Tinklenberg, is that while “the 1944 Water Treaty does 
stipulate rationing rules for drought conditions, it does not include a definition of what drought 
conditions are nor does it give authority to the IBWC to decide when those conditions have been 
met.”428 The term “extraordinary drought” in the 1944 Treaty is severely inadequate to assist the 
IBWC to determine drought conditions. Tinklenberg further states that “The lack of 
groundwater, ecological needs, and defined drought management in the 1944 Water Treaty 
reveals the next criticism: an outdated mandate.”429 To that outdated mandate we may wish to 
add the issue of climate change. 
On the treatment of drought Ingram notes that under the 1944 Treaty: 
Mexico must deliver 350,000 acre-feet of water to the United States from the Rio 
Grande annually. The United States is required to deliver 1.5 million acre-feet of 
water from the Colorado River to Mexico every year. If Mexico, because of 
extraordinary drought, is deficient in its delivery to the United States of the one-
third portion, after the run of a designated five-year cycle, it must make up any 
deficiency in the five-year cycle that immediately follows. In the event of such 
deficiency Mexico would have to pay “double” for a five-year period: the dent 
from the previous five-year cycle and “the allotment for the next five-year 
period.” This assumes that any drought or other “extraordinary” circumstance 
would self-correct and make up for losses in neat five-year increments. 
Unfortunately, the Treaty never defined the term “extraordinary.”430 
Conclusion: A New 21st Century Minute 
Just as the incipient institutions and treaty bodies of the mid-19th to mid-20th centuries faced 
constraints in the form of the Harmon Doctrine and other survival of the fittest paradigms, a 21st 
Century Minute as has been called for by Steven Ingram431 will be challenged by “states of 
nature” attitudes that see bilateral water sharing through the lens of game theory. Globalization 
has increased the contacts between citizens of different states; so much so that sympathy for a 
neighbor in distress is natural. The 320 minutes issued to date have set the stage for a deeper and 
                                                 427 TCEQ, “Rio Grande International Water Accounting - Fort Quitman, Texas,” 2016,  http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/ 
border/international-water.html/. 428 Stephen Mumme and Nicolas Pineda (2001), quoted in Annelia Tinklenberg, “Will The Minute System Work to 
Modernize the International Boundary and Water Commission?” 429 Tinklenberg, “Will The Minute System Work to Modernize the International Boundary and Water 
Commission?” 385 Ingram, “In A Twenty-First Century Minute.” 431 Ibid. 
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more proactive cooperation between Mexico and the U.S. It would be irrational to view drought, 
natural disaster, or any other contributor to water shortages in one country as issues that can be 
confined to borders drawn for reasons as fickle as the passing of a railroad. 
The New 21st Century Minute would establish a modern framework for the Colorado, Rio 
Grande/Rio Bravo, and Tijuana River basins, based on international best practices as articulated 
in the 1997 Convention, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the OECD Principles on 
Water.432 The work of the IBWC would then be scrutinized based on this framework. At the very 
least, stakeholders will have benchmark information regarding the performance of the 1944 
Treaty in relation to today’s exigencies. Where shortcomings are highlighted, the strong 
democracies of both Mexico and the U.S. will act responsibly in the face of “state of nature” 
inclinations to egoism. 
It is clear that the 1944 Treaty reflects past realities and concerns. According to Stephen 
Mumme, “Treaties…are the political documents that reflect the diplomatic possibilities of the 
past as reinforced by their cumulative record of institutional practices in their service, and, as 
such, are often difficult to change…[and] it is highly unlikely that the present binding treaties 
will be reopened for revision given the enormity of the political stakes.”433 
Our analytical framework suggests that if a policy minute is not forthcoming, the IBWC may fall 
into a lull that would preclude the type of cooperation that the functionalists see as key to 
progress. In other words, inasmuch as the IBWC becomes stagnant, we run the risk of unlearning 
decades of cooperative behavior. The minute process provides an avenue for the IBWC to make 
progress in areas where the 1944 Treaty is silent. This progress, though it may seem nominal, is 
absolutely key to the bigger picture of the continued relevance of the 1944 Treaty and the IBWC. 
Recent minutes suggest that the Treaty is highly receptive to political will. Where the two 
governments so instruct, the Treaty is far from a “dinosaur.” Allocation schedules can be shifted 
to accommodate crises. What is true, however, is that anything beyond a postponement or 
advance of due allocations would run contrary to the soul of the Treaty. Much, however, can be 
done through the minute process, to ensure that the risks associated with drought and other 
climatic events are not as acute as they could be in the absence of cooperation. In addition to the 
management side of things, a policy minute could serve as an aspirational framework, 
highlighting the Treaty’s shortcomings vis-a-vis the 1997 Convention, the Sustainable 
Development Goals, and OECD water principles. 
  
                                                 432 OECD 2016, Principle 10 calls for the promoting of stakeholder engagement for informed and outcome-oriented 
contributions to water policy design and implementation. 433 Mumme (1999), quoted in Stephen Ingram., “In A Twenty-First Century Minute.” 
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Chapter 16. The Rio Grande Compact of 1938: Legal and Environmental Challenges of the 21st Century 
by Podie Chitan 
Introduction: The Unique Legal Character of the Rio Grande 
The Rio Grande is both an interstate and international river. Drought conditions, together with 
the increased demand for Rio Grande water, have put a strain on the river’s supply. Adding to 
the strain are issues of evaporation losses and sedimentation that have implications under the 
legal framework governing the Rio Grande. This strain has been the catalyst for political and 
legal action among the states party to the Rio Grande Compact of 1938. Groundwater pumping 
and unauthorized diversions challenge the effectiveness of the complex scheduling and 
accounting system of the Compact. A clear understanding of the intent and purpose of the Rio 
Grande Compact is vital to the continuation to the interstate comity intended by the Compact. 
The Rio Grande begins its long journey in Colorado and flows southward for more than 400 
miles across New Mexico. After leaving New Mexico, it turns eastward and forms the boundary 
between Texas and the Republic of Mexico for about 1,250 miles to its mouth. The total length 
of the river is about 1,800 miles.434 
The 1938 Compact governs the river in its character as an interstate stream up to Fort Quitman. 
A portion of the Rio Grande that forms the international boundary, that is from the head of the 
Mexican Canal down to Fort Quitman, Texas, is governed by the 1906 Convention between the 
U.S. and Mexico for the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande (1906 
Convention). The 1944 Treaty between the U.S. and Mexico governs the Rio Grande where it 
forms the international boundary below Fort Quitman up to the mouth of the river in the Gulf of 
Mexico.435 The 1938 Rio Grande Compact is the focus of this chapter. 
History 
The preamble to the operational clauses of the Rio Grande Compact of 1938 adequately address 
the reason for its ratification by the states of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. The preamble 
states: “…desiring to remove all causes of present and future controversy among these States and 
between citizens of one of these States and citizens of another State with respect to the use of the 
waters of the Rio Grande above Fort Quitman, Texas, and being moved by considerations of 
                                                 
434 Raymond Hill, Development of The Rio Grande Compact of 1938 (The University of New Mexico School of 
Law, 2016), http://lawschool.unm.edu/nrj/volumes/14/2/01_hill_development.pdf. 
435 Article XIV of the Compact precludes the use of increases of decreases in Mexican water delivery under the 
1944 Treaty as reason to modify Compact delivery schedules. 
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interstate comity, and for the purpose of effecting an equitable apportionment of such waters, 
have resolved to conclude a Compact for the attainment of these purposes.”436 
Figure 16.1. 
Rio Grande Governance Map 
    Source: Created by author in Illustrator. 
   Note: The serrated line below Elephant Butte reservoir represents the river segment related to the question of 
whether New Mexico’s compact obligations end with water delivery at San Marcial. This matter is 
discussed below. 
Douglas R. Littlefield argues that post-1938 interstate water conflicts are the result of the lack of 
understanding of the history of the 1938 Compact.437 According to Littlefield, for many it is an 
“enduring mystery” as to why the Compact provides water deliveries to New Mexico at the 
Colorado-New Mexico state line, measured at or near Lobatos, while New Mexico’s water 
delivery to Texas is made at San Marcial, just above the Elephant Butte Reservoir, some 105 
miles from the Texas state line. This detail continues to be relevant in the interpretation of the 
respective states’ obligations under the Compact, most evidently in the legal proceedings before 
the U.S. Supreme Court since January 8, 2013, on the issue of whether New Mexico is in 
violation of the Rio Grande Compact and the Rio Grande Project Act, which apportion water to 
                                                 
436 New Mexico Water Resources Research Institute, “Rio Grande Compact,” accessed March 27, 2016, 
http://www.wrri.nmsu.edu/wrdis/compacts/Rio-Grande-Compact.pdf. 
437 Douglas Littlefield, “The History of The Rio Grande Compact of 1938,” WRRI Conference Proceedings, 1999,  
http://www.wrri.nmsu.edu/publish/watcon/proc44/littlefield.pdf. 
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Rio Grande Project beneficiaries. Littlefield rebuts arguments suggesting that Texas’ negotiators 
were “taken” in the build-up to the 1938 signing. 
Littlefield, a historian, argues that the seemingly glaring oversight to guaranteeing that Rio 
Grande water would get to Texas in the agreed amount is a misunderstanding of the spirit of the 
Compact. According to Littlefield, the Compact is silent on water delivery to the New Mexico-
Texas border because this, in fact, was provided for in 1905 “when Federal lawmakers 
authorized the construction of the Rio Grande Project in southern New Mexico and western 
Texas by the U.S. Reclamation Service (today, the Bureau of Reclamation).438 Based on studies 
conducted, the Reclamation Service determined that the water of the Rio Grande Project would 
be apportioned in such a way as to supply sufficient water for irrigating 88,000 acres of arid 
lands in southern New Mexico and 67,000 acres in western Texas. 
The Rio Grande Project was constructed by the Reclamation Service and water stored behind the 
Elephant Butte structure would serve New Mexico and Texas in corresponding amounts as 
determined by the Service’s previously mentioned studies, and would also guarantee 60,000 
acre-feet of water to satisfy Mexico’s demands, in anticipation of a treaty being agreed with 
Mexico for the latter point. That Treaty was indeed signed in the form of the 1906 Convention. 
Figure 16.2. 
NASA Image Showing the Impact of the Rio Grande Project  
 
Source: National Park Service, “Making The Desert Bloom,” The Rio Grande Project, accessed March 27, 2016, 
https://www.nps.gov/nr/twhp/wwwlps/lessons/141RioGrande/141RioGrande.htm.  
                                                 
438 Ibid. 
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Figure 16.2 provides a visualization of the impact of the Rio Grande Project in southern New 
Mexico and West Texas. The heart of the Rio Grande Project is the Elephant Butte and Caballo 
dams, whose features are described in Part I of this report. 
Relevant to this paper is the fact that although the Rio Grande Compact does not explicitly 
provide for the delivery of water to the Texas state line, such a provision may have been deemed 
redundant by the Compact negotiators, as Littlefield argues, since the Rio Grande Project 
preceded the Compact by over three decades. If this is the case, then it may be interpreted that 
the Compact subsumes the Rio Grande Project and that a violation of the terms of the latter 
would naturally hinder the intent and purpose of the former. 
Making a case for the spirit (intent and purpose) of the Compact, Littlefield recounts the initial 
reticence of the Texas legislature to ratify the Compact in 1938 over concerns that Texas’ water 
delivery would paradoxically be made in New Mexico territory. Those concerns were removed 
when the then Texas Compact Commissioner, Frank Clayton, explained that: 
The negotiators of the new Rio Grande Compact (1938)439 had recognized an existing 
apportionment of the river’s waters between New Mexico and Texas below Elephant 
Butte Dam through the allocations made by the Bureau of Reclamation and the operation 
of the Rio Grande Project…. [T]he question of the division of the water released from 
Elephant Butte reservoir is taken care of by contracts between the [irrigation] districts 
under the Rio Grande Project and the Bureau of Reclamation.440 
The Compact 
This section will highlight those features of the 1938 Compact most relevant to the present 
discussion. 
 Article Ib provides for the creation of the Compact Commission, on which each of the 
contracting parties is to have a representative (Commissioner). 
  Article Ip defines actual spill as all the water spilled or released as a flood control 
measure (in excess of credit water441) in excess of current demand on project storage 
which does not become usable water by storage in another reservoir. 
  Article Iq defines a hypothetical spill as that which would have occurred if 790,000 acre 
feet had been released from project storage at rates proportional to the actual release in 
every year from the starting date to the end of that year. 
  Article VI provides that in a year of actual spill no annual credits nor annual debits shall 
be computed for that year. Furthermore, Article VI states that “In any year in which there 
is actual spill of usable water, or at the time of hypothetical spill thereof, all accrued 
                                                 
439 The 1938 Compact was preceded by one in 1928. 
440 Littlefield, “The History of The Rio Grande Compact of 1938.” 
441 Annual credits are the amounts by which actual deliveries in any calendar year exceed scheduled deliveries; 
annual debits are the amounts by which actual amounts fall short of scheduled deliveries. 
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debits of Colorado, or New Mexico, or both, at the beginning of the year shall be 
cancelled.”442 
  The compact provides delivery schedules at given gaging stations, and establishes that 
intermediate quantities shall be computed by proportional parts. 
  The Resolution Adopted by the Rio Grande Commission in 1948 defines evaporation 
losses as to be applied in Article VI of the Compact as: o Evaporation losses for which accrued credits shall be reduced shall be taken as the 
difference between the gross evaporation from the water surface of Elephant Butte 
Reservoir and rainfall on the same surface. o Evaporation losses for which accrued debits shall be reduced shall be taken as the net 
loss by evaporation as defined in the first paragraph. 
Controversies and Challenges to the Compact 
Overview 
The rationale behind the seemingly perennial interstate conflict between the states of the Rio 
Grande is probably best captured by the following excerpt from President Theodore Roosevelt’s 
first State of the Union Address on December 3, 1901: 
In the arid region, it is water, not land, which measures production. The western half of 
the United States would sustain a population greater than that of our whole country today 
if the waters that now run to waste were saved and used for irrigation.443 
The sustainability of economic endeavors in arid New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico are 
undeniably hinged on the availability of water. Analyzing the president’s discourse, it is evident 
that in 1901 the challenge was to capture floodwaters that would ordinarily go to waste. 
Upstream development in Colorado only affected downstream users because water capture was 
not efficient. The president thus explicitly references the role of government, not private entities, 
in constructing and maintaining reservoirs.444 
As an aside, and in keeping with observations in this report’s Reservoir Impact Assessments, 
President Roosevelt, in his wisdom, made the following statement in his State of the Union: 
It would be unwise to begin by doing too much, for a great deal will doubtless be learned, both 
as to what can and what cannot be safely attempted, by the early efforts, which must of necessity 
be partly experimental in character.445 
                                                 
442 Rio Grande Compact, 2016. 
443 The American Presidency Project, “Theodore Roosevelt: First Annual Message,” December 3, 1901, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542. 
444 The President argued that their (reservoir) construction has been conclusively shown to be an undertaking too 
vast for private effort. Also, as Littlefield (1999) explains, rivalry between the companies proposing dams at 




Today, however, despite the ability of the Elephant Butte and Caballo dams to store 
approximately 2.3 million acre feet of water, drought conditions have put the spotlight on grey 
areas in the Compact and the 1948 Compact Commission Resolution and have exacerbated 
interstate tensions. 
Notably, the Compact contains provisions for “appropriate adjustments” to be made in water 
delivery schedules to account for a) any change in location of gaging stations; b) changes in the 
runoff above inflow index gaging stations; and c) any trans-mountain diversions into the 
drainage basin of the Rio Grande. 
Figure 16.3. 
Elephant Butte Reservoir Storage since Closure 
 
   Source: Water Data for Texas, “Elephant Butte Lake,” http://www.waterdatafortexas.org/reservoirs/ 
individual/elephant-butte. 
Figure 16.3 captures both the variability in water storage as well as the marked decline in storage 
levels in the Elephant Butte dam since 2004. The graphic is supported by the following 
observations: 
 These conditions (average or above average precipitation from 1965 to 1998) gave way 
by 1999-2000 to conditions that were warmer and drier than at any period in the 20th 
century or the preceding 1,200-plus years.446 
 Since 2001, a great part of the Southwest U.S. has experienced drought, with particularly 
widespread and severe drying in 2002, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2012. During these 
                                                 
446 Glen M. MacDonald, David W. Stahle, Jose Villanueva Diaz, Nicholas Beer, Simon J. Busby, Julian Cerano-
Paredes, Julie E. Cole, Edward R. Cook, Georgina Endfield, Genaro Gutierrez-Garcia, Beth Hall, Victor Magan, 
David M. Meko, Matias Méndez-Pérez, David J. Sauchyn, Emma Watson, and Connie A. Woodhouse, “Climate 
Warming and 21st Century Drought in Southwestern North America,” EOS Transactions 8(9) (2008): 82-83. 
 154 
extremes, precipitation across the region averaged 22 to 25 percent below the average for 
all of the 20th century.447 
The decrease in water supply is made worse by the increase in demand, and Census Bureau 
statistics show that some downstream communities are growing by as much as 45 percent. The 
gap between supply and demand will grow even if there are no increases in average annual 
precipitation. The growing imbalance between supply and demand will likely lead to a greater 
reliance on non-renewable groundwater resources. Increased reliance on groundwater resources 
will lead to greater losses from the river into the groundwater system.448 
This confluence of increased demand and decreased supply has lead the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation to consider as real the possibility of 30 percent less water as the new hydrological 
normal. 
Sedimentation and Evaporation Losses 
In addition to drought conditions, the Compact delivery schedules are affected by difficult to 
measure variability in surface water evaporation, and reduced reservoir capacity caused by 
sedimentation. 
Estimates of evaporation losses, based on different modelling approaches, have ranged from 
230,000 to 350,000 acre-feet per year in the Rio Grande basin.449 Scientists readily admit that 
direct measurement of evaporation from water surface is very difficult. The process of 
evaporation is a complex phenomenon, which is a function of solar radiation, temperature, wind 
speed, vapor pressure deficit, atmospheric pressure and the surrounding environment.450 
The 2007 sedimentation assessment by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation reports that sediment has 
claimed 600,000 acre-feet (23.16 percent) of the Elephant Butte Reservoir 2.6-million-acre-foot 
capacity.451 Caballo Reservoir lost 6.3 percent.452 
                                                 
447 Glen M. MacDonald,  “Water, Climate Change, and Sustainability in the Southwest,” Proceedings of the 
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450 Ali Abbasi and Nick van de Giesen, “Evaporation Modeling in Lakes in Arid and Semi-Arid Regions,” 
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EGU2012/EGU2012-933.pdf. 





The Accounting System 
The above-mentioned difficulties in estimating sedimentation and evaporation losses 
undoubtedly compound Rio Grande Compact accounting. In the 2013 annual Report of the Rio 
Grande Commission to the governors of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas, in the section on 
Compact accounting, the following opening paragraph highlights the challenge facing Compact 
administration: 
The Engineer Advisers reviewed the streamflow and reservoir storage records and 
other pertinent data for the Upper Rio Grande Basin during calendar year 2013 
and are again unable to reach a consensus on the 2013 accounting [author’s 
own emphasis]. The lack of consensus arises from a disagreement that began in 
2011 amongst the Texas Engineer Adviser and New Mexico and Colorado 
Engineer Advisers on the release of water by Reclamation from Elephant Butte 
Reservoir in late summer 2011. As a result, the Engineer Advisers have not 
reached consensus on how to finalize the 2011, 2012, and 2013 Rio Grande 
Compact Delivery Tables for Colorado and New Mexico and the Release and 
Spill from Project Storage Table.453 
In addition to the challenge of accurately measuring system losses due to evaporation, 
sedimentation, and as we will see below, diversions and ground water pumping, concern has 
been raised by the New Mexico Engineer adviser that there is double accounting of evaporation 
on New Mexico credit water stored in Elephant Butte Reservoir when Article IV and Article VI 
of the Compact are applied. 
Groundwater Pumping and Diversions 
In the 2013 case of Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado, still before the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, on behalf of the State of Texas, contends that as a 
result of ground water pumping (an resource that falls under a separate legal regime from surface 
water) and unauthorized surface diversions between Elephant Butte and the Texas State line 
since 1938, Texas does not receive its share of water allocations as provided for in the Compact 
and in accordance with federal law for the Rio Grande Project. Texas asserts that New Mexico is 
in violation of its Compact obligations, and issues between sovereign states that can only be 
resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court.454 
New Mexico counters that it does in fact deliver the mandated volumes of water to the Elephant 
Butte reservoir as provided for in the Compact. It argues that any diversions or groundwater 
pumping below Elephant Butte and above Texas state lines are a violation of the Rio Grande 
Project and not the 1938 Compact. If the latter were to prove true, the matter would need to be 
raised by the El Paso County Water Improvement District in its capacity as project beneficiary, 
                                                 
453 Rio Grande Compact Commission, “Report of the Rio Grande Compact Commission to the Governors of 
Colorado, New Mexico and Texas,” 2013, http://www.ebid-nm.org/legalUpdates/legalUpdates/2013_RGCC_ 
Report_Final.pdf.  
454 Under the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over controversies 
between two or more states. 
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and would therefore not be a matter for the Supreme Court. As discussed previously, while the 
Compact provides for the delivery of water at San Marcial, New Mexico (just above the Elephant 
Butte Reservoir), some 105 miles north of Texas State lines, the terms of the Rio Grande Project 
guarantees the delivery of water to Texas. 
In determining whether the Compact was violated, the Supreme Court would have to interpret 
the rationale of the Compact negotiators when they decided to deliver Texas’ water in New 
Mexico territory. New Mexico argues that Texas’ claim is not based on the express terms of the 
Compact, while Texas argues that the 1905 Rio Grande Project and the obligations thereunder 
are an integral part of the spirit in which the Compact was accorded. Irrespective of the legal 
interpretation on which this matter hinges, the Honorable Pat Gordon, Texas’ Rio Grande 
Compact Commissioner, estimates that 2,500 wells have been drilled below Elephant Butte since 
the compact was signed.455 
Conclusion 
The spirit of the 1938 Rio Grande Compact is to divide the waters of the Rio Grande in a manner 
that would preclude the types of conflicts that brought the states of Colorado, New Mexico, and 
Texas to the negotiating table in the first half of the 20th Century. 
Today, drought conditions have exacerbated underlying tensions that are given life by Compact 
ambiguities and actions perceived to run contrary to the spirit of comity that must prevail for the 
effective management of a waterway as unique as the Rio Grande (interstate and international). 
Compounding the drought conditions is a complicated accounting system that naturally suffers 
from the difficulty of dealing with sedimentation and evaporation losses. The difficulty of 
measuring evaporation losses is an ambiguity which may enter the ongoing Compact/Rio Grande 
Project dispute. 
There appears to be sufficient historical evidence to suggest that obligations under the Rio 
Grande Compact were not intended to end with New Mexico’s delivery of water at San Marcial, 
105 miles north of the Texas state line. While this point is the subject of ongoing debate, the 
account of former Commissioner Frank Clayton appears to sufficiently establish that the Rio 
Grande Project was viewed as an integral part to the intent and purpose of the Rio Grande 
Compact. 
 
                                                 
455 Michael Haederle, “Texas, New Mexico Tangle Over Water,” Los Angeles Times, January 25, 2013, 
http://www.acmwater.com/assets/Texas-New-Mexico-tangle-over-water.pdf. 
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Chapter 17. The Energy-Water Nexus in the Paso del Norte Region 
by Faith Martinez Smith 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to address the energy-water nexus in the Paso del Norte (PdN) 
segment of the Rio Grande. The study seeks to determine the types of energy consumed and 
produced, the water available, the uses of ground and surface water, and the future of water for 
energy production. Using the Energy Information Agency’s online database, the energy 
production within the PdN was determined to primarily be for electricity generation. Most forms 
of electricity generation require water to generate power. Additionally, electricity is used to heat, 
treat, and pump water for various end uses. The interconnectedness of water and energy 
production is termed the water-energy nexus. The PdN Region has a robust mixture of electricity 
generation as well as various end uses for both electricity and water produced in the region. 
Water Availability in the Paso del Norte 
The PdN region uses both groundwater and surface water, and is primarily reliant upon surface 
water. The region begins at the Elephant Butte Reservoir in Sierra County, New Mexico, and 
continues along the Rio Grande’s pathway southeast towards El Paso. The Rio Grande then 
begins to form the border between the United States and Mexico. The Rio Grande begins as a 
stream in the San Juan Mountains of southern Colorado, continuing south through the PdN 
Region and eventually flowing into the Gulf of Mexico. Along this pathway the Rio Grande 
meets Fort Quitman, ending the PdN Region. A significant portion of the PdN includes the north 
eastern portion of the Mexican state of Chihuahua. The energy-water connection in the PdN, due 
to limited supply and heavy demand, is complex.456,457,458 
The PdN includes both urban and rural population centers, severe climatic differences, and 
numerous economic activities as well as the use of both surface water via the Rio Grande and 
groundwater resources. The watershed of the Rio Grande is large, covering 336,000 square 
miles, with half of the drainage basin being arid or semiarid, which limits the contribution of 
runoff water to the flow of the Rio Grande.459 
Surface water in the PdN is supplied by the Rio Grande drainage basin, which is over-allocated 
and relied upon for a variety of uses. This includes potable use in health care, education, 
construction, public administration, food services, and other service industries in addition to 
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irrigation, and power plant cooling.460,461 Groundwater within the region exists, but is often 
brackish, containing a high concentration of total dissolved solids or brine. Groundwater is used 
in southern New Mexico along the Rio Grande for irrigation of pecan groves.462,463,464 
Groundwater for the groves is pumped near the Rio Grande, impacting the water table, and 
according to the Texas Water Development Board, reducing the flow received by Texas from 
New Mexico. During drought years the United States proportionally reduces the 60,000 acre-feet 
water delivery to Mexico required by the 1906 Convention for regular years. 
Energy Production in the Paso del Norte 
Power plants in the PdN are primarily located along the Rio Grande for their proximity to 
accessible surface water for cooling. Renewable energy, including hydropower and solar, depend 
on water, elevation changes, and sunlight.465 Fuel types within the U.S. typically vary between 
coal, natural gas, uranium or nuclear, renewables, and petroleum. Within this region, several of 
those fuel types are utilized in various power plant types. This region uses geothermal power, 
natural gas, hydropower, solar, wind, and coal. Within the portion of the PdN in the United 
States, hydroelectric, solar, natural gas, geothermal, and wind are the fuel sources, while the 
Mexican portion of the PdN primarily uses coal-fired generation. Summer capacity tends to be 
the maximum capacity that a power plant can produce, due to the increased demand required in 
the PdN region for air conditioning purposes. Variations between capacity are directly related to 
fuel source, and hydrocarbons are a much more energy-dense resource when compared to the 
sun, wind, or water resources. 
Hydropower  
The PdN begins in New Mexico at the Elephant Butte Reservoir, which was created for the 
primary purpose of irrigation for the surrounding region’s valleys, Rincon, Mesilla, and El 
Paso.466 When Elephant Dam was built (1908-1916), demand for electricity was relatively low 
and hydropower turbines were not included in the dam.467 However, increased demand for 
energy eventually took hold, and hydropower generation was incorporated in 1940 after the 
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completion of the Caballo Reservoir downstream from Elephant Butte.468,469 The tandem 
operation of these reservoirs is important. Hydropower is produced year-round at Elephant Butte, 
while irrigation water is released from Caballo Dam only during the growing season. 
Hydropower was and is important for a region relying primarily on agriculture. Elephant Butte 
Reservoir’s summer capacity is 27.9 megawatts (MW). For perspective, there are 1,000 watts in 
a kilowatt; a traditional light bulb uses about 100 watts, while 1 megawatt can power about 1,000 
homes. Capacity is the maximum that a generator or turbine can produce under strenuous 
conditions. Summer capacity is used in arid, dry, and hot climates to estimate the most extreme 
environmental conditions under which a generator is able to operate at full capacity. 
Solar 
Along the Rio Grande in New Mexico, solar energy generation using photovoltaic panels has 
become fairly popular for municipal use, educational institutions, and industrial users. The City 
of Truth or Consequences, the village of Hatch, and SunE near Las Cruces have all installed 
photovoltaic cells to capture sunlight and convert it to electricity. According to the EIA, the City 
of Truth or Consequences’ solar power plant produces 1.9 MW, Hatch Solar Energy Center 
produces 5 MW, and SunE produces 13.6 MW during summer capacity.470 Siemens Government 
Technology also generates electricity using solar, but is privately consumed. El Paso also has a 
solar power plant, Newman Solar, which generates 10.3 MW.471  
Wind 
Wind is popular in West Texas, but most power generated is sent to other major population 
centers such as Dallas, Houston, or Austin. Horizon City Wind, near El Paso, is a part of the 
PdN, and it produces wind power through a traditional wind turbine, which generates electricity 
by spinning a turbine, blades in this case. Summer capacity for Horizon City Wind is 1.3MW.472 
Fossil Fuels  
Electricity production in the Texas part of the PdN is not as diverse as in the New Mexican 
portion of the PdN region. However, El Paso and Ciudad Juárez produce significantly more 
electricity, primarily due to demand to meet urban and industrial needs. The primary fuel choice 
for these cities is natural gas, which is used in natural gas combined cycle plants, natural gas 
steam turbines, and natural gas combustion turbines. In many cases, city centers or businesses 
that require some sort of back-up generation have options onsite, for example Providence 
Memorial Hospital in El Paso. The hospital requires a back-up for safety precautions if the grid 
is down or unable to meet demand, so a natural gas internal combustion engine is used as its 
generating source, allowing the hospital to have power at any time regardless of the outside 
resources. Additionally, Phelps Dodge Refining in El Paso is included in a list of available back-
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up resources for the potential of using the generation in emergency or assisted situations, such as 
helping back up the grid, and the plant can sell excess power generated to the grid operators. 
The following is a list of fossil fuel power plants, all using natural gas, in the U.S. part of the 
PdN, including their summer capacity: 
 Newman (760.9 MW);  Rio Grande (324.2 MW);  Providence Memorial Hospital (4.2 MW);  Phelps Dodge Refining (14.8 MW);  Copper (62 MW); and  Montana Power Station (200 MW).  
Mexico’s energy production is primarily owned and operated by the federal government, 
including electricity generation under the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE).473 The CFE’s 
North Region in Mexico encompasses the entire portion of the border Texas shares with Mexico, 
including the PdN.474 This region contains 17 percent of the nation’s generating capacity, or 
6,835 MW.475,476 Within the region, the following states are included: Chihuahua, Coahuila, 
Durango, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas.477 The PdN is entirely within the state of Chihuahua, 
with a population of nearly 3.3 million, and five major cities. Juárez is the largest of the cities, 
with a population approaching 1.3 million.478 The state currently only represents 10 percent of 
the economic activity of Mexico, primarily from assembly plants, while timber production, 
mining, and livestock ranching used to be “staples of the economy.”479 While economic activity 
is relatively low, Chihuahua is the richest state in Mexico due to its livestock (beef), and mining, 
as the second-largest silver producer in Mexico.480 Outside of the major cities, population is 
sparse, resulting in numerous types of generation, including traditional power plants, diesel 
generators, and geothermal. 
Cooling Technologies for Power Plants and the Energy-Water Nexus 
The majority of the power plants in or near the PdN region use water for cooling purposes. 
However, some of these plants do not require water for cooling purposes. The PdN region relies 
heavily on surface water, even when available water is low. The region is well aware of water 
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concerns, as demand from numerous users including “municipalities, irrigation, mining, 
industrial, and other users” exists.481,482 
The major cities in the PdN of Las Cruces, El Paso, and Ciudad Juárez receive top priority for 
water use, closely followed by thermoelectric power plants that require water to produce 
electricity. Thermoelectric power plants generate excessive amounts of heat when producing 
steam to generate electricity. Some plants do not use water to create steam for generation; instead 
the fuel source is burned to generate electricity directly through the turbine. With many of these 
power plants, water is required in different quantities, and in many cases can either be consumed 
or simply withdrawn and discharged back into the system with minimal losses. There are three 
main types of water or non-water use cooling options: once-through, recirculating, or dry 
cooling. 
Once-through cooling uses local water sources to absorb heat from the steam in condensers by 
withdrawing the water, using the water for cooling, and then discharging the water into the local 
system.483 Once-through systems consume little water, but they withdraw significant amounts of 
water. When the water is released to the local system it can be harmful due to its high 
temperature. These systems are not used frequently, but still exist. The second system for cooling 
is a recirculating system or a closed-loop system where the water is reused in a secondary cycle 
or through cooling towers. In a closed-loop system, the amount of water withdrawn tends to be 
less than in the case of once-through systems. However, these systems consume more water than 
once-through systems, as water is consumed or evaporated in the process and is replaced with 
additional water withdrawals.484 Lastly, dry-cooling systems are used to help reduce water 
consumption, where air is used instead of water to cool the steam system. Dry-cooling systems 
can be used in combination with different types of natural gas and solar thermal power plants. 
However, dry-cooling is not an option for coal-fired or nuclear generation, but it is common for 
combustion turbines as it is a non-steam system.485 
Within the PdN region, all cooling types are utilized depending on available water resources and 
water rights. The majority of the natural gas-fired power plants in the U.S. are combined-cycle 
plants, and within the PdN only three natural gas generators are not combined-cycle plants.  
Combined-cycle plants are much more energy efficient, meaning they are able to generate more 
electricity than just burning the fuel as they capture the waste heat from the initial combustion to 
then generate steam to turn an additional turbine. These power plants require significantly less 
water than traditional steam turbine plants since they recirculate the water in the secondary 
process. Natural gas steam generation systems require more water than the combined-cycle 
systems, while combustion turbines require no water for electricity production. 
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Desalination is the most unique project the region has taken on, as a partnership between Fort 
Bliss and El Paso Water Utilities to create and operate the Kay Bailey Hutchinson (KBH) 
Desalination Plant. It is the largest inland desalination plant in the world, and is unique in that it 
treats brackish groundwater as opposed to ocean water, common to plants near coastal areas.486  
This desalination plant relies on local electricity to produce fresh water, and it is very energy 
intensive to do so. Because of the increased energy required to process the water, additional costs 
are added for the users. 
The KBH plant is capable of producing 27.5 million gallons of water each day, significantly 
impacting the region’s water supply.487 Desalination strips the water of total dissolved solids, the 
majority of which are salts, making the water safe for consumption, but the process produces 
solid waste which adds another layer to the complexity of using the resource. Brackish 
groundwater is also an exhaustible resource, which should also be taken into consideration if the 
region is heavily encouraged to shift to utilizing this resource.488 However, the precise volume of 
brackish groundwater is unknown.489 
Because of the increased energy required to process desalinated water, additional costs are added 
for the consumers. The high cost of desalination makes the desalination plant almost 
uneconomical to run and local citizens would rather change their water consumption behavior to 
avoid the increase in water prices. Other desalination plants in the world are coupled with an 
onsite power plant, which helps reduce costs and provides additional revenue stream options for 
the company—selling electricity, water, or a combination of the two to maximize profit.  
Energy Consumption and Water Consumption 
Water resources are closely tied to energy production, in this case, specifically thermoelectric 
power plants, which require water to operate. Because they are directly connected, cost is 
considered when building or choosing to operate certain types of power plants. Additional costs 
should also be considered for municipalities and irrigators as water becomes more scarce. This is 
because water for use in municipalities requires electricity for pumping and treatment to become 
potable water. Irrigation also requires electricity, typically for pumping or other on-site 
operations, but is usually not directly tied with water or typical power plant operations. However, 
diesel or natural gas generators are used for most on-site applications. 
Irrigation districts in both the U.S. and Mexico are second on the list of priorities for water. 
These stakeholders already have claim to the water resources, and in some cases have water 
rights equal to or higher than cities. While it is not directly input in many directives, industrial 
users also have claim to the water resources, and also have water rights. The water rights are 
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generally many-years-old claims for the right to use the water resources. For this region, there 
are several options for water resources, including, but not limited to surface water, wastewater, 
treated wastewater, desalination systems, rainwater harvesting and pumping of various grades of 
ground water. Surface water requires the water rights to obtain the water rightfully, while 
groundwater typically only requires permitting for pumping.490 
Even with water rights in place, various stakeholders may be willing to pay more for their share 
of water. However, policy changes for pricing structures of water may need to occur before 
certain users are willing to participate in conservation or reduction of uses. Other options such as 
subsidies may need to be considered for irrigators, or municipalities to improve their 
technologies or to reduce consumption of water and energy resources. 
The Texas Water Development Board and the TCEQ monitor and determine the use of water 
resources in Texas. In Mexico, the waters are managed by the government as well. Water 
management and conservation has been at the forefront of the locals’ minds for decades. The 
expected decrease in water resources has led them to explore additional options, such as 
switching power plant options to reduce or eliminate water needed for cooling, using 
groundwater resources, and opening a desalination plant near El Paso. While groundwater seems 
to be a logical option, it does have flaws as it is generally connected to surface water, and can 
impact the level of surface water if wells or pumping occurs near the riverways. This is an issue 
currently being argued between the State of New Mexico and the State of Texas, as Texas claims 
it is unable to provide the allocated water resources as part of the Treaty to Mexico due to over-
pumping of groundwater resources near Las Cruces, New Mexico, along the Rio Grande.491, 492 
This issue only adds to the complexity of water concerns in the region. 
Conclusion 
The PdN region understands the importance of conservation and has already taken significant 
steps to reduce water consumption. Some of the reduced consumption is due to drought, but 
some may be due to the inability to obtain water rights. Examples of this include the power 
plants that have chosen to use closed-loop cooling or dry cooling options, irrigators who have 
updated their irrigation technology, the desalination plant to increase water supply in El Paso, 
and the use of renewables when generating electricity such as wind and solar. 
As the future of water within the PdN remains contentious, it is necessary to use planning 
methods focused on the energy-water nexus. So far, most stakeholders may ignore the energy-
water nexus in their planning and management. The PdN produces energy from a variety of 
resources, primarily natural gas. The process requires water and the nexus between energy and 
water requires increased attention. 
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Chapter 18. Survey of Paso del Norte Water Stakeholders 
by Deirdre Appel 
Introduction 
At the request of the Paso del Norte Water Task Force, the PRP conducted a survey on water 
scarcity in the region. We received input from a range of stakeholders and believe this input is 
critical to prepare for a Rio Grande/Bravo future with less surface water. Survey results were 
presented at the May 2016 Task Force workshop on response strategies to water scarcity in the 
river segment from Elephant Butte Reservoir to Fort Quitman, including parts of New Mexico, 
Texas, and Chihuahua. Workshop participants received a brochure summarizing the information 
listed below. 
Purpose 
There are several reasons why it is timely to prepare for a future with less river water. 
● The Paso del Norte is in the midst of a multi-year drought. Elephant Butte Reservoir 
stands at 14.5 percent of storage volume (July 4, 2016). Changing El Niño patterns 
suggest that the region has entered a period with increased threat of persistent droughts. 
 
● The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and other experts predict that climate change may cause 
a loss of 30 percent of river water by 2040, compared to the 1990 norm. Increased 
evapotranspiration and reduced snowpack are the likely causes of the decreases in 
available surface water. 
 
● According to sediment surveys by the Bureau of Reclamation, Elephant Butte Reservoir 
loses 2.5 percent of its storage volume each decade. In 2016, 100 years after closure, the 
reservoir has lost 25 percent of its storage volume. 
 
● With important economic sectors, such as agriculture and energy, and a growing 
population dependent on water, current and future water availability is an important 
aspect of safeguarding the livelihoods of the region’s people and maintaining good 
relations among riparian neighbors. Equally important: reduced stream flow will increase 
environmental damage. 
Methodology   
The Paso del Norte Water Task Force sought to gather feedback on current methods of water 
management from stakeholders in the Paso del Norte region, which include irrigation districts, 
water utilities, water governance institutions, water planning agencies, and other water 
stakeholders/NGOs. The purpose of the survey was to document how PdN stakeholders: 
1)    Address changing hydrologic conditions, 
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2)    Plan to operate under a scenario of future water shortage, and 
3)    Envision a sustainable water future for the PdN segment of the Rio Grande/Bravo.   
Our research utilized a qualitative survey method to explore the issue and gather input from the 
range of stakeholders. The sample of survey participants were recruited using recommendations 
from the steering committee of the PdN Water Task force, supplemented by desk research and 
expert input.  This group of individuals received an email invitation to participate in the survey 
on January 28, 2016, with a follow-up reminder email on February 3, 2016. We estimate the 
initial total sample size to be 54. Of those, 31 respondents began the survey and 22 respondents 
completed the survey. 
The survey began with nine questions for all participants on perceptions on the severity of the 
drought, measures used to cope with drought, and suggested measures to help cope with a 
reduced Rio Grande/Bravo flow. The participants were then asked to identify which organization 
they most closely identify with: irrigation districts, water utilities, water governance institutions, 
water planning agencies, or other water stakeholders/NGOs. Based on this selection, the 
participants then addressed eight questions relevant to their stakeholder group. At the conclusion 
of the survey, all participants were provided the full questionnaire. The list of survey questions 
along with a list of organizations of the survey respondents can be found at the end of this 
chapter. 
Ensuring Privacy and Confidentiality 
Prior to participation in the survey, participants were made aware that responses gathered from 
their participation in the survey would be kept confidential and anonymous. To ensure privacy of 
the collected data, the survey team created a collaborative electronic workspace and shared 
folder to which only team members had access. 
Limitations of the Methodology 
The survey was limited by the number of responses received. As previously stated, the sample 
size of respondents was 22 participants. The analysis of responses from each organizational 
subgroup is numerically limited even more. While a smaller sample size is less relevant for 
qualitative research and prohibits the Task Force from drawing general conclusions on the matter 
or extrapolating individual responses, the information provided by the participants should serve 
as insight into the matter. Issues discussed or brought up in the survey should be further explored 
and should not serve as a consensus of that affiliated group. 
Results 
Questions Asked of All Participants 
At the onset of the survey, all participants were asked a series of eight questions. In regards to 
the participant’s perception of the severity of the 2015 drought, almost half of the participants 
(45 percent) described it as a severe drought while the other half (41 percent) described it as a 
moderate drought. Two participants selected abnormally dry. One participant perceived it as an 
exceptional drought.  
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Participants were then asked how this drought affected their organization. Answers to this 
question can be grouped into three categories:  
1) Not Severely Affected/Did Not Affect: A large portion of the participants (7) believed that 
their organization was not directly affected by the Paso del Norte drought last year. 
2) Planning Difficulties/Changes in Planning: This category has a range of responses but 
the common thread is the drought’s impact on water plans, particularly water restrictions. 
Respondents noted the need to impose restrictions on use of surface water in northern 
Chihuahua, southern New Mexico, the City of El Paso, and West Texas, and restrictions 
of everyday use such as swimming pools or car washing. These restrictions in turn affect 
revenues. More preventative impacts were noted such as advancing water supply projects 
to provide drought proof supply. One participant from the IBWC noted that the drought 
resulted in a reduced delivery of flows under the 1906 Convention with Mexico. It also 
hurt their ability to implement native riparian environmental enhancement within the 
project areas. Another IBWC participant mentioned that because the drought varied 
across the Rio Grande basin, impact varied by region as well. The IBWC, however, was 
directly involved in planning and executing various studies, designs, and maintenance 
projections that involved the drought. For a water resource planning consultant, the 2015 
drought made water planning particularly difficult as many communities the organization 
works with had to truck water in for the first time in a long time. With the increased 
water needs around the El Paso area and a shortage of surface water supply, an Integrated 
Water Management Plan needs to be developed using innovative ideas to prepare for 
future water demands. 
3) Impacts on Farming: In addition to imposed restrictions, respondents noted the 
consequences droughts have upon the agriculture community. During the drought, certain 
producers were only allowed to plant 15 percent of their available land. Another 
respondent noted that the rural sector in particular is greatly affected as it causes crop 
failures and economic stresses. City residents, on the other hand, do not experience this 
stress. Yet the urban population is especially vulnerable because they do not expect 
supply constraints in the short term but rather continuous availability. 
Table 18.1. 
Perceived Severity of Drought 
Answer Responses Percentage 
Abnormally dry 2 9% 
Moderate dry 9 41% 
Severe drought 10 45% 
Exceptional drought 1 5% 
Total 22 100% 
 
Participants were asked to rate the level of importance of each of the following coping 
mechanisms. The rating scale is from 0 to 10 (10 being most important, 0 if not applicable) 
Results are displayed in Table 18.2.  
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Table 18.2. 
Perceived Importance of Drought Coping Mechanisms 
# Coping Measure Level of Importance Total Responses 
1 Greater emphasis on water conservation 7.73 22 
2 Increased groundwater pumping 4.9 21 
3 Letting fields lie fallow 4.45 20 
4 Change to more efficient irrigation 
technologies 
5.10 20 
5 Putting distribution channels underground 3.70 20 
6 Repair leaking pipes 5.19 21 
7 Municipal watering restrictions 5.29 21 
8 Other* 8.80 5 
     *Includes education, groundwater management, wastewater recycling, reuse of treated wastewater, and new 
homes with xeriscaped front yards. 
Participants were then asked whether they plan to adopt additional measures to cope with 
drought conditions if the drought continues: 59 percent of respondents (13) indicated they would 
while 41 percent of the respondents (9) indicated they would not. Of those who plan to adopt 
measures, these measures fall into the four categories below.  
1) Research:  Research should be conducted on the impacts of climate change, the growing 
and competing demands of water, the effect of decreasing groundwater levels, and on the 
coordination of reservoir water releases to minimize losses.  
2) Water Use and Water Rights: To cope with less water in the future, participants noted the 
need for reallocation of water and changes in the management to improve water use 
efficiency.  
3) Water Supply Projects: Such projects could be the collection and use of rainwater, 
advanced design of water supply projects, and investigation into market-based solutions 
to encourage more efficient water supply.  
4) Conservation/Community Projects: Several respondents noted the need for more 
conservation practices governed locally, or through the regional water group. They also 
indicated the need for the use of reclaimed water, waterless urinals, participation in a 
nation-wide discussion on water situation.   
In addition to inquiry of action to be taken under the agency’s jurisdiction, the survey asked what 
action the respondent would like to see taken to improve the economic, social, and 
environmental sustainability in respect to water resources in the entire PdN region. Participants 
would like to see the following actions taken: 
1) Conservation: The need for public education on conservation methods or increased water 
conservation in general was a common theme in these respondents. One respondent noted 
that conservation is especially necessary for agricultural uses while another noted the 
need for the continued expansion of the use of reclaimed water, 360 recycling for waste 
water, water conservation through further limitations. 
2) Regional Cooperation: Two respondents noted a need for a regional approach to 
preserving the water available from the Rio Grande. Another noted the need for a rapid 
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resolution of treaty disputes and a reexamination of water rights as they are being used 
inefficiently. According to another respondent, regional cooperation is not enough. The 
region and the state need to move towards a “conjunctive” use mind set. Stakeholders 
should recognize that surface and groundwater are all part of the same hydrologic cycle 
and they should be considered as one source when planning for a growing population 
with drought like conditions.  
3) Funding: The lack of funding is a common challenge for respondents. They would like to 
see an awareness of the need for additional supplies and the cost of these supplies.  
4) Infrastructural Support: One respondent noted they would like to see piped municipal 
drinking water provided to Juárez while another mentioned the need for a greater 
emphasis in urban planning to include more green space design and reduce outward 
expansion.  
5) Research/Knowledge Sharing: Respondents would like to see research conducted on the 
impact of subsidized surface water use on water transfers as well as the sharing of 
knowledge, strategies, and technologies in the use of water for human consumption, 
water reuse, salvage industrial uses, and agricultural uses. Emphasis should be placed on 
the expansion of environmental science concepts in school to promote awareness of the 
environment for future leaders. Additionally, water availability should be taken into 
account in new initiatives or endeavors in a stronger way.  
 
The participants outlined the following obstacles to implementing the measures described 
previously in the survey to cope with continued drought.  
1) Lack of Incentives and Funding: A large share of respondents noted the financial burden 
on individual organizations to take on conservation practices. Additionally, there is a lack 
of funding to create change and a lack of incentives to promote change.  
2) Institutions/Legal Framework: Such institutional constraints include the water rights 
system and the lack of remedial action. One respondent noted that the rules and 
regulations that currently oversee the permitting of surface water and groundwater are 
operated by two very different agencies. Each agency has their own set of guidelines 
which rule surface and groundwater very differently. Changing policy to make this a 
more uniformed system will continue to be a challenge but is necessary.  
3) Culture/Education Surrounding the Issue: Respondents noted a public apathy and lack of 
knowledge held by government officials not directly involved in water management. 
There exists, for some, a culture of failing to perceive lack of water as a problem or 
failing to engage effectively at the regional level. 
 
As previously mentioned, the next section of the survey was determined by each respondent’s 
organizational identification. The breakdown of the participants based on organizations is found 




Breakdown of Survey Participants Based on Organization Type 
# Organization Type Responses Percent 
1 Irrigation District 1 5% 
2 City or County Water Utility 3 14% 
3 Water Governance Agency (involved in water allocation) 6 27% 
4 Water Planning Agency 5 23% 
5 NGO/Other 7 32% 
 Total 22 100% 
 
Questions for Irrigation Districts 
The PdN has four irrigation districts. Unfortunately, only one took part in the survey. Irrigation 
districts face reductions in river water allocation during droughts. The district reported that they 
were allocated 10,000 acre-feet during a non-drought growing season and only 5,600 acre-feet 
during the most serious drought year. This has serious implications for the farmers as districts 
must change their water allocations. 
Farmers use a range of techniques for irrigation. Respondents noted sprinklers and drip 
irrigation, laser leveling techniques, and concrete lined ditches. To encourage water 
conservation, irrigation districts use public awareness campaigns, naming and shaming private 
measures, and charges to the farmer for the amount of water used. Despite these measures, there 
is a consensus that farmers face great difficulties in coping with drought. To do so, they will try 
crop switching, minimize crop switching and system losses, and achieve greater overall 
efficiency. The greatest barriers for using water more efficiently are inability to change farmer 
practices, outdated infrastructure, ineffective enforcement of water use, and high cost of 
conservation methods.  
Questions for City and County Water Utilities 
All utilities foresee an increase in demand for drinking water in their respective service area by 
2040. According to El Paso Water Utilities, monthly water loss ranges from 8-15 percent. This is 
due to poor infrastructure, such as leaking distribution systems or pipes. Two out of these three 
respondents use purple pipe water (partially treated water) or non-potable water for non-drinking 
purposes. 
Respondents were asked to specify the percentage of water they receive from each of the 
following sources: river water, fresh groundwater, desalinated groundwater, and other. El Paso 
Water Utilities specified they received 50 percent river, 46 percent groundwater, 3 percent 
desalinated groundwater, and 1 percent reclaimed water while Junta Municipal de Agua y 
Saneamiento Ciudad Juárez noted they receive 100 percent from river water. The third 
respondent did not specify a breakdown.  
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Questions for Water Governance Agencies 
Water governance agencies play a critical role in allocating water to different user groups. In 
order to change allocation rules, water governance agencies noted they either have monthly 
meetings with water users or, in the case of Texas users, making request to the TCEQ to change 
water allocations. 
When asked how their agencies address the connection between surface and groundwater 
(conjunctive use), the agencies noted difficulty because the matter is not properly defined or 
addressed by the legal system. Regardless, they do study and determine the impacts to find out 
how to address it. 
For example, current Texas water law does not license or regulate groundwater extraction. 
Groundwater is treated as a privately owned resource, that of the surface property owner, thus 
making it difficult to protect and regulate. “In Texas, these are regulated differently. While 
recognizing that there are connections, in one case (surface water), it is the state that grants the 
rights to use water, and in the case of groundwater, the landowner has full use of water. It makes 
no sense but that's the law. It could create a groundwater conservation district (GWCD), but it is 
doubtful it was created.” 
The survey asked water governance agencies what changes to the Rio Grande Compact are 
needed to cope with increased water scarcity. One respondent believes changes to the Compact 
will be difficult due to interstate political relations. The focus should be on greater enforcement 
of the Compact. One respondent noted that with a very probable reduction in surface water 
supply, the induced recharge to aquifers will diminish surface water even further. This must be 
addressed first before any changes to the compact can occur. Another indicated honest 
implementation by the states is needed, not changes. While another recommends a joint study 
and use of scientific and technical measures as opposed to legal. Based on the responses by 
Water Governance Agencies, it appears changes to the Rio Grande Compact should be secondary 
to other action.  
A similar question was posed to the agencies in respect to the binational 1906 Convention and 
1944 Water Treaty. A respondent noted political pressure on Mexico to compel is needed to 
better cope with increased water scarcity. One respondent worries that any changes made to the 
treaties will “only open Pandora’s Box.” Another questions how Mexico would be interested to 
renegotiate the 1906 Convention as it allocates Rio Grande surface water to Mexico even in 
times of drought. Alternatively, another respondent believes these changes should be discussed 
domestically and followed by a binational forum. 
Of those water governance agencies asked, three believed these changes to the 1906 Convention 
and 1944 Water Treaty can be achieved using the IBWC minute process. One indicated they do 
not know. 
Two governance agencies are involved in inter-basin transfers for supplemental water supplies 
and two are not. There transfers are expected to occur in the future when the El Paso dam is 
completed or if market based solutions are factored in.  
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In closing, water governance agencies indicated they did not need new rules to cope with a 
potential 30 percent reduction in surface water supply. The current rules offer adequate 
flexibility and there is no need for more rules; instead, “we need local action.” 
Questions for Water Planning Agencies 
There were not enough responses from the “Water Planning Agency” category to conduct a 
qualitative analysis. The following questions were addressed: 
What is your timeline for planning ahead? 
The Texas water planning process is on a five-year term. Every five years we update the 
Regional and State Water Plans to keep the information as current and accurate as possible. 
Do you consider reduction of groundwater supplies in your plans, if so how? 
Groundwater Conservation Districts through the joint-planning process must agree on a “desired 
future condition” for each aquifer within their Groundwater Management Area. In the 
development of these values, each District is able to consider how they want their aquifer to look 
50 years from now and how best to reach those goals. Groundwater modeling scenarios guide the 
group in making sure they do not over-pump (deplete) their aquifer supplies. Most districts 
consider maintaining a sustainable supply for future generations as top priority.  
Do you consider the impact of climate change? If so, how? 
New to the 2016 regional water plans, coordinated by the Texas Water Development Board, was 
chapter 7. This chapter is dedicated to drought and water management in times of drought. Each 
region was able to discuss among the water planning group the impacts drought has on their 
specific region. Climate change can be discussed within this chapter. 
Do you factor in reservoir sedimentation? If so, how? 
The regional plans do factor in reservoir sedimentation. For each strategy (project) that is 
developed to meet growing demands, along with the project the Plan must discuss all types of 
impacts that are associated with the strategy. Although, my office does not specialize on the 
surface water side of things, we team with an engineering firm that can bring their expertise on 
this topic.  
What changes in land use do you expect in your planning between now and 2040? 
More dry farming. 
What population changes do you expect in your planning area between now and 2040? 
Population is projected to continue to grow between now and 2070, which is the planning 
horizon that we plan for. 
Questions for Non-Governmental Organizations and Other Agencies 
The concerns ranged from environmental flows to upland watersheds and from research to cost. 
There was no general consensus over concerns regarding water. Yet when asked how their 
organization sees the water future for the Paso del Norte all believe work must be done to deal 
with the pessimistic future of increased demand and decreased supply. NGOs were then asked 
 172 
what is necessary from a range of different stakeholders to cope with water scarcity in the future. 
Their responses are compiled in Table 18.4 below.  
All the NGOs that participated in the survey are involved in environmental restoration aside from 
one. Actions for environmental restoration include the improvement of upland watersheds, 
restoration of riparian wetlands, rangeland restoration, and cooperative governance. When asked 
what incentives are needed to support such environmental restoration initiatives, respondents 
noted funding, investment, training, and viable alternatives to conservation. While NGOs have 
recognized the issue of water scarcity in the region, their effectiveness is limited in the following 
ways: remote location and fragmented governance, lack of incentives for water conservation, 
lack of good institutional planning, lack of resources, and the Texas and New Mexico Compact 
suit. 
Table 18.4. 
Summary: Needed Measures for Coping with Water Scarcity 
Irrigation Districts City and County Water Utilities 
Water Governance 




Improve handling leaks 
and efficient management 
of groundwater sources 
Less politics and more 
actions/investments 
Hire personnel more 
qualified/trained on the 














System efficiencies Explore water rights 
for the river 





Water conservation and 
ordinances 
Water conservation Strategic planning for future 
use associated with 
anticipated growth 
 
Survey Respondents and Questionnaire 
Survey Respondents 
● Center for Environmental Resource Management (CERM) 
● The University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP)  
● Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez  
● Texas A&M University El Paso 
● El Paso County Tornillo Water Improvement District  
● Retired from DOI, Bureau of Reclamation  
● Texas Commission on Environmental Quality  
● Junta municipal de agua y saneamiento Ciudad Juárez  
● New Mexico State University  
● Rio Grande Restoration  
● Presidio County Underground Water Conservation District  
● El Paso Water Utilities  
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● Bureau of Land Management  
● Bureau of Reclamation  
● HCCRD#1 (Irrigation district) 
● International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC)  
● U.S. Section, International Boundary and Water Commission  
● LBG-Guyton Associates 
Survey Questionnaire  
Questions for all participants 
1. In your view, how severe is the current drought in the Paso del Norte? 
a. Abnormally dry 
b. Moderate drought 
c. Severe drought 
d. Exceptional drought 
e. Extreme drought 
2. How has the current drought affected your organization/your part of the Paso del Norte? 
(Max 10 lines) 
3. Please indicate and rate the measures you currently use to cope with drought conditions 
in the column below. Please rate on a scale from 0 to 10 (10 being the most important, 0 
if not applicable). 
a. Greater emphasis on water conservation 
b. Increased groundwater pumping 
c. Rainwater collection and use 
d. Change to more efficient irrigation technology 
e. Desalination 
f. Reallocation of agricultural water to urban supply 
g. Lawn watering restrictions 
h. Other (Please specify) 
4. Does your organization plan to adopt additional measures to cope with drought 
conditions if the drought continues? If so, what are they? (Max 10 lines) 
5. Thinking about the Paso del Norte region as a whole, what actions would you like to see 
taken to improve the economic, social and environmental sustainability of the region? 
(Max 10 lines) 
6. What obstacles do you see to implementing the measures you describe in Question 5? 
 
Additional questions for irrigation districts  
1. How much river water are you allocated during a non-drought growing season? 
2. How much river water were you allocated during the most serious drought year? Specify 
the year. 
3. How did you change your river water allocations to farmers during the current drought? 
4. What irrigation techniques do your farmers use? (give percentages for methods used) 
5. How do you encourage water conservation? 
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6. How do your farmers cope with drought? 
7. What is the greatest barrier for using water more efficiently? 
a.  Inability to change farmer practices 
b. Outdated infrastructure 
c. Water theft 
d. Ineffective water use enforcement 
e. Other (specify) 
8. How do you reach decisions on changing water allocation rules?  
Additional questions for city and county water utilities 
1. How much water do you receive each year? 
2. Specify the percentage of water you receive from each source: 
a. River water 
b. Fresh groundwater 
c. Desalinized groundwater 
3. By how much were your water allocations reduced during the most serious year of the 
current drought?  (Specify the year) 
4. How much drinking water do you lose to leaking distribution systems? 
5. What is the current per household water use? 
6. How has water use per household changed over time? 
7. Do you use purple (partially treated) water for non-drinking purposes? If yes, please 
specify its purposes. 
8. What is your prediction of future drinking water demand in your service area in 2040? 
Additional questions for water governance agencies 
1. What are your operating rules for dealing with drought conditions? 
2. What is your procedure for changing water allocations? 
3. Do you currently have contingency plans for dealing with increased water scarcity? 
4. How do you address connections between surface and groundwater use (conjunctive 
use)? 
5. If you or your agency is involved in inter-state water sharing, what changes to the Rio 
Grande Compact might be needed to cope with increased water scarcity? 
6. If you or your agency is involved in transboundary water sharing: 
a. What changes to the 1906 Convention and the 1944 Treaty between Mexico and the 
United States of America might be needed to cope with increased water scarcity? 
b. Can these changes be achieved by using the IBWC minute process? 
7. Is your agency involved in interbasin transfers for supplemental water supplies? 
8. Do you expect such transfers to occur in the future (when)? 
9. What new rules might your agency need to deal with a potential 30 percent reduction in 
surface water supply?  
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Additional questions for water planning agencies 
1. What is your time horizon for planning ahead? 
2. Do you consider reductions of available groundwater supplies in your plans?  If so, how? 
3. Do you consider the impact of climate change?  If so, how? 
4. Do you factor in reservoir sedimentation?  If so, how? 
5. What changes in land use do you expect in your planning area between now and 2040? 
6. What population changes do you expect in your planning area between now and 2040?  
 
Additional questions for NGOs/Others 
1. What aspect(s) regarding water is your organization most concerned with? 
2. How do you see the water future of the PdN? 
3. What do you recommend to the groups/agencies listed below? 
a. Irrigation district managers 
b. City and county water utilities 
c. Water governance agencies 
d. Water planning agencies 
4. Are you involved with environmental restoration?  If so, please specify. 
5. In your view, what incentives are needed for water owners, managers and users to 
support environmental restoration? 
6. What enhances and/or limits your organization’s effectiveness in addressing water issues 

















Chapter 19. Euphrates-Tigris Workshop 
by Aysegül Kibaroğlu, Haytham Oueidat, and Jurgen Schmandt 
Aysegül Kibaroğlu convened a workshop at The Ohio State University entitled “The Evolution 
of Transboundary Water Politics in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria” as part of the Hydropolitics 
Seminar Series on Water Scarcity and Water Security, co-sponsored by the Middle East Studies 
Center, Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Global Water Initiative.  
The two-day workshop, held April 21-22, 2016, provided a platform to reconvene the Euphrates-
Tigris Initiative for Cooperation with a purpose to uncover the intersections between technical 
and traditional knowledge bases, and address the misunderstandings that arise due to conflicting 
epistemic perspectives. Current issues, such as the impending evacuation around the Tigris due 
to issues with the Mosul dam, make this workshop particularly salient. Participants came from 
the Euphrates-Tigris riparian nations (Syria and Turkey) and the United States, and three 
members of the LBJ School PRP attended the event. The workshop agenda and summary are 
found below. 
Agenda 
Thursday, April 21 - Keynote Address 
Aysegül Kibaroğlu, “The Evolution of Transboundary Water Politics in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria” 
Friday, April 22 - Euphrates-Tigris Water Issues  
9-9:15 a.m. - Welcome Remarks  William Brustein, Vice Provost for Global Strategies and International Affairs, The Ohio 
State University 
9:15-9:45 a.m. - Origin, Mission, and Activities of Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation 
(ETIC)  Faisal Rifai, Executive Director of the Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation 
(ETIC), retired Professor of Water Resource Management from Aleppo University 
9:45 a.m. - Collaborative Planning and Knowledge Development 2008-2011  Eblal Zakzok, Assistant Professor of Water Resource Management, The Ohio State 
University  Faisal Rifai, Executive Director of the Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation 
(ETIC), retired Professor of Water Resource Management from Aleppo University 
10:30 a.m. - Comparative Transboundary Issues: Rio Grande and Euphrates Rivers  Jurgen Schmandt, Professor Emeritus, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, 
University of Texas-Austin 
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1-2 p.m. - Concurrent Sessions 
1. Geographical Information Systems (GIS) as useful tools in water resources management: 
how to continue GIS projects with war on the ground, political tensions, humanitarian 
crises? (Eblal Zakzok) 
2. Capacity building in transboundary water management: Regional and local perspectives 
(Faisal Rifai) 
3. Urgent water issues in the ET basin: Case of Mosul Dam (Haytham Oueidat, LBJ School, 
UT-Austin) 
2-3:15 p.m. - Report from Concurrent Sessions  Whole group discussion 
3:15-3:30 p.m. - Concluding Remarks  Alam Payind, Director of the Middle East Studies Center 
Summary 
The Euphrates Tigris workshop addressed current situation in the region, which faces major 
challenges. The riparian nations of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran have sought to maximize their 
benefit from the water sources within their borders, often causing issues for their neighbors. The 
Euphrates Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC) was formed to address these challenges 
through cross-border cooperation, and the improvement of information and knowledge sharing. 
Board members and participants of this organization spoke at the workshop, along with other 
experts, to share knowledge regarding public policy, political science, civil engineering, 
technology for gathering and processing current data, and environmental sustainability. 
Conversations were lively due to the diverse priorities of each professional discipline, and the 
diverse cultural perspectives. A desire for sustainable water usage and peaceful cross-border 
relations unified the group.  
The challenges are formidable. Concurrent development projects in each of the countries, and 
multiplying forms of water resource extraction and usage have increased demand and created 
competition for water resources between these countries. Dams were originally installed for 
flood control, but quickly they became means for industry, irrigation and power generation. 
Currently, water resources from reservoirs are allocated for drinking and domestic use, as well.  
As time passes dependence on artificial sources becomes more entrenched, making water 
development a path of “no return.” At the same time, means for usage reduction, and more 
effective management are improving. Major issues include: 
 Periods of tension over water rights, sometimes verging on the brink of war.   Implementation of water management systems and issues with decaying dams negatively 
impacting local communities.    Increasing war and terrorism due to the formation and entry of jihadist groups, and 
misguided interference of world powers in the region.    
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Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the increase in the number and intensity of conflicts, and the 
continued involvement of outside powers, and especially the involvement of the so-called 
“Islamic State,” have made it increasingly difficult for researchers, government officials, and 
technical professionals to continue their work. As the civil wars and the factional cross-
boundaries conflicts have steadily increased, cross-boundary cooperation has become 
correspondingly more difficult, especially since the civil war began in Syria in 2011. At the same 
time, outside powers depict crises that may be manageable from the perspective of locals on the 
ground. The U.S. government reported that the Mosul Dam, for example, was on the verge of 
rupture, but according to Oueidat, these claims are overblown. It is true the design of the dam is 
inherently flawed, utilizing a gypsum foundation, but regular maintenance of the dam could 
forestall any ruptures for many years. 
The keynote lecture of the workshop, presented by Professor Kibaroglu, focused on how the 
current situation of water competition in the region evolved over time. The competition started in 
the 1960s, as Syria and Turkey built dams to protect against floods and provide for droughts. 
These quickly became irrigation projects, and hydroelectric power plants were built.  Demands 
increased further as these became primary sources of drinking water. The draw on the water is 
made more severe by the natural evaporation which occurs as the two rivers cross arid planes in 
Iraq and Syria, while the development of dams exacerbated the loss of water. While the countries 
had similar objectives of security, water supply and sanitation, food, and energy (hydropower), 
they conducted their reforms nationalistically, consolidating resources for their own populations. 
The nationalistic direction described above took the form of Ba’athist party centrism in the 
Syrian and Iraqi Ba’athist regimes, in addition to Turkish development projects focusing on its 
southeast region. This led to a period of aggression, but eventually all sides sought to negotiate 
water resource management agreements. The organization Euphrates Tigris Initiative for 
Cooperation emerged from the corresponding  dialogue amongst academics and lower level 
government professionals desiring pragmatic solutions to bypass political obstacles.  The 
organization’s goal was, and continues to be, to seek collaborative solutions to the problems 
faced by each country. ETIC facilitated cooperation, under the auspices of the USAID, UNEP, 
the Indian Government, the Swedish Government, U.S. universities, such as Kent State, and 
other supporters. ETIC has served its mission of knowledge sharing, exchange of information, 
and supporting data collection and analysis across borders by hosting stakeholder meetings and 
training workshops. 
Major activities of the Euphrates Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC): 
 ETIC Stakeholder Workshop, World Water Congress, Nov. 2005, New Delhi;  Dam Safety Training Program for Water Managers, February 2006, Istanbul;  ETIC Stakeholder Meeting, 4th World Water Forum, March 2006, Mexico City;  Stakeholder Meeting, World Water Week, Middle East Seminar, August 2006, 
Stockholm;  Modeling training workshop, Sandia National Labs, Nov. 2006, Amman;  CSD-15 Partnership Fair, United Nations, May 2007, New York;    Project Development, Workshops on ET Region, University of Tokyo, March 2005, 
March 2006 and Nov. 2006, Tokyo; 
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 Participation in the Joint Seminar with Nile Basin Initiative, FAO, Gov. of Italy, July 
2007, Como;  ETIC Stakeholders Workshop and Conference, Bahcesehir University, Istanbul, 11-17 
September 2007;  Workshop on Knowledge Technology, Gaziantep, Turkey, 13-15 March 2009;  Training Workshop on Global Geographic Information System, Aleppo, Syria, 2010; and  Conference of ETIC and the German National Committee of  the international 
Hydrological Program (IHP) of UNESCO and the Hydrology and Water Resources 
Program (HWRP) of WMO Okan University, Istanbul October 18-21, 2011. 
 
Since 2011, and the events of the uprisings across the Arab world, along with intensified conflict 
in Iraq, riparian nation cooperative activities have slowed down in the region. The ETIC Board 
met in Istanbul in 2012, the last meeting to take place in one of the riparian nation states.  
The Euphrates Tigris riparian nations are not alone in most of the issues they are facing, 
however. A global view on river basins water issues provided by Professor Schmandt aided the 
discussion of universal properties of this critical source of fresh water for many of the world’s 
largest population centers. Rivers are distant sources of water, originating from mountain snow, 
or tropical rainfall. Their journey downstream creates fertile soil but also entails loss of water to 
evaporation through what are often arid climates.  This is certainly true in the Euphrates Tigris 
region. Worldwide, dams, reservoirs, canals, distribution channels, modern forms of agriculture 
which require intensive irrigation, and growing basin populations , are putting immense pressure 
on these water resources. Massive rivers, such as the Rio Grande, actually dry to a trickle in 
some seasons. Clearly these factors make cross-border cooperation, not only more necessary, but 
more fraught with conflict based on competing interests. 
Conclusion 
The evolution of water resource management and associated national and foreign policies in 
Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, the riparian nations of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, has been 
both predictable and volatile since the 1960s. Development of the economy, of the social benefits 
of becoming a “developed country,” and of the natural assets of the terrain of each country drove 
each country to invest heavily in water management projects. Turkey’s Güneydoğu Anadolu 
Projesi, or “GAP” project, is perhaps the most well-known of these projects. Since the inception 
of such projects local and global perspectives on water management have become more inclusive 
of environmental, social, and political demands.  ETIC was formed in response to these needs. 
The water development projects began with modest goals of preventing floods and droughts, but 
quickly became more ambitious. As the scope of the water resource uses increased, the number 
and significance of the issues also increased. For example, the issue of natural evaporation over 
the arid plains has existed for centuries, but accelerated evaporation from large reservoirs has 
made the issue of water loss much more severe. This is made more complex by the dependence 
the reservoirs have created in regard to drinking water, irrigation and hydropower. There are a 
host of complex issues created by the new technologies that effect people, wildlife, and the 
environment. 
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In addition to the intrinsic challenges of water management and cross-border negotiation of 
water usage, local academics and professionals capable of addressing these challenges are 
increasingly fleeing from the region with the increasing number of conflicts, terrorist groups 
occupying the region, and persecution from local groups, governments or foreign occupiers. The 
work of ETIC continues, but much of the work must now operate remotely. Universities and 
other organizations in the business of knowledge production and knowledge sharing may 
continue to host these activities. There is hope that with the Internet and satellite technology that 
the regional knowledge will continue to be developed and exchanged amongst the riparians. 
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Chapter 20. Paso del Norte Workshop 
by Sara Eatman, Marimar Miguel, and Jurgen Schmandt 
The Paso del Norte workshop was held on May 27, 2016, in El Paso, Texas, with participants 
from the U.S. and Mexico. This chapter contains the workshop agenda, bulleted summaries of 
the presentations and sessions, and a table showing the results of a vote by  attendees on the 
priorities for water planning. 
Agenda 
Paso del Norte Water Task Force Workshop 
“Preparing for Less Water in the Paso del Norte” 
University of Texas at El Paso 
Morning session: Chair Jose Garcia 
 
8:30  Opening Statements  Welcome by IBWC/CILA Commissioners Ed Drusina and Roberto Salmon: On behalf of 
the PdN Water Task Force, IBWC/CILA are pleased to work with PdN stakeholders to 
develop a vision for a regional water future  Goals for today: Review and discussion of expert views and stakeholder input on PdN 
water future, Oscar Ibañez, Water Task Force Steering Committee  Goals for 2016/17: Use PdN Water Taskforce for developing binational strategy to cope 
with water scarcity, Jose Garcia, Water Task Force Steering Committee 
9:00  Short expert reports on need for planning ahead NOW 
9:00  Projected 2030 population growth in the PdN, Ed Archuleta, UTEP 
9:15  PdN/Mexico 2030 surface water supply and demand, Oscar Ibañez, UACJ 
9:30  PdN/Texas 2030 surface water supply and demand, William Hargrove, UTEP 
9:45  PdN/New Mexico 2030 surface water supply and demand, Philip King, NMSU 
10:00  How climate change/variation reduce surface water supply, David Dubois, NMSU 
10:15  Coffee Break  
10:45  The economic impact of climate change on the PdN, Brian Hurd, NMSU 
11:00  How reservoir sedimentation reduces Elephant Butte storage volume, Bert Cortez, 
           U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
11:15  Q and A session 
11:30  PdN Stakeholder survey, Jurgen Schmandt, HARC and UT Austin  
11:45  Comments by Diana Natalicio, President of UTEP  
12:00  Lunch, Remarks: Lic. Antonio Andreu, Presidente de Junta Municipal de Agua y 
           Saneamiento Juárez (JMAS)  
 
Afternoon session: Chair René Franco 
 
13:30  PdN Water Task Force Draft Action Plan, Jurgen Schmandt, HARC and UT Austin 
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13:45  Discussion: Comments on proposed Action Plan 
14:45  Main points raised by stakeholders, Sara Eatman and Mariam Miguel, UT Austin 
15:00  How our PdN regions will work together—Oscar Ibañez, Ari Michelsen, José Garcia 
15:30  Closing remarks, CILA and IBWC Commissioners, René Franco 
16:00  Meeting adjourns 
 
Summaries 
Morning session: Chair Jose Garcia 
 
Opening Statements: IBWC/CILA Commissioners Ed Drusina and Roberto Salmon. On behalf 
of the PDNWTF, IBWC/CILA are pleased to work with PdN stakeholders to develop a vision for 
a regional water future. 
Ed Drusina, USA: 
 The Colorado Basin system has been in a 15-year drought.  The Bureau of Reclamation 
has been monitoring water from U.S. to Mexico Colorado basin: 10 percent chance of 
Lake Mead hitting lowest mark ever this year, and the chance increases to 64 percent in 
2020.  The 2011 drought on the Rio Grande resulted in only 6 percent water allocation, which is 
the lowest allocation recorded.  Reviving the Paso del Norte Water Taskforce is an important step, since drought is a 
regional issue that requires cross-border cooperation. “Political lines are just that when it 
comes to natural resources.” 
Roberto Salmon, Mexico: 
 The Paso del Norte region, on both sides of the border, has more similarities than 
differences. We are distant from state and national capitols and so the region is dependent 
on cooperative efforts like the Task Force and the IBWC/CILA to ensure water issues are 
addressed. Sustainable water management requires binational effort.  
Goals for Today: Review and Discussion of Expert Views and Stakeholder Input on PdN 
Water Future 
Oscar Ibañez, Water Task Force Steering Committee: 
 Today we will select priorities for the work of the Taskforce.  Preparation of the PDNWTF workshop: 
○ Talks began last fall and a number of people helped with the preparation. 
○ Dr. Jurgen Schmandt has been overseeing a research group at UT Austin, which 
developed and circulated a survey of regional stakeholders, asking about goals and 
interests in the region concerning drought and water scarcity. 
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 The PdN has a unique set of issues, so water management requires local input and 
informal engagement, like that of the Paso del Norte Task Force, to develop appropriate 
solutions.  Stakeholder input is critically important. 
 
Goals for 2016/2017: Use PDN Water Taskforce for developing binational strategy to cope 
with water scarcity 
Jose Garcia, Water Task Force Steering Committee: 
 As a region we have one river, two countries, three states, and various political 
jurisdictions that deal with water management and distribution, which can make this 
process very difficult.  However, water management can be an opportunity for a region-
building exercise, bringing together all of these entities and working toward a common 
goal of sustainable water supplies across the Paso del Norte.  The Taskforce includes policy-makers, water managers, and many of the decision 
makers.  If these people can speak together about the issues facing the Paso del Norte, 
they’re more likely to be heard at higher levels of government.  The role of the Paso del Norte Task Force is to convene and facilitate the exchange of 
views, understanding similarities and differences, and trying to find a single voice.  The 
goal is to understand concerns, goals, and suggest next steps. 
Population Projections for 2030 
Ed Archuleta, UTEP -  El Paso segment of the PdN: 
 El Paso has created a 50-year water plan for the city. It is being implemented successfully 
with assistance from the state of Texas. Population projections were developed by the 
state demographer.  NAFTA in 1994 led to more coordination across the border, through the EPA and now 
through other channels.    El Paso has been involved in county and state regional water planning, which has allowed 
for sharing of expertise and resources for gathering population data and projecting growth 
of the population and water demands.   El Paso drives the regional water demands as the largest city by far in the Texas portion 
of the Rio Grande PdN sub-basin, although there has been some growth in Presidio and 
Marfa.   In recent years, birth rates have exceeded death rates. We expect an increase in 
migration into the region due to economic development projects underway.  El Paso City has a population of 700,000 plus, and grows by 10-12,000 per year.  Bottom line: No economic development or growth can happen without water. 
Networking, communication, will help us work on things we agree on and define next 
steps forward. 
Eng. Vicente Lopez, IMIP -  Juárez Municipality: 
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 Ciudad Juárez saw a reduction in population due to security issues in 2008, but in 2015 
and 2016 has seen record employment numbers. The 2015 population for Ciudad Juárez 
is 1,382,753, it was 789,522 in 1995, and it is projected to be 1,616,344 in 2030.  As a result of security problems, demographic shifts in the population, and changes in 
industrial employment, there have been many re-adjustments in the projections of 
population in recent years. In 1995 NAFTA promised a lot of jobs, but some of the 
industries that moved in have created fewer jobs than expected, and the economic 
landscape is constantly changing.  The city has been growing, but the aging population and predominantly working-class 
population make it difficult to manage infrastructure with the limited resources available.  The city has been working to encourage centralized development, because low population 
density presents a challenge to city utilities.  The rural population is decreasing, but the region is still working to find a balance 
between urban and rural water users. Agricultural water efficiency requires improved 
technology, including application and metering.  The hope is that the PdN Water Taskforce will work towards sustainable solutions to 
secure water for the next generation. “We hope that the Taskforce is able to stay together 
and achieve the goals that are set forth at the end of this meeting.” 
2030 projected water supply and demand in the PDN segment of the Rio Grande/Bravo 
William Hargrove, UTEP: 
 The water resources that need to be considered in this area are both surface water and 
groundwater.  
○ The main aquifer is the Hueco Bolson.  Water scarcity issues are a result of growing competition for water in the basin, the 
changing and uncertain climate, prolonged drought and extreme events  Bureau of Reclamation has developed climate projections for the southwestern USA 
○ Temperature increase of 5-7 degrees F over this century 
○ Precipitation increase in the northwestern basin, and north central, and a decrease in 
the southwest and south central   
○ Decrease in April 1 snowpack  Climate projections for the Rio Grande basin are particularly severe 
○ Upward trend in average temperature since the 70s 
○ Annual snowpack is less than 50 percent of normal, which has been a trend for about 
10 years. 
○ Higher demands, particularly agricultural, both from increased evapotranspiration and 
the longer growing season. 
○ The state-wide reservoir storage in New Mexico is predicted to drop 55 percent by 
2100  Elephant Butte has not been full for years, and may not fill regularly in the future, it’s 
management is based on the assumption that the climate of the 1990s was typical, when 
in fact that was an unusually wet period. So, we would like to think that the last few years 
were an anomaly, but actually, the high supply years were the anomaly.  The riverbed in the Paso del Norte runs dry 9-10 months of the year. 
 186 
 The growing season has been impacted: 100-year average of the date of the last frost was 
March 23, whereas the last 10-year average is March 1. The growing season is getting 
longer, which causes greater evapotranspiration. Region E (the Texas Regional Water 
Planning group that contains El Paso and six other west Texas counties) projects water 
demand in 2020 will be 73 percent for irrigation, and 21 percent municipal/industrial.    Texas, since groundwater use isn’t regulated, allows farmers to grow things like pecan 
trees that require massive amounts of water even in years of drought, effectively 
“borrowing from” the aquifer.  We at UTEP have been talking to stakeholders, including large and small farmers in the 
Rio Grande basin in Nnew Mexico, Texas, and Chihuahua, Industrial water users, 
government entities, etc., and for all of these stakeholders, the chief concern was the 
prolonged drought and how to respond.  Key questions to keep in mind: 
○ Can we manage across boundaries and jurisdictions? 
○ Can we cooperate across sectors instead of compete? 
○ Can we come up with a win/win situation? 
Update on Water in New Mexico’s Lower Rio Grande 
Philip King, NMSU: 
 There are opportunities to influence policy in several arenas.  The 1938 Rio Grande Compact describes a simple system for water delivery from 
Colorado to the NM state line according to gauge data.  NM makes its deliveries to TX 
determined by gaged values and delivers at Elephant Butte, even though the end users are 
Mexico, New Mexico, and Texas (“Compact Texans”).    Working with Elephant Butte Irrigation District, I report decline in total irrigated acreage 
but increase in water use due to more water-intensive crops.    Releases from Caballo are directly related to available diversions to the downstream 
irrigation districts:  the data show increased groundwater withdrawals in low precipitation 
years.  The drought of the 50s depleted groundwater and increased the depth to water 
over that period.  We have maintained high agricultural production through drought by 
borrowing from groundwater supplies. Water supplies currently are similar to drought of 
record, but the increased temperatures mean that this drought is significantly more severe.  “Compact Texans” are impacted more severely by drought simply because they’re 
downstream. The Compact referred to a relatively wet time as the standard expected.  
Equity depends on going between wet and dry years, which are imbalanced because of 
the datum selected. An increasingly arid climate was not contemplated in design of 
project, or the obligations outlined in the Compact.  As we look toward solutions, it’s important to understand that most of the irrigation 
“conservation” doesn’t actually reduce groundwater depletions. Efficiency of on-farm 
irrigation reduces groundwater recharge; so reduced irrigation negatively impacts 
groundwater levels.  Although we talk about shifting to lower water demand crops, 
selection follows market crop prices and will not follow water use for the sake of 
conservation. 
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 Other solutions that have been discussed include brackish water desalination, which is 
expensive but reliable, storm water capture, which is difficult in a region with highly 
variable precipitation (would require significant flood and storage infrastructure), and 
conservation or rain capture, which may be useful but aren’t significant enough in 
volume to make a dent in the overall needs.  A “Depletion Reduction Offset Program” (DROP) would allow agricultural users to 
voluntarily fallow land to allow for another use (M&I).  Is water available? Yes. Is cheap water available? Sort of, but you get what you pay for 
(reliability). Is cheap and reliable water available? Nope. 
PdN/Mexico 2030 Water Supply and Demand 
Oscar Ibañez, UAC – Mexico: 
 Cuidad Juárez population hasn’t grown as much as was expected for 2020 (2.5 million) 
and projections have been adjusted down.  Employment and migration have impacted 
growth, and now the expectation is 1.8 million in 2030.  That’s a significant decrease and 
is good news with regard to demand. However, the rate of growth has surpassed what 
was expected.   Irrigation water is limited specifically to water from the 1906 Convention, however 
demand for municipal/urban water is the largest group (surpasses irrigation).  149 cubic 
meters/year per-capita use. Needs to be reduced.  Under the 1906 Convention, 74 million cubic meters per year are delivered through the 
Compact and there are normal variations, but the change in storage regimes have 
decreased the delivery volumes.  The delivery period requires when the water can be 
used, which often forces lower efficiency.  They could supplement urban use with the 
water guaranteed by the convention.   Right now the city is reusing water which decreases return flows, which has been 
impacting District 009. District 009 was more efficient in the last year than it had ever 
been, which involves using treated water from the city.   The 2000 Paso del Norte plan intended to reduce irrigated acreage.  Reduction has 
fluctuated. They have been using groundwater at a rate almost twice of a reliable 
extraction volume. Estimated that between 1-1.5 meters of abatement of the aquifer 
occurs annually – which is a significant depletion.    The need that we see for balancing supply and demand has changed with changing 
demand projections.  However, there are challenges and conflicts between agriculture and 
urban use.  We can maintain agricultural production in the Juárez area but it requires 
improvements in technology and management.   Trying to find the right balance between demand supply presents us with a challenge. 
Originally, we thought the demand was going to increase and would cause for more 
expensive projects (e.g. if we try to recapture the water). We face potential conflicts 
between agricultural and urban use – we can have productivity, but we would need 
accord and availability of water that would provide a more sustainable environment. It 
needs cooperation and MONEY.  
How climate change and variation are reducing surface water supply 
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David Dubois, NMSU: 
 Looking at the changing climate in New Mexico: periodic droughts with increasing 
intensity since the 1980s. Temperature increase that peaked in 2012 with about 2.8 
degrees F higher average temp (worst in 121 years), decreased snowpack, increased 
demands, seasonality changes (earlier runoff and more rain instead of snow), increased 
surface runoff; 2012 was third-driest year in records.  Dust storms in the four-corners area then blow over to the mountains in southern 
Colorado and change the albedo on snowpack, so that it heats faster—forces land 
management decisions outside of our planning area that directly impact snowpack and 
water supplies.   A range of different climate factors will continue to stress the water resources in the 
region, both in direct ways (like precipitation and use in the basin) as well as indirect 
ways, like the impact of dust storms.   Management strategies should address these regional and intra-regional issues.  Good recent data source: USBR, 2016 Secure Water Act Report to Congress 
The economic impact of climate change on the PDN 
Brian Hurd, NMSU: 
In addition to climate and demographic factors, one must look at the economic value of water.   Using a model developed by Julie Coonrod (UNM) looked at the economic impacts of 
streamflow variations.  The dollar amount ranged from $30 million/year to $100 
million/year depending on the climate scenario. How can we adjust, since water is only 
going to become more scarce?   Various mechanisms for appropriating water: 
○ Prior appropriation method, the current standard, respects the current water rights but 
it imposes a constraint that lays the burden of the drought on particular users and user 
types.   
○ An economic model (i.e., water pricing) will distribute the impacts over all of the 
users based on the value of water, and encourage the highest value use of water. 
○ Proportional adjustment, either for all users or categorize users and assign portions of 
the drought burden (i.e., limit agricultural use in drought).    Return flow availability is going to be another complicated issue as we move toward 
efficiency and reuse, and therefore reduce return flows which downstream users (and 
aquifer recharge) may depend on.   Another issue will be how groundwater management has shifted from a supplemental 
supply during drought to more of a permanent supply.  How should we manage groundwater? 
○ The aquifer is our bank in times of shortage, but has been over-extended in the 
northern part of the state and will become a permanent feature rather than a 
supplement.  
○ How do we think about the sustainability? 
○ We need to take the present value of water and think of what it will mean in the future 
to deal with increased scarcity.  
 189 
How reservoir sedimentation reduces Elephant Butte storage volume 
Bert Cortez, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation: 
 Elephant Butte / Caballo  
○ The Bureau authorized the Rio Grande project in 1905, and it was completed in 1916. 
○ Current storage is about 2 million acre-feet. 
○ Elephant Butte Reservoir is turning 100 years old this year. 
○ Elephant Butte was initially authorized for irrigation, then in 1920 a special act 
authorized the sale of water for municipal, industrial, and miscellaneous uses.  
○ Caballo Reservoir was supposed to be for flood control, but was increased for storage 
and power generation.  The 1906 Convention states that 60,000 acre-feet be delivered to Mexico at the Acequia 
Grande.  The Rio Grande Compact treats everything downstream of Elephant Butte as “Texas.”  The rate of sedimentation has decreased slightly, possibly due to upstream reservoir 
construction. However, we can still assume about 6500 AF/year of storage capacity will 
be lost, 0.68 percent per year, 25 percent by now. Estimate from 2007: the reservoir will 
be at half initial capacity in 2164 (1.02 million AF). Half-life of reservoir is 157 years.  How should we respond to lower inflows and lower storage? Reclamation started as a 
way to settle the western states but it has become a water management agency since then. 
Promotion of conservation and active management in response to drought are central to 
the current mission of the Bureau.  Today, BOR is a modern water management agency with a strategic plan outlining 
numerous programs, initiatives, and activities that will help the western states, Native 
American tribes, and others to meet new demands. 
Remarks by UTEP’s President 
Diana Natalicio, UTEP 
The importance of interdisciplinary research is central to the mission of the University and to 
solving problems. UTEP serves an area that has been historically underserved and 
undereducated, and provides opportunities for people in the area on both sides of the border to 
create opportunities to move into professional careers. The University has tried to foster work on 
water and natural resources, and look at the way that political boundaries impact the 
management of shared resources, called Connectography. Some of the ongoing work at UTEP 
includes engineering research of nanotechnology in water treatment and Dr. Hargrove’s work on 
sustainable water resources for irrigated agriculture in arid regions. 
 
Eng. Manuel Herrera, on behalf of Lic. Antonio Andreau, Presidente de Junta Municipal 
de Agua y Saneamiento Juárez (JMAS) 
Presented a ConAgua study which estimates 12.6 percent losses through water spills. Stated that 
we suffered from watershed loss. We fell into 60 percent to micro mediation.  One of the priorities is to reduce the estimated 12 percent losses, and to be more efficient 
delivering water in the residential sector.  In green areas, we use a purple-pipe system (recycled non-potable water). 
 190 
 Aquifers are being overdrawn, and we are trying to approximate this with aquifer models.  
We have seen the aquifer behavior patterns, and have tried to model the rates of recharge 
and withdrawals.  What are we doing?  In Mexico, we recharged in 2014 and 2015. Applied rigid rules for reuse in drinking 
water.  We’ve been working with legislators to create incentives to work for reuse and recharge 
of aquifer water by treatment.  We need to recharge our own aquifers. 
Results of PdN Stakeholder Survey 
Jurgen Schmandt, Sara Eatman, Marimar Miguel, University of Texas at Austin: 
 The increasing need for preparing for increased regional drought has been demonstrated 
by all of today’s speakers. Drought, sedimentation of reservoirs, and aquifer over-use 
need to be addressed together. All impact the Rio Grande Basin and the Paso del Norte 
area.  As a part of a larger effort, a group of graduate students at the University of Texas at 
Austin’s LBJ School of Public Affairs conducted a survey of stakeholders in the Paso del 
Norte to address current concerns and response to drought. 
o The survey was provided to stakeholders in New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico in both 
English and Spanish. A brochure on results was distributed today, Paso del Norte 
Water Task Force, 2016 Stakeholder Survey: Preparing for Increasing Water 
Scarcity.  
o Results are also summarized here. 
o Participants included Irrigation Districts, City and County Water Utilities, Water 
Governance Agencies, Water Planning Agencies, and NGOs; 53 surveys were 
distributed; useable responses were received from 22 participants. 
o Participants were asked about how entities cope with drought and plan for action. 
o Shortcomings: few responses were received from irrigation districts and Mexico.  Stakeholders propose four overall priorities for action: 
o Conserve water 
o Cooperate rather than take legal action 
o Conduct research on impacts of climate change and groundwater depletion 
o Obtain funding for infrastructure improvements  Priorities for irrigations districts: 
o Crop switching 
o Use sprinklers and drip irrigation 
o Line ditches/put them underground 
o Minimize system losses 
o Encourage water conservation  Priorities for water governance agencies: 
o Change water laws to conjunctive management of surface and groundwater 
o No new rules are needed to cope with 30 percent reduction in surface water supply 
o Instead, we need action 
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 Priorities for city and county water utilities 
o Plan for increased demand of drinking water due to population growth 
o Repair water leaks 
o Use purple pipe water for non-drinking purposes  Priorities for NGOs 
o Funding, investment, training for environmental restoration and water conservation 
o Focus on practical steps, not political disputes  The PdN survey is part of a larger ongoing effort to understand how 10 different river 
basins around the world are coping with increasing water scarcity (see 
http://harcresearch.org/work/SERIDAS).  The project proposes a new definition for sustainable water supply and demand in a river 
basin in arid or semi-arid areas: 
o Nature’s water supply, averaged over the period of the most severe drought 
experienced in the historical record, delivers a dependable yield sufficient to meet 
human and ecological needs in the basin. 
o To prepare for increased water scarcity from either natural or human causes, water 
managers and stakeholders proactively search for ways to use water more efficiently. 
o Whenever observed or projected changes in the natural system or human actions 
modify river flow, the dependable yield is recalculated, and water managers, after 
consultation with stakeholders, adjust existing rules for water allocation and water use 
to match the new level of dependable yield.  
o PdN water managers are invited to look at the applicability of the definition for their 
region.  The Paso del Norte Taskforce is an example of stakeholder involvement in regional water 
planning and sustainable drought response. It provides an opportunity to gather 
practitioners, water planning professionals and academics to guide water policy. 
Using technical information and survey results for developing a water action plan for the 
PDN: Summary of main points  
Chair René Franco and Lorenzo Arriaga: 
Potential solutions and avenues for collaboration in Paso del Norte were listed and grouped in 
categories in an interactive discussion. Several categories of potential solutions were listed on 
posters and each attendee was given six stickers to indicate which category or specific items 
represented the highest priorities. 
 
The solutions proposed are listed below, followed by a table showing the results of priority 
voting. 
  Engage other sectors in management and conservation of water resources  
○ Chamber of Commerce and the business sector  Environmental management 
○ Watershed improvements (invasive plant species removal, storm water management)  Define the demand of growth and the source of growth; having detailed demographic 
projections, industrial and agricultural demand data help to meet demands 
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 Evaluate the potential for regional-scale infrastructure (Texas, New Mexico, and 
Chihuahua) 
○ Desalination plant proposal to serve the whole region 
○ Watershed management, like Arundo donax eradication  Irrigation management at all three levels: river, canals and then farms—opportunity for 
conservation 
○ Farm-level conservation (crop selection, laser leveling, narrow border flood, drip, 
etc.) 
○ Irrigation district conservation (delivery channel improvements, operational 
efficiency, loss prevention, metering)  Research 
○ Interdisciplinary approaches including academia, stakeholders, community 
○ Economic incentives, financial and price incentives 
○ Environmental science, climate and natural systems 
○ Treatment technology, water supply  
○ Revisit the 1906 Convention to be sure it’s adapting to changed conditions  Better stakeholder engagement 
○ Encourage collaboration through role-playing activities, “table-top exercises” where 
participants work through issues as a different party (e.g. irrigation district manager 
versus regulator) 
○ Annual conference to give ideas for water management, share thoughts, provide 
forums for engagement 
○ Supreme Court case may be impeding the communication with the irrigation districts, 
keeping them from participating  Green infrastructure 
○ Rainwater harvesting (single property-scale) 
○ Potable/non-potable reuse 
○ Greywater 
○ Storm water capture and management 
Table 20.1. 
Results of Voting on Priorities 
STRATEGY VOTES PERCENT 
Reuse 11 5.2% 
  Potable 9    Non-potable 2  Economic Incentives 18 8.6% 
  Price Incentives 3    Financing 7  Education 22 10.5% 
  General public 9    Schools 3    Political 9  
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Environment 16 7.6% 
  Watershed & Water Quality 16  Legal/Regulatory 15 7.1% 
  Environmental Protections 5    Diversion/Pumping limits 6    Enforcement of (existing) Laws 4  Engagement 24 11.4% 
  More stakeholders 15    More involvement 2    Table-top exercises 2    Surface Water – Groundwater coordination 1    Forums 4  Governance 28 13.3% 
  Inter-sector 2    Cross-border (state and national) 23    Change in laws 3  Green Infrastructure 20 9.5% 
  Rainwater harvesting 5    Greywater 0    Storm water capture 4  Technologies 29 13.8% 
  Desalination 16    Research & development 13  Conservation 27 12.9% 
















Chapter 21. Defining Sustainability of Engineered Rivers in Arid Lands 
by Aysegül Kibaroğlu, Jurgen Schmandt, and George Ward 
Two months before the end of the academic year, we asked our PRP team to reflect on whether 
our work helps to answer the question that we had started with: What is needed to make 
Euphrates-Tigris and Rio Grande/Bravo, and engineered rivers in arid lands generally, more 
sustainable? We searched for definitions of sustainability of water resources in general, and of 
engineered rivers in arid lands specifically. Policy reports and research studies guided our quest. 
Our conclusion: Helpful, but a more detailed definition, including numbers, is needed to guide 
policymakers and stakeholders. Here is a short summary of how we proceeded, followed by our 
new definition. 
Initially, sustainability of water resources was not at the center of the sustainability debate, which 
began in earnest with The Limits to Growth (1972) and Our Common Future (1987). This 
changed since the beginning of this century. Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 of the U.N. Conference on 
Environment and Development calls for integrated, watershed-based management with priority 
given to “the satisfaction of basic [human] needs and the safeguarding of ecosystems.”493 The 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Rio+20) contains 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), including a dedicated goal for water and sanitation (SDG 6) that calls for 
“availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all.”494 In April 2016 the 
U.N. Secretary-General and the President of the World Bank appointed ten heads of state and 
government and two special advisors to the High-Level Panel on Water. The group is charged 
with mobilizing action to accelerate the implementation of SDG 6.495 Previously, in 2015, a 
group of 15 countries from all parts of the world launched the Global High Level Panel on Water 
and Peace at a ministerial gathering in Geneva. The mandate of this panel is to propose global 
architecture to transform water from a source of potential crisis to an instrument of cooperation 
and peace.496 
In 1998, the American Society of Civil Engineers published a report entitled Sustainability 
Criteria for Water Resource Systems.497 Their definition of a sustainable water resource was 
further refined by ASCE committee member D. P. Loucks in a UNESCO Hydrology Series 
publication, published in 1999 and also titled Sustainability Criteria for Water Resource 
                                                 
493 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, Chapter 18: “Protection of the Quality and 
Supply of Freshwater Resources,” 1992. 
494 United Nations, “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” 2015, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld. 
495 U.N. News Center, “UN and World Bank chiefs announce members of joint high-level panel on water,” April 
21, 2016,  http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53747#.VyBQOJMrIgo. 
496 Geneva Water Hub, “Global High-Level Panel on Water and Peace Launch,” 2015, https://www.geneva 
waterhub.org/news/global-high-level-panel-water-and-peace-launch. 
497 American Society of Civil Engineers, Sustainability Criteria for Water Resource Systems (Reston, Virginia, 
1998). 
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Systems: “Sustainable water resource systems are those designed and managed to fully contribute 
to the objectives of society, now and in the future, while maintaining their ecological, 
environmental and hydrological integrity.”498 In 2015 ASCE concluded that its suggested 
definition had not had the desired impact: “Somewhat surprisingly, given the urgent stressors 
associated with rising global temperatures and competitive demands on water, definitions of 
sustainability [of water resources] have not been particularly evident in the intervening years.” 
499 Brian Richter proposed specific sustainability principles based on the water management 
approach by the Australian Murray-Darling basin authority. The principles are: build a shared 
vision for your watershed; set limits on consumptive water use; allocate a specific volume to 
each user, then monitor; invest in water conservation; enable trading of water entitlements; 
subsidize reductions in consumption; learn from mistakes or better ideas; and adjust as you go.500 
These are excellent principles. We add this recommendation: Use the calculated yield of river 
water under normal and historical drought conditions as the critical starting point for moving 
reservoir management towards river sustainability. Let us explain by using the example of the 
Amistad-Falcón reservoirs in the Rio Grande/Bravo basin. 
The fundamental problem for engineered basins in arid regions is the time variability in the 
natural water supply, i.e. the river flow. Reservoirs for storage of water are essential in 
engineered basins because of their capability to retain water during surfeit periods for 
distribution during drought. Design and operation of heavily engineered water systems require a 
long period of record (POR) of river flow, either from historical measurements or from long-
term simulations, to meet minimal needs during periods of low river flow or drought. 
Mathematically, these are periods of negative trends in the measure of water availability. 
Drought for a reservoir is defined by a period of declining trend in stored water, called a 
drawdown period.  The dependable yield of a reservoir is the constant volume of withdrawn 
water, met without failure, during the POR.501 This occurs during severe drought, specifically, 
the “drought of record,” also called the “critical drawdown period.” 
An example determination of dependable yield for the reservoirs in the Lower Rio Grande is 
shown in Figure 21.1. The first two estimates of the constant withdrawal clearly bound the 
dependable yield, since the reservoirs meet 200 and 250 million cubic meters per month during 
the time period considered. Yet the latter withdrawal was no longer possible during the drought 
of record in the mid-1950s. Additional approximations within these bounds converge to 229.6 
million cubic meters per as the dependable yield during the critical drawdown period. While 
dependable yield is a theoretical construct, it is the single most important management indicator 
for assessing reservoir performance, and is often used as a basis for allocation of water from a 
                                                 
498 D.P. Loucks and J.S. Gladwell, eds., Sustainability Criteria for Water Resources Systems (UNESCO 
International Hydrology Series, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999), 131.  
499 George F. McMahon, Helene Hilger, and Cristiane Queiroz Surbeck, “Special Issue on Sustainability,” Journal 
of Water Resources Planning and Management, 141(12) (2015), http://ascelibrary.org/doi/full/10.1061/%28ASCE 
%29WR.1943-5452.0000608. 
500 B. Richter, Chasing Water: A Guide for Moving from Scarcity to Sustainability (Island Press, Washington, D.C., 
2014), 140.  
501 R. Linsley and J. Franzini, Water-resources engineering (McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1964); T. 
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reservoir system. We argue that it needs to be carefully monitored and recalculated whenever 
natural or social conditions in the basin reduce water supply or increase water use. Climate 
change and population growth are change factors that need special attention. Based on the 
concept of dependable yield we propose this definition for sustainability of engineered rivers in 
arid lands: 
A reservoir-dominated river in arid lands is sustainable when these conditions are met: 
1. Nature’s water supply, averaged over the period of the most severe drought experienced 
in the historical record, delivers a dependable yield sufficient to meet human and 
ecological needs in the basin. 
2. To prepare for increased water scarcity from either natural or human causes, water 
managers and stakeholders proactively search for ways to use water more efficiently. 
3. Whenever observed or projected changes in the natural system or human actions modify 
river flow, the dependable yield is recalculated, and water managers, after consultation 
with stakeholders, adjust existing rules for water allocation and water use to match the 
new level of dependable yield. 
4. An ecologically prudent level of in-stream flow is maintained or restored. 
Figure 20.1. 
Dependable Yield Calculation (229.6 Million Cubic Meters per Month) for Combined 
Contents of Amistad and Falcón Reservoirs on Rio Grande, in Tandem Operation 
Constant withdrawals in million cubic meters per month, 1945-1960 
   Source: Designed by author George Ward. 
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Following weeks of reflection and debate our team added three sobering comments on obstacles 
that at this time stand in the way to reaching sustainability of engineered rivers in arid lands. 
Management practices: The revised definition of sustainability of water resources given above 
can guide a rational and quantitative approach to sustainable management of a water resource, 
especially that of an engineered river in an arid region. However, each of our four criteria calls 
for a departure from the usual management practices of most river basins. Their application 
requires a willingness of the prevailing management culture to consider changes in their 
traditional operational practices. We invite river management agencies, as well as water 
stakeholders, to adjust their views and procedures so that maintaining, or moving towards, 
sustainability becomes the principal goal for river management. 
Conjunctive management: Sustainable water management requires integrative consideration of 
connections between river water and groundwater. Existing law in some rivers, for example the 
Texas part of the Rio Grande basin, makes this goal difficult to reach. We urge movement 
towards conjunctive management of water resources. 
Water conflicts: Where water becomes the core of, the trigger to, and a weapon in active conflict, 
the goal of sustainable water supply and demand is unattainable. Sustainability of water 
resources requires stability, cooperation, and peace. The sub-state level conflicts and illegal 
control of water resources and water infrastructure in the Euphrates-Tigris deprive people of 
access to sufficient clean water, energy, and food resources in Syria and Iraq. The lack of water 
undermines the search for sustainable development and causes agricultural, economic, and 
political decline. Hence, we argue that the prerequisites for establishing or restoring 
sustainability in a river basin include stability as well as participatory, transparent, inclusive, and 
accountable governance structures. 
Only when these issues are addressed can river managers and stakeholders cope with the 
looming problems of water scarcity, climate change and variation, reservoir sedimentation, 
population growth, economic losses, food security, and ecological damage. 
 
